War evaluation of Leiyang campaign

A rebuttal argument about a company defeating a department

The composition of this article has gone far beyond history itself and can only be regarded as a novel. Before ascertaining the facts, we must first correct a simple mistake in the above article, that is, the "Laiyang" in the above article is the mistake of "Leiyang" in Hunan, otherwise we can't go together at all. In fact, this simple common-sense mistake is not the author's slip of the pen on the Internet, but when he copied some reportage, he copied their mistakes together (for example, Mao Zedong and Lin Biao published by Inner Mongolia People's Publishing House was written as Laiyang).

It is groundless to say that Zhu De and Chen Yi retreated in a hurry and didn't have time to inform Lin Biao Company. In fact, some reportage writers confused the events between April 65438 and February 65438. 1April, 928, Guangxi army attacked Leiyang, Yongxing, Yizhang and other counties on a large scale, and Zhu De and Chen Yi assembled their main forces in Leiyang countryside and retreated hastily. Due to time constraints, it is too late to inform all localities. In some areas, the agricultural army and some main forces (such as Yongxing, which has a main platoon and an independent regiment) suffered great losses. [5]1928 Division had informed Zhu De and others in advance that the temporary evacuation was carried out according to the plan, and there was no such thing as "Zhu and Chen hastily contracted the skirmishers and led the main force to retreat without resistance" and "informed a company led by Lin Biao in advance". The attack time of Li Yixuan Division was around February 25th and 26th 1928 (Bai Chongxi sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek in the Archives of the Republic of China in March 1 year, saying that the troops had invaded Leiyang on March 26th), and Zhu and Chen's main forces were in Leiyang county at that time, and after "two dozen Leiyang", they moved to Leiyang countryside, namely. At that time, Zhu De, Chen Yi, Wang, Deng Zonghai, secretary of Leiyang County Party Committee, Liu Tai, chairman of the county Soviet, and Chairman of the Military Commission decided to avoid the enemy and save their strength after a military meeting, so they left Leiyang voluntarily. [6] At this point, there are still many articles and documents that can be verified, such as Memories from Nanchang to Jinggangshan with Comrade Zhu De [7], Nanchang Uprising edited by Xiao Ke, Roar at the Aohe River edited by Leiyang County Committee [8] and Historical Draft of Southern Hunan Uprising written by Li Asphalt. According to historical records, before the Battle of Aoshan Temple, Lin Biao Company was not in Aoshan Temple, but stationed at the blast furnace nozzle [9].

The enemy who attacked Aoshan Temple was a battalion, not a regiment.

Zhao Rong said in the memory of "Following Comrade Zhu De from Nanchang to Jinggangshan": "More than 400 enemies ... most of them were killed". "Roar at the Aohe River" compiled by Leiyang County Committee said: "More than 500 people from Enemy East Road arrived at Xiaojiangkou along leishui this morning". Nanchang Uprising, edited by Xiao Ke, said: "More than 400 people were annihilated and a large number of weapons and ammunition were seized", and Li Asphalt and others. Even in the book Mao Zedong and Lin Biao fabricated by Inner Mongolia People's Publishing House, it is pointed out that the enemy is a battalion, not a regiment. In my opinion, the real enemy attacking Leiyang is a division of Li Yixuan, the 19th Army of the enemy of Guangxi, with only one regiment in total. Two battalions occupied Leiyang County (West Road), and a battalion on the other road was ambushed for "mopping up" Aoshan Temple (East Road). Because from the process of "two strikes against Leiyang", many memoirs [6][7][8][9][ 10] all mentioned that the enemy guarding the city retreated hastily because they didn't know the truth. More specifically, for example, Wu Yunfu, who participated in the riots in southern Hunan, said in the memory of "Leiyang Nianguan Uprising" [1 1]: "The enemy guarding the city didn't know how many troops there were, so he resisted a little, and after 50 or 60 casualties, he fled in panic. We finally recovered Fuyang County. " Zhong Yongchuan and Li Changqin's article "A Brief History of Uprising in Southern Hunan" [6] also said: "The enemy can't figure out how many siege troops there are. More than 60 people were killed or injured, and they abandoned the city and fled. Our army recovered Leiyang City. " If the enemy sends a division, there will be no shortage of troops guarding the city, and they will certainly not waver and flee after "50 or 60 casualties". The article "Nanchang Uprising" [12], written by the editorial team of the former Military and Political University of China People's Liberation Army and revised by the editorial team of the Academy of Military Sciences, also said: "Two battalions of Hu Zongduo, the 19th enemy army, took advantage of the situation and occupied Leiyang City". It can be seen that in the aforementioned "myth" of Lin Biao, which soldiers first guard the camp and then defeat a regiment; What defeated the enemy's division in flight, etc. It's all made up. Of course.

Who planned and directed Twenty Leiyang?

In the aforementioned "myth" of Lin Biao, all this comes from Lin Biao's head, and Lin Biao's analysis of the situation of the enemy makes it clear. In fact, we can confirm that Zhu De, Chen Yi, Wang and Deng Zonghai, secretary of Leiyang County Party Committee, Liu Tai, chairman of the county Soviet Committee, and Chairman of the Military Commission, have jointly agreed to attack the enemy of Aoshan Temple. The commander-in-chief of the campaign was Xu He, vice chairman of the Soviet government in Leiyang County at that time, and Zhu De personally sought Xu He's advice. It's not Lin Biao's turn to plan and direct. On the afternoon of the Battle of Aoshan Temple, Zhu De personally attended the celebration meeting held in Aoshan Temple and made a speech [8]. According to the above historical data, we can also research that the decision of "two dozen Leiyang" was made jointly by Zhu De and Leiyang County Committee, and Lin Biao was only carrying out the task (even the book Mao Zedong and Lin Biao by Inner Mongolia People's Publishing House clearly stated that two dozen Leiyang were the tasks given to Lin Biao by Zhu De and Chen Yi). In the "myth" that "one company defeats one division", thundering against the sun has become Lin Biao's independent decision, which has nothing to do with others! )。 The only thing that needs to be explained is, why didn't Zhu De take part in the battle of Aoshan Temple with all or most of his main forces? This is because "the main force cannot be dispersed (because there was a plan to fight Hengyang at that time)", so we can only give a local main force company as a cooperation.

In the "two dozen Leiyang", do you mainly rely on the agricultural army or Lin Biao Company?

According to the above data, in the Battle of Aoshan Temple, the agricultural army dispatched more than 3,000 people, and the main force was relatively small because of the above plan to fight Hengyang, mainly relying on local armed forces [13]. For example, in the Nanchang Uprising edited by Xiao Ke, it was written: "Commander Zhu called comrades to the headquarters to talk face to face and told him that the main force could not be dispersed (because there was a plan to fight Hengyang at that time), and only one company was given to cooperate with you. This battle mainly relies on local armed forces. " ; "Roar at the Aohe River" compiled by Leiyang County Committee wrote: "After dinner, Commander Zhu handed over the task to comrades, and Commander Zhu said:' ... We have very few main forces, only one company is for you, mainly relying on the masses. " "; Li Asphalt and others also clearly pointed out in the Historical Draft of the Uprising in Southern Hunan: "Zhu De ... studied with Li Tianzhu, Chairman of Leiyang Military Commission, and selected the Aoshan Temple near Dabei City as the ambush site. At the same time, he called Xu He, vice chairman of the county Soviet government stationed in Aoshan, and met him face to face, and made it clear that Xu He was the commander-in-chief of the campaign. Zhu De immediately ordered Lin Biao, who was stationed at the blast furnace nozzle, to take two company soldiers to cooperate with nearby battles, and the camera annihilated the enemy. " Similarly, the "two strikes against Leiyang" were mainly local armed forces, and Zhu De and his subordinates only played a coordinating role. For example, Zhong Yongchuan and Li Changqin's "A Brief History of the Uprising in Southern Hunan" [6] said: "The enemy's occupation of Leiyang County is a great threat to the people of the four townships. The county party Committee requested Zhu De and Chen Yi troops to assist the Leiyang peasant army in organizing siege battles." ; Nanchang Uprising, edited by Xiao Ke, said: "More than 3,000 Red Guards recovered Leiyang with the cooperation of the revolutionary army of workers and peasants." ; Zhao Rong recalled: "After killing the enemy of Xiaoshuipu, Comrade Zhu De cooperated with the independent division of the Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants in Leiyang County to launch an attack on the enemy of leiyang city, Li Yixuan."

Is there only one company in Lin Biao, the main force of Lei Yang?

Li Asphalt and others said in the Historical Draft of the Uprising in Southern Hunan: "On March 1st (the 10th day of the second lunar month), the revolutionary army of workers and peasants cooperated with Leiyang Agricultural Army to launch a siege war. At about five o'clock in the afternoon, the troops moved to Leiyang city root: the sixth and seventh companies attacked the city from the west gate, the eighth and ninth companies attacked the city from the north gate, and the other company took the main attack from Mafuling in the northwest of the city. Because before the encirclement was formed, the Sixth and Seventh Company launched a charge prematurely, which made Ximen unable to attack for a long time and forced him to retreat to Zaotou (City) Street. The 89th Company was frustrated in the fierce battle with the enemy at the north gate and had to retreat to the south. Fortunately, the enemy did not know the actual situation of our army and dared not go out to pursue it. " The "other company" here is the second company where Lin Biao is the company commander [14]. Lin Biao Company performed well in this battle and successfully completed the task. However, it can be confirmed from the above-mentioned documents that there are at least five main companies attacking Leiyang (judging from the serial number, all or most of the three battalions in Zhu De may have participated), so isn't it reasonable to put all the credit on Lin Biao?

What is "beating a division"

In fact, the Red Army of Workers and Peasants in Zhu De defeated an enemy division, but not in Leiyang, Hunan, but in Pingshi, Guangdong. The time is not February or March of 1928, but the end of the same year 1; The enemy we have to deal with is not Li Yixuan, but Xu Kexiang. In the Battle of Shi Ping, Zhu De led the First Division of the Red Army of Workers and Peasants to defeat an entire division (five regiments) in Xu Kexiang, captured more than 0/000 enemy troops, seized nearly 2,000 rifles, more than 0/00 light and heavy machine guns, more than 30 mortars and mountain guns, and achieved brilliant victory. This is found in many books that study or describe the history of the Red Army. Even Gong Chu, a famous traitor in the Communist Party of China (CPC) in his early days, talked about this point in his memory "I and the Red Army" (because Gong Chu was the chief of staff at that time). In this campaign, all three battalions and training teams under the command of Zhu De participated, leaving only one local armed battalion in the rear.

I can't find out where the so-called "myth" that Lin Biao defeated a division with one company came from. However, it is probably from some tabloids during the Cultural Revolution. Later, after some reportage (such as Mao Zedong and Lin Biao of Inner Mongolia People's Publishing House), it was believed by some people on the Internet, and some opinions and adaptations were added to spread this "myth". However, the fact is a fact after all, and it is hard for people with a little historical knowledge and military common sense to believe such a "myth".

[5] "Huang Kecheng readme", People's Publishing House.

[6] Selected Papers on the History of the Communist Party of China Zhong Yongchuan Li Changqin: "A Brief History of the Uprising in Southern Hunan", originally published in Journal of Hunan Normal University 1979.

[7] Research on Modern History, 1980, the first issue.

[8] Study on Nanchang Uprising, edited by Zhang Xia, Shanghai People's Publishing House.

[9] "Historical Draft of Southern Hunan Uprising", Li Bitumen is waiting.

[10] Nanchang Uprising, edited by Xiao Ke.

[1 1] A single spark can start a prairie fire. The first episode, People's Literature Publishing House, 1964 edition.

[12] Selected Works of Literature and History No.56.

[13] In "Mao Zedong and Lin Biao" published by Inner Mongolia People's Publishing House, the number of peasant soldiers was only 200, which was reduced ten times at will.

[14] For example, according to Liu Xing's "Talking about the Battle of Long Yuan Mouth" ("Recalling the Jinggangshan Struggle Period", Jiangxi People's Publishing House, 1979 edition), the battalion commander of the 28th regiment was originally Zhou Zikun, and 1927 Lin Biao was appointed as the battalion commander of the 2nd battalion after being injured in Pingshi, Guangdong. However, this memory is not consistent with the memories of other witnesses, and it is also inconsistent with the conclusions of some researchers (for example, in Wang Jianying's Tracing the History of Zhu Maohong Army, it is clear that the first battalion commander of Zhu De Army is still Zhou Zikun after 1928 and 1 occupied Yizhang). Maybe Liu's memory is wrong. There are doubts for the time being.