What is the biggest panic attack in human history?

The conflict between Hitler and the Wehrmacht before and after the largest siege of Kiev in history.

After Hitler came to power, Germany quickly recovered from World War I and became a world power. The comprehensive strength of a country is composed of many aspects. Germany leads the world in industrial manufacturing, military, science and technology and efficiency, but it is short of resources in population, land and natural resources.

Before World War II, Germany faced the problem of aging population. Hitler strongly advocated racial theory and even invented group marriage to stimulate the growth of Aryans. However, before the war, the population of Germany only reached 67 million.

The personal experience of World War I made Hitler unable to endure another war of attrition. Hitler's confidence in launching World War II came from the "Blitzkrieg" theory of German armored forces: Germany invaded Poland, low countries and France, which proved that Blitzkrieg was really invincible.

For the war prediction of conquering Europe and the Soviet Union, Hitler can accept the limit of 2 million troops loss. The generals of the Defence Force were equally optimistic, and the General Staff did not even intend to fight east of the Dnieper River: the Soviet Union should have surrendered by then.

The Battle of Kiev was the largest encirclement and suppression campaign in human history, and the Soviet army lost nearly one million troops and numerous technical weapons, which was also the peak of the blitzkrieg of German armored forces.

The Soviet army could not resist the German blitzkrieg, a large number of troops were wiped out through encirclement, and the army groups in central and northern Germany made rapid progress. The Soviet high command believed that the key point of the German attack was Ukraine, so it deployed seven army groups in Kiev, the Southwest Army and the South Army, under the command of Marshal Boudini.

After the central army group captured Smolensk, it continued to advance eastward, making Kiev a huge protrusion and seriously threatening the south wing of the central army group. Although the German Southern Army Group won some victories, it did not have enough troops to surround and destroy the Soviet troops in Kiev.

1941At the end of August, the German General Command was faced with operational choices: First, it continued to advance to Moscow according to the Barbarossa plan and captured the Soviet capital before the arrival of winter; Second, Shi Li and the southern army group encircled the Kiev Soviet heavy army group to solve their worries.

Hitler's strategic concerns before the siege in Kiev made him persist in launching the siege in Kiev despite the opposition of the defense generals.

Undeniably, in the early stage of the Soviet-German War, Hitler's strategic pattern and vision really surpassed the commander-in-chief of the Army, Blacic, and other national defense generals.

Hitler launched World War II in the form of blitzkrieg, the core of which was to use the rapid blitzkrieg of the air force and armored forces to surround opponents and avoid falling into positional warfare and attrition war similar to World War I.

The most fundamental resource for armored combat is oil. Once there is no oil, the war cannot continue. German generals said that Hitler's concern for oil almost reached the abnormal level, and the early outbreak of the Soviet-German war was due to the Soviet threat to Romanian oil fields.

Germany is not an oil producer. Although the Romanian oil field was occupied, all the oil reserves of the occupying country were wiped out, even the advanced coal-to-oil technology, but with the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, Germany's oil reserves fell sharply.

In World War II, Germans fought almost by counting oil reserves. Hitler relied on armored forces, but because of the lack of oil, the number of armored forces could not meet the needs of combat. The purpose of Hitler's war against the Soviet Union was not only to eliminate the threat of the Soviet Union, but also to obtain oil in the Caucasus.

The occupation of Moscow is not what Hitler is most interested in, but it has a little political significance. Hitler intends to turn it into a reservoir after occupation. The most important thing is to surround the Soviet army in Kiev, open the way for the southern army group and shorten the distance with the Caucasus.

Hitler finally gave the battle order under the repeated opposition of the defense generals, and the two armored army groups of the Central Army Group returned to Kiev to surround the Soviet heavy group there; Then the Germans on the eastern front turned to rest and prepared for the winter.

The generals of the Defence Force are firmly opposed to the latter plan. They thought they would have enough time to surround the Soviet troops in Kiev and then attack Moscow again to ensure that they had enough resources to fight in autumn and winter. Hitler hesitated, but finally gave in and agreed to the Moscow battle plan.

With the convergence of army groups in central and southern Germany, the encirclement of Kiev was formed. Stalin rejected budyonny's request to retreat in front of the camp. As a result of the campaign, the Soviet Southwest Army ceased to exist, and 660,000 Soviet troops laid down their weapons, with a total loss of nearly one million people, while the Germans only lost100000 people.

The encirclement and suppression of Kiev is of far-reaching significance to the Soviet-German war. A wrong decision made Germany bury the bitter fruit of failure in 194 1

After the war, many people criticized Hitler's attempt to annihilate the Soviet troops in Kiev at 194 1, which was a great strategic mistake. This is a misinterpretation and does not understand the real history.

It is the correct military choice for the Central Army Group to surround the Kiev Soviet heavy group and annihilate the effective forces. Similarly, it is understandable to ignore the Soviet troops in Kiev and attack Moscow directly, thus undermining the resistance will and confidence of the Soviet troops.

The last mistake was that Hitler agreed to two completely different plans: the Central Army Group continued to fight in the autumn after Kiev was surrounded and attacked Moscow again. This decision caused a series of disastrous consequences:

The German General Staff did not expect that the muddy roads in autumn were more terrible than the climate in the Soviet Union in winter. Heavy equipment is trapped in mud several meters thick, and the mud rolled up by the crawler can be as high as 5 or 6 meters, and only a few tracked vehicles can pass through. Mud devoured almost all armored units and heavy artillery of the Central Army Group, and some armored divisions lost as much as 90%. At the beginning of the battle of Moscow, the Germans did not pull a heavy artillery to the front.

The transportation capacity of the Eastern Railway is all used to transport the equipment, accessories and arms urgently needed by the road maintenance and armored forces, which leads to the German winter combat materials, such as winter clothes, being thrown on the platform and warehouse and unable to be transported. Many people think that Germans failed because they didn't prepare winter clothes. This is a historical joke. Is there no cold winter in Germany? Germans don't wear winter clothes in winter?

When winter came, the Germans got better: the roads hardened, and the armored forces and heavy artillery that survived in the mud went to the front. The most fatal thing is that the Germans did not prepare antifreeze for armored vehicles and antifreeze for firearms, which led to the collapse of the Central Military Group.

194 1 is particularly cold in winter. Not only the Germans, but also the Soviets suffered heavy casualties due to the cold, but few soldiers on both sides really froze to death. A large number of Germans used local materials and requisitioned cotton-padded clothes from garment factories and residents.

The truth is that when the Soviet army counterattacked in winter, the Germans lacked antifreeze oil for armored vehicles and firearms: German tanks and armored vehicles could not be started, and a few tanks capable of fighting burned straw in the chassis day and night; The soldier's rifle bolt won't open; The troops left their positions and ran to the residents' homes to keep warm, which led to the collapse of the entire Central Army Group.

Hitler dismissed Blauchic, the commander-in-chief of the army who had made a mistake, but began a bigger nightmare for the Germans.

In order to get Hitler to agree to the Moscow campaign plan, brauchitsch brought two German soldiers wearing winter uniforms and assured Hitler that all frontline soldiers could wear the same clothes. Hitler agreed to the autumn and winter campaign plan.

In fact, many of Hitler's military decisions at the beginning of the war were correct, such as encircling the Soviet troops in Kiev and annihilating the effective forces; Stop the winter war and transfer troops to rest; Stick to Zhelev's defense line and avoid the collapse of the whole Central Military Group.

The battle of Moscow caused the Germans to lose 500,000 elites, and the equipment and military technicians of the two armored army groups, the Central Army on which Hitler lived, were almost completely lost and suffered heavy losses.

After the Battle of Moscow, Hitler flew into a rage when he learned the real situation, and dismissed brauchitsch as the commander-in-chief of the army. From then on, the Germans began a bigger nightmare: Hitler no longer believed in the generals of the National Defence Force and personally served as the commander-in-chief of the German army and the commander-in-chief of the Eastern Front.

After 1942 was fully supplemented and strengthened, the Germans on the Eastern Front recovered their vitality. This time, Hitler, commander-in-chief of the army, put the attack direction on the southern line completely according to his own imagination: for the sake of Caucasus oil, move forward!

Hitler and the generals of the National Defence Force fully considered the disadvantages of population and oil before the war, but ignored the huge territorial advantages of the Soviet Union.

Hitler attached great importance to Germany's population and oil disadvantages compared with the Soviet Union, but like the national defense generals, he did not take into account the greater advantages of the Soviet Union: unparalleled advantages in land and resources.

The Soviet Union has more than 20 million square kilometers of land, equivalent to more than 60 Germany. When the Germans marched in the East, the distance between the three army groups was getting farther and farther, and there was no joint operation between them. At the same time, the German supply lines on the Eastern Front are getting longer and longer.

Not only that, the Soviet Union has the worst weather and the worst roads in the world, which is unimaginable for young staff officers who stay in Germany. The marching route they drew on the battle map and the marching speed they calculated were not completed by front-line officers and soldiers.

The Soviet-German war completely subverted people's previous understanding of war.

The Soviet-German war is the biggest war of mankind, which completely subverts people's previous understanding of war, that is, the soldiers are expensive but not many; Quality advantage will definitely overcome quantity advantage, and this military theory has been reflected in all previous wars of mankind.

The German army, which has the advantages of weapon quality, military quality and war concept, is so pale and powerless in the face of a larger number of Soviet troops and weapons: the huge territory, resources, population and industrial machine tools of the Soviet Union, as well as the continuous military aid, have made the quality advantage of the German army disappear.

It was not until the end of 1943 that Hitler woke up, ordered Germany to enter the wartime system, and issued a general mobilization order for national defense, so that the number of German armed forces reached10.46 million. However, it is too late, and any increase in troops will not change the number disadvantage of the Germans. On some defense lines, the ratio of German troops to Soviet troops is as high as 1 26.

The original article of the University Library of Alcohol and Tobacco, thank you for your praise and attention.