Chu Yunfei’s life

I recently read "General Su Yu" and found that the East China Field Army never dealt a serious blow to Hu Lian's reorganized 11th Army. Instead, it suffered a lot. Later, a friend said that "Bringing the Sword" hit Chu Yunfei's prototype is Hu Lian, so he became interested in him. I found an article on the Internet and discussed it with you.

"About Mao Zedong's comment on Hu Lian (18th Army)" "Cunning as a fox, fierce as a fox" Research on the theory of "like a tiger"

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As for the theory of "as cunning as a fox", because Hu Lian was extremely alert and cunning in his military use, and at the same time his name Hu Lian homophoned "fox", especially It is the dialect of Northern Jiangsu of the Central China Field Army, and is more similar to fox. Therefore, Huaye and Zhongye called Hu Lian a fox. When the 11th Division marched into Nanma, Nanma posted slogans everywhere, "Catch the fox alive" and "Break and eat the hard walnut of the 11th Division." After the Battle of Nanma, Huaye's 9th Column suffered heavy casualties (more than 4,600 casualties) and did not make any progress. Xu Shiyou called Su Yu and said: "Hu Lian, this cunning fox,... next This time I will cut him into pieces." (Page 279 of "The Third Field Army's Campaign" by Ding Bingsheng), which is completely consistent with Mao Zedong's cunning as a fox.

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About the theory of "fierce as a tiger": In the Battle of Zhang Fengji, the 3rd, 6th and 7th columns in the middle field besieged the entire 32nd Regiment of the 11th Division for five days. After five nights, the battle was finally tied, with more than 3,600 casualties in the middle and field. Liu Bochengai sacrificed his life, including Wu Daming, commander of the 19th Brigade of the 3rd Column and 7th Column, and Yao Pitian, the political commissar of the 21st Regiment of the 3rd Column and 7th Brigade. The 32nd Regiment of the 11th Division suffered more than 2,700 casualties. The 32nd Regiment did not want to retreat. Because the 1st Battalion Commander Niu Zhenjiang led two companies to break through and evacuate without authorization, the regiment commander Zhang Muxian had to withdraw with the remaining troops. In the Battle of Nanma in Shandong, Huaye concentrated five columns, one of which was for reinforcements. The four columns plus three regiments from the Central Shandong Military Region attacked Nanma for 5 days and 5 nights. They only annihilated one regiment of the 11th Division and suffered more than 10,000 casualties. A large number of soldiers including Qin Xian'an, political commissar of the 2nd and 5th Division, Hu Dabing, deputy commander of the 18th Regiment of the 6th Division, and Wei Ziqiang, chief of the Organization Section of the Political Department of the 4th Division, died. The 11th Division is indeed as fierce as a tiger. After the 11th Division entered the Dabie Mountains, this tiger became even more majestic, sweeping through the middle and field. The middle and field were not only highly vigilant, but almost did not dare to engage in battle. Except in Beixiangdian, in order to protect Comrade Liu Bocheng and the central and field command organization, they had to fight for a while. Fight, and avoid the rest if you can (tend to avoid them).

When the 18th Brigade of the 11th Division encountered the Zhongye 1st Column and the Zhongye Command Organization in Beixiangdian, the main force of the 11th Division and the 10th Division came from Longsheng Town and Xuanhuadian to encircle them. The People's Liberation Army saw that the situation was unfavorable. , the 1st Column broke out from Zhaiheji and headed north on the Yuexinhuang Highway. Comrade You Wanchuan, the chief of staff of the 19th Brigade of the 1st Column, died in the battle with the 11th Division.

For example, in December 1947, Chen Su and Chen Xie's armies besieged Queshan, and the middle and field troops attacked for reinforcements. On December 31, the 118th Brigade, the leading force of the 11th Division, exchanged fierce fire with the 1st Column in Songdian, northwest of Zhengyang. The 1st Column could not stop the 11th Division's attack and suffered heavy casualties. The 11th Division approached Queshan, and Su Yu had to attack on the 31st. The Queshan battle ended in the evening.

Another example is that the 20th Brigade, the absolute main force of the 1st Zhongye Column (equivalent to a division, under the jurisdiction of the Zhongye Column), encountered the 11th Division in Bao Xinji on January 10, 1948, and suffered heavy losses, including A main force battalion with more than 400 people was wiped out. At that time, the political commissar and deputy brigade commander of the 20th Brigade heard that the 11th Division was coming, and they insisted on retreating and not fighting. The brigade commander Wu Zhong was determined to fight, and a fight produced such a result. Many cadres heard that the 11th Division was coming and took the lead in escaping. They were later sentenced to death by military courts. (See page 240 of "Wu Zhong, a General in One Hundred Battles".)

Another example is the Zhongye 2nd Column, which kept avoiding the 11th Division in the Dabie Mountains. (See pages 173-192 of "Chen Zaidao's Memoirs".) Basically, it was a process of chasing, fighting, and encircling the 11th Division.

There is also the 6th Zhongye Column, which basically adopts the policy of avoiding the 11th Division if possible. However, on January 16, 1948, the 11th Division suddenly surrounded the 6th Zhongye Column camping in Wangjiadian. The artillery company of the 18th Brigade (also the first-class main force in the field) lost two mountain cannons and ran away, easily giving the two mountain cannons to the enemy. When the brigade commander Xiao Yongyin heard that the entire 11th Division was coming, he abandoned the brigade's direct team, including the Political Department, The supply department, health department and dozens of wounded people in the town immediately retreated, leaving all 300 people captured. Wei Jie, the deputy commander of the 6th Column, asked to rescue these comrades, but Xiao Yongyin still retreated at all costs, finally saving the 18th Brigade. Wangjiadian has become a pain that will never be erased.

Most of the captured personnel were cadres of our army, including two regiment-level officers, Zhang Yufeng, director of the supply department, and Hu Zheng, a reporter accompanying the army. Because of the lack of direction in the Dabie Mountains, the 11th Division could not find its way in the Dabie Mountains because of the lack of direction in the field.

In response to various circumstances at that time, Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Li Da, and Zhang Jichun jointly issued instructions to the heads of each column on January 31, 1948, and reported them to the Central Military Commission, pointing out: "And there are still many cadres. It is an extremely shameful behavior of the People's Liberation Army to fail to take control of the troops and fight against the enemy in times of danger, either alone or with a few people to escape." (See page 241 of "Generals in Hundred Battles—Wu Zhong.")

By the way. Mention, Wu Zhong led the 1st Column 20th Brigade, which was the absolute main force in the middle and field, often protecting Comrade Bocheng. After liberation, Wu Zhong served as the garrison commander of the Beijing Military Region. During the counterattack against Vietnam, he commanded the Southern Group troops of the Guangzhou Military Region. He made a comprehensive, objective and true evaluation of the entire 11th Division from the perspective of the opponent and the People's Liberation Army. He truly recorded the history at that time and it is a rare and valuable information. To study the Liberation War and the 11th Division, you must read " "Wu Zhong, General in Hundred Wars", this book is indeed a rare and precious information in the past years. Page 248 of "Wu Zhong, a General in Hundred Battles" comments on the 18th Army. Wu Zhong said, "The troops of the Northwest Army fought fiercely, and the troops of the Guangxi Army fought cunningly. Among Chiang's direct troops, the one who left the deepest impression on Wu Zhong was Reorganize the 11th Division."

He said: "Other units of the Kuomintang may be better in some aspects, but the 11th Division is indeed the strongest unit in terms of overall combat effectiveness. The officers' tactical literacy and the technical level of the soldiers are relatively high, so it is difficult to deal with them."

On the contrary, the big losers among the national army generals, such as Tang Enbo, Hu Zongnan and others, rejected them. He was extremely jealous and often slandered and attacked him. Few people praised him. How could the national army remain undefeated? In order to support the critical situation on the battlefields in northern Shaanxi and Shandong, Liu and Deng's armies had to make heavy sacrifices, attack on the Dabie Mountains, surround Wei and rescue Zhao, and attract enemy troops from Shandong and northern Shaanxi to return for reinforcements. However, the situation in the middle and field was extremely severe and difficult. In the Guangxi Clan Fighting in the base area has no rear support, and the replenishment of weapons, ammunition, food, soldiers, etc. is problematic. The wounded in the battle cannot be resettled, so the situation is dangerous. It is by no means a strategic counterattack, nor is it like Gaoshanpu, which has been repeatedly promoted in the past few decades. Zhangjiadian was so glorious and so easy, it was just a few victories in the Dabie Mountains. Beginning in November 1947, Bai Chongxi concentrated 33 brigades on a concentric siege. The situation was always dangerous and activities were divided into parts. Among them, 3 vertical brigades were once dispersed into battalions and companies for activities. In this case, it was impossible to concentrate the absolute superior force. To fight a war of annihilation, we can only engage in guerrilla actions.

The main reason for this situation is the 11th Division, the 7th Army, and the 48th Army. Among them, the 11th Division poses the greatest threat. The latest information recently disclosed mentions this issue, which is very precious. Seeing the situation at that time, Liu Deng reported to the Military Commission in January 1948; "We are under the pressure of several strong enemy divisions and unable to fight, so we can only disperse our activities... But if this continues, the troops will continue to weaken and their morale will continue to weaken. "It will be greatly affected. Local work will continue to be greatly damaged. This situation is very unfavorable. Please consider the instructions of the Military Commission." He also continued to appeal to the Military Commission to help the neighboring troops to attract and transfer the 11th Division. The report is as follows: "We The current situation is that the troops are extremely insufficient and ammunition is gradually becoming difficult. Without the help of friendly neighbors, at least all the 11th Division (Hu Lian) will be transferred, and it will be difficult to gather the troops... and when they are dispersed, the enemy will take divisions as units. I have lost a lot of strength in the past two months due to my scattered travel and fighting. If this continues, my morale will be greatly affected, my combat power will be further weakened, and I will be extremely passive. The situation is particularly disadvantageous. Changing this disadvantageous situation depends on the assistance of friendly neighbors and the early arrival of new troops." From the above, it can be seen how serious the threat posed by the 11th Division to Liu and Deng's army in the Dabie Mountains was.

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Judging from the writing style of this notice, it is completely Mao Zedong’s writing style. The strategic thinking is absolutely in line with Mao Zedong's idea of ??concentrating superior forces to attack weak enemies first. The entire 11th Division is one of the four bones of the enemy in the Central Plains. Su Yu said: "The enemies in the Central Plains have four "bones": the 5th Army, the 18th Army, the 7th Army, and the 48th Army." (See page 361 of "Su Yu's Military Collected Works") Enemies like this should be avoided Of.

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Echoing Mao Zedong’s collected works, every time he fought in the Central Plains, Mao Zedong always emphasized the need to hold back the 18th Army and restrain it from joining the battlefield. He was very serious about it. Scruples, there are 7 telegrams specifically targeting the 18th Army and Hu Lian in "Mao Zedong's Military Collected Works", such as "Confining the enemy's 11th Division and other units to facilitate the rest and reorganization of Liu and Deng's main force", "The main task of Chen Xi's coalition is to suppress the 18th Army", "Suppressing the enemy's 18th Army to ensure the victory of the Sui Army", "Do not allow the enemy's 18th Army to cross Suiqi County within a week", "Measures to deal with Hu Lian and Zhang Zhen's northward advance", "Agree with Liu, Chen and Deng to annihilate Hu Lianyi" Ministry", "Asking whether the 1st, 3rd and 2nd Columns can go west to join the war", etc. Think about it, which enemy general attracted so much attention from Mao and mentioned it so many times? What does this mean?

After reading it carefully, Fan Renwen is undoubtedly reliable. The author takes a neutral stance, trying to objectively and truly reflect history, and pay tribute to those who were involved in these battles decades ago. After all, they all fought and even died for their beliefs. We people in peaceful times will never be able to reach this state. If some people are dissatisfied because it reflects the truth, then I apologize