70 years have passed, it’s time to explain clearly the battle of the 180th Division of the Volunteer Army

The defeat of the 180th Division is an eternal pain for the Volunteer Army. But what I want to say is that 70 years have passed since 1951, and it’s time to clear their names. This article does not talk about personnel or responsibilities, but only talks about the battlefield situation to restore the historical achievements of all the soldiers of the 180th Division. Because if we talk about personnel matters and responsibility, this issue will never be clear.

During World War II, the U.S. military’s attack speed in offensive campaigns averaged 5 to 10 kilometers per day. This figure dropped significantly when facing volunteers in the Korean War. During the period of mobile warfare, the US military's attack speed in offensive campaigns averaged 1.3 to 3 kilometers per day. During the period of positional warfare, when the Volunteer Army had no tunnel fortifications, the U.S. Army faced the Volunteer Army's solid defensive positions. The attack speed during the offensive campaign was an average of 0.5 to 1 kilometer per day. With tunnel works, this figure is zero.

It can be seen that when the US military attacked the volunteers at its strongest, it could advance an average of 3 kilometers per day. This stage was the fifth battle transfer stage.

In the 19 days from May 23 to June 10 during the transfer phase of the fifth battle, the US military advanced 55 kilometers in attack, an average of 3 kilometers per day. highest level. However, it should be noted that in the first 9 days, the US military attacked and advanced about 45 kilometers, and in the next 10 days, the US military attacked and advanced about 10 kilometers. In other words, the US military was able to advance an average of 5 kilometers per day in the first 9 days, but in the next 10 days, it could only advance an average of 1 kilometer per day.

Advancing 1 kilometer every day is actually equivalent to the defensive battle in the autumn of 1951, when the US military faced the strong defensive positions of the volunteers. This period of time was when the Hwacheon Blockade and Cheorwon Blockade were ongoing, and of course other blockades were also included.

In other words, in the Cheorwon Blockade and Hwacheon Blockade, the Volunteer Army used temporary field fortifications to establish a pre-prepared and solid position.

On May 19, 1951, Ridgway flew to South Korea and met at the 10th Army Command Post with Commander Van Fleet, Commander of the 8th U.S. Army, Hogg, Commander of the 9th Army, and Commander of the 10th Army Almond. After the meeting, Ridgway issued an order:

The 8th Army should launch an offensive on May 20, with the 10th Army on the right, to prevent the Volunteers from breaking through on the right, and to coordinate with the 9th Army's right-wing troops to launch a counterattack , the right wing of the 9th Army is protected by the 10th Army.

The 9th Army was in the middle, attacking and seizing the high ground to the west of the Chuncheon Basin.

The 1st Army is on the left wing, attacking along the axis from Seoul to Cheorwon, and is responsible for protecting the left wing of the 9th Army.

It can be seen from Ridgway's order that the U.S. military's style of play is still the standard Ridgway style of fighting, lining up in a row, advancing hand in hand, and moving forward step by step. If we follow Li Qiwei's style of play, this "history" of the transfer stage of the fifth battle will not be controversial. This style of play is not afraid of the volunteers at all, and can even be said to be a gift to the volunteers.

However, before the U.S. military actually turned to the counterattack, at Van Fleet's insistence, it changed its deployment: a large part of the Hwacheon Reservoir was assigned to the 9th Army. The 10th inserted into the northeast direction to pursue the retreating Volunteer Army and People's Army. The Korean 1st Corps advanced north along the coastline, and then attacked northwest.

It is very obvious that Van Fleet's style of play is a typical Volunteer Army style of play. The U.S. 10th Army is a frontal attack force, the Korean 1st Army detours around the flanks, and is responsible for flank attacks. The U.S. 9th Army is an interspersed and divided force, responsible for cutting off the connection between the Volunteer Army's 3rd Corps and 9th Corps, and cutting off the 9th Corps and the 9th Corps. The "Golden" group of the People's Army retreated and was responsible for blocking. In this way, the U.S. 9th Army, the 10th Army, and the Korean 1st Army will form an encirclement network against the Volunteer Army's 9th Army Corps and the People's Army's "Golden" Group.

However, the Hwachuan Blockade of the 58th Division of the 20th Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army blocked the US 7th Division and the Korean 6th Division, which were responsible for intervening, making Van Fleet's plan to block the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the People's Army. The retreat troops could not be deployed, and the plan went bankrupt. The picture above is a battle diagram of the 27th Army in the transfer stage of the fifth battle.

Let’s look at the battle situation map drawn by the US military on May 19 below. Taken together, it is very obvious that after the US 9th Army captures Hwachuan and moves to the northeast, it will completely block the 9th Corps and the People’s Army’s “Golden” Group. retreat. Regarding the Huachuan Blockade, see the US military commander setting a perfect trap, Peng Dehuai suffered a loss, and a division commander found a way to crack it

So, what is the relationship between the Huachuan Blockade and the 180th Division? The relationship is very big.

Although from May 23 to June 10, the U.S. military advanced 55 kilometers in a full-line attack, the average was 3 kilometers per day, and it did not necessarily mean 3 kilometers per day.

Let’s examine the situation of the 180th Division in the center line of the battle. By the way, let’s talk about the 179th Division.

The U.S. Army’s 9th Army was on the center line. After launching a counterattack on May 23, it entered Huachuan on May 27. Then the 58th Division of the 20th Army of the Volunteer Army launched the famous Huachuan Blockade. In 13 days, the U.S. 9th Army only advanced 10 kilometers.

The South Korean 6th Division was approximately 48.6 kilometers away from Hwacheon on May 23, and the US 7th Division was approximately 41 kilometers away from Hwacheon. In other words, the two troops attacked and advanced more than 40 kilometers in only 5 days. It seems that the attack is rapid, but in fact there are many articles in it.

According to Li Qiwei’s initial deployment, the US and South Korean military units were heading straight north. The 60th Army actually only had to face the US 7th Division. As Van Fleet changed Ridgway's plan, the focus of the US 9th Army moved eastward. The 60th Army of the Volunteer Army needed to face the entire US 9th Army, namely the US 7th and 24th Divisions, and the Korean 2nd and 6th Divisions. group. See the picture above for the battlefield situation. This picture is the picture that can clearly see the fighting situation of the 180th Division. I have also marked it in the picture to make it clearer.

On the surface, the 60th Army is one army. In fact, the 179th Division is assigned to the 15th Army, the 181st Division is assigned to the 12th Army, and I only have one 180th Division. The other two divisions were not ordered to return to construction until the Volunteer Army withdrew northward. The 179th Division was not far away, but the 181st Division was far away. It did not return to formation until the 26th.

Therefore, the 60th Army only has two divisions to fight against the two US divisions and two South Korean divisions of the US 9th Army. In addition to being at an absolute disadvantage in terms of firepower, they were also at an absolute disadvantage in terms of military strength, with more than 16,000 men versus more than 45,000 enemy troops, a strength ratio of nearly 1:3.

We can imagine that without the 179th Division and the 180th Division of the 60th Army, the 7th Division of the 9th U.S. Army and the 6th Division of the Korean Army could reach Hwacheon within one day, that is, 5 January 24th.

In real history, the 181st Division took a similar path to the 12th Army, and rushed to Huachuan on the evening of the 26th; the 12th Army followed the 181st Division, and the Military Headquarters and the 35th Division passed through Huachuan. The division is still behind; while the 12th Army passed through Hwachuan, the 59th Division of the 20th Army passed through Hwachuan. On the 27th, the 58th Division passed through Huachuan and found that Huachuan had been occupied by the US military, so they took the initiative to stop and block the attack.

If Hwachuan is occupied by the enemy on May 24, the 12th Army, 20th Army, and 27th Army of the 9th Corps, the 181st Division of the 3rd Corps, and the People's Army "Golden" Group will basically be surrounded by the US military. The whole army was destroyed.

People who don’t understand military affairs will tell me that even if the 180th Division delayed the US military for 5 days, it would have lost the battle after all.

As mentioned before, if Ridgway's plan is followed, the 180th Division and the 179th Division only need to deal with one US 7th Division. According to Van Fleet's plan, the 180th Division and the 179th Division only need to deal with the US 7th Division and the Korean 6th Division.

In these two situations, the US military cannot defeat the 180th Division.

But history is often made up of many coincidental details. Originally, the front of the 63rd Army was the Korean 6th Division. According to Van Fleet's plan, the Korean 2nd Division and the US 24th Division should take over from the Korean 6th Division and continue to attack the 63rd Army. Because Fu Chongbi, commander of the 63rd Army, felt that he was in danger of being interspersed, divided and surrounded by US troops, he jumped out of the US military encirclement and retreated north. In this way, the US 24th Division and the Korean 2nd Division had no obstacles in front of them, and they directly detoured to the right side of the 180th Division.

Originally, the front of the 180th Division was the US 7th Division. During the daytime battles on May 23 and 24, under the brave resistance of the 538th and 539th Regiments of the 180th Division, the US 7th Division only advanced. 2 kilometers.

However, because the US 24th Division bypassed the 180th Division and captured the 540th Regiment's Seonghuangdang position, the 180th Division faced the situation of being divided on the south bank of the Bukhan River. The 180th Division could only withdraw north. Continue to block the attack on the north bank of Bukhan River.

When the 538th and 539th regiments of the 180th Division were on the south bank of the Beihan River, they were about 5 kilometers away from the Beihan River. The first-line positions of Jiguanshan and Chenghuangtang on the north bank of the Beihan River occupied by the 540th Regiment were about 6.6 kilometers away from the Beihan River. After the 538th and 539th regiments withdrew north, in order to be level with the 540th regiment, the US military could smoothly advance 11 kilometers.

But there is another problem. For some reason, the 15th Army did not receive the order to stop the attack on the spot issued by the 3rd Army on the 23rd and has left the Chuncheon area. Therefore, the US 7th Division did not completely follow and pursue the 180th Division. Instead, it took advantage of the gap left by the 15th Army to attack in the northeast direction. Only one division continued to contact the 180th Division. The Korean 6th Division moved eastward and took over the task of continuing the frontal attack on the 180th Division.

If there were not this huge gap, the 179th Division could fight and retreat side by side with the 180th Division, and the two divisions could form a whole. The 179th Division can stand alone against the US 7th Division. The situation of the 180th Division is a little worse. In addition to confronting the Korean 6th Division in the front, it also has to take care of the U.S. 24th Division and the Korean 2nd Division on its flank. But at least the 179th Division will not be easily defeated by the US 7th Division, and the left wing of the 180th Division is guaranteed.

However, this huge gap makes it difficult for the 179th Division to fight and retreat at a speed that can match the speed of the US mechanized troops. As a result, the 179th Division has been fighting the US 7th Division without being able to gain a foothold. The situation is as follows. Become very passive.

However, in a desperate situation, the 180th Division showed a tenacious fighting style. As the US 24th Division detoured its way back, it fought fiercely with the US 24th Division, the first part of the 7th Division, and the Korean 6th Division. It only retreated from the Jiguan Mountain line to the Beipei Mountain and Jiade Mountain lines. About 3.5 kilometers. In other words, the US 9th Army only advanced 3.5 kilometers in attack on the front of the 180th Division on the 24th and 25th.

But the situation of the 179th Division is not optimistic. Why did the US 7th Division move eastward? One reason is to take the road to take advantage of mobility. The 179th Division and the US 7th Division have always been in a situation where we are surrounded by the enemy and we are surrounded by the enemy. If we move a step slower, we will be surrounded. In such a battle, there is no way to stabilize the position and organize a defense.

On the morning of the 26th, the Mapingli position of the 179th Division, about 7.6 kilometers north-east behind the 180th Division, was captured by the 17th Regiment of the 7th Division of the US Army. The US 24th Division also captured Tanganli, about 9 kilometers north-west behind the 180th Division, on the 26th. The 180th Division's retreat was completely cut off. However, the main force of the US 24th Division, the main force of the Korean 6th Division and the first part of the US 7th Division in front of the 180th Division still failed to make much progress. The 180th Division still maintained its front-line position in Gaideoksan. In other words, the US military attacked and advanced only 5 kilometers from May 24 to May 26 on the front of the 180th Division. What needs to be explained here is that the battlefield situation at that time was completely crisscrossed. The leading troops of the US 7th Division had passed through Mapingli and were fighting with the 535th and 537th Regiments of the 179th Division at Yuanchuanli and Changjuli, about 8 kilometers away from Huachuan. . From south to north, the 180th Division and the 179th Division were surrounded by US and South Korean troops, and the enemy and ourselves were completely mixed together. When studying the 180th Division, it is best to make the time points accurate to the hour, but this cannot be completed without tens of thousands of words. This article only discusses attack speed, so it can only be omitted.

The 179th Division and the 180th Division have different tasks. The 179th Division is only blocking, so after the fall of Mapingli, the 179th Division immediately moved to Shicangli, otherwise the US 24th Division would destroy their retreat. cut off. The 180th Division was responsible for covering the transfer of the wounded, so they could only hold on.

In fact, we can see that even when being detoured by the U.S. military, the 180th Division still only allowed the U.S. military to attack an average of 1.66 kilometers per day, which was far lower than the U.S. average of 3.0 kilometers in the fifth battle. Kilometers of attack speed.

After occupying Mapingli, the US 17th Regiment continued its assault on Huachuan on the 27th. At this time, the distance was about 17.6 kilometers. By noon on the 27th, the US military occupied Huachuan. Fortunately, the 58th Division of the 20th Army arrived at Hwachuan at this time and took the initiative to join the battle, stopping the rapid advance of the US military.

The 180th Division had several opportunities to retreat north to get out of trouble. Books about the 180th Division and the memoirs of 180th Division members all believe that this is the key to avoiding failure.

However, the division commander Zheng Qigui always insisted on executing the orders from his superiors and stopped the attack on the spot. Blocking on the spot is a dead end. Everyone in the 180th Division knew it from top to bottom. All division-level cadres and political commissars of each regiment proposed withdrawing north. However, in the end, the 180th Division Party Committee held a meeting to study and decided to stay where they were and fight.

If the 180th Division does not persist in blocking the attack, the US military will be able to reach Huachuan as soon as the 24th, and as late as the 26th. Mapingli was lost on the morning of the 26th. If the 180th Division was not still behind to contain the US military, the US military could have directly attacked Huachuan.

No matter it is the 24th, 25th or 26th, at this time point, no troops of the 9th Corps can reach Huachuan. The 9th Corps and the People's Army "Golden" Group, which have run out of food, will be 100% surrounded by US troops, and no troops can rescue them. The U.S. military doesn't even need to attack, hunger can bring down these hundreds of thousands of troops.

Therefore, I have always disagreed with the statement "the 180th Division suffered a disastrous defeat". The 180th Division was indeed defeated, but it was not a disastrous defeat. What is a fiasco? If there are mistakes in command, problems in judgment, and improper handling of the situation, it is true that the enemy cannot be defeated. This is called a disastrous defeat. Some people will tell me that the 180th Division lost three to four thousand men, so how could it not be a disastrous defeat? Then you can check the casualties of various units in the volunteer army's previous blocking battles, as well as the specific losses of the 3rd Corps' fifth battle, and then tell me. This article does not list data to avoid being used by people with ulterior motives.

The 180th Division did not make any mistakes except for the questionable dispersion during the final breakout. The entire division knows that staying to block the attack is a dead end. Who in the 180th Division doesn't know this? So why do they stay? This is the characteristic of the People's Liberation Army. There are always troops who take the initiative to sacrifice. The 180th Division was unwilling to sacrifice and ran away. What about the troops in the process of transfer? Especially what to do with the wounded? And what about the 9th Corps and the People's Army "Golden" Group?

In fact, this is it, either the 180th Division will die, or the wounded and the 9th Corps will be finished. This is a multiple choice question with only two options! The 180th Division finally chose to resolutely execute the order and die on its own.

This is not called a disastrous defeat, this is sacrificing oneself and taking the overall situation into consideration.

The person who threw the grenade was the US platoon leader Barnes. Facing the 180th Division, the US infantry still performed poorly. The soldiers hid aside, but the platoon leader was fighting bravely. After the disastrous defeat in the second battle, the U.S. military added a large number of veterans. These company commanders and platoon commanders were the backbone, and these people were also the main force in the subsequent battles. Without supplementing these World War II veterans, the combat effectiveness of the US infantry will be even weaker.

This article does not go into detail. It just briefly talks about the attack speed of the US military offensive campaign. The time to truly discuss the 180th Division may not be mature yet. But as a researcher of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, I call for a re-examination of the issue of the 180th Division. Our military has always been very strict, which is understandable given the war years and previous historical background. For example, the leader of the 180th Regiment mentioned in the previous Shuimenqiao article died in Huangcaoling. The summary of the 20th Army praised him, but still made very severe criticism.

But the situation is different now. We can re-examine this period of history and be more peaceful. There is no doubt that the 180th Division lost. However, the defeat of the 180th Division was a sacrifice for the overall situation, and this must be taken seriously.

Is it too one-sided to simply look at the defeat without seeing the role played by the 180th Division? Should we change our thinking? This article does not talk about personnel matters or responsibilities. These things cannot be discussed clearly, but battlefield situation maps will never lie.

Preserve your troops and you will be praised. If the troops suffer losses, they will be criticized. So if your own troops suffer losses in order to preserve other troops, should you be praised or criticized? The consequence of Commander Zheng Qigui's resolute execution of his superiors' orders was that he suffered losses and other troops were spared.

Many people accused Zheng Qigui of mechanically executing orders from his superiors, not understanding changes, and not daring to "reject foreign military orders." This is a big joke. You can't just think about yourself. The 180th Division can indeed run away. There are several opportunities. But as long as the 180th Division escapes, the 9th Corps will definitely be doomed. Therefore, this is not called mechanically executing orders from superiors, but resolutely executing orders from superiors.

This is party spirit, absolute loyalty to the party, taking the initiative, having the courage to take responsibility, not being afraid of difficulties, and daring to sacrifice.