Why did the Japanese navy and army dislike each other during World War II?

The conflict between the Japanese navy and the army has a deep origin. It originated after the Meiji Restoration, and the emperor was unable to mediate for a time.

During World War II, the navy and the army could not act in unison and had many differences. Let me talk about a few views: First, strategic opposition. In 1936, Kanji Ishihara, chief of the War Guidance Section of the General Staff Headquarters, represented the army. The Ministry of National Defense formulated the "Outline of National Defense Policy", which advocated advancing north and defeating the Soviet Union with all its strength. Contrary to the army, the Navy formulated the "Outline of National Policy" and advocated defending the north and advancing south. However, no one in the Hirota cabinet dared to offend. , formulated the "Imperial Diplomatic Guidelines", which advocated advancing north and south in parallel, and listed the United States and the Soviet Union as equal targets.

Second, with the defeats in the Zhanggufeng and Nomenkan battles, the Army agreed to postpone the northward advance and implemented the southward advance. However, at this time, Germany achieved a great victory in the early stages of the European battlefield. , the idea of ??advancing north became excited again.

In July 1941, the Japanese army launched a nationwide mobilization and prepared to advance northward. However, the navy once again objected. Later, the German army suffered heavy losses in the Soviet Union, and the army's northward advance was postponed indefinitely. Advancement began to become a national policy, so in December 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.

Thirdly, the two sides also have differences on the pace of the war of aggression against China. For example, the Army advocates controlling North China first and fighting for a long time, while the Navy advocates a quick victory and focusing on attacking Shanghai. On the issue of dealing with Qingdao , the army wanted Qingdao to be under the jurisdiction of the army, which was an important supply base for the Japanese army in North China, while the navy advocated changing Qingdao into a naval port and base and establishing the North China Navy Department.

Fourthly, after Japan’s sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, the two sides again faced off over the next battle plan. The Army advocated focusing on the Chinese region and implementing defense as a whole to protect vested interests, while the Navy advocated The decisive battle with the US military in the Pacific is the top priority, and he advocates attacking Hawaii and Australia.

Fifth, after the failure of the Battle of Midway, the Navy lost face, concealed the situation of the battle, and shifted the responsibility to the Army, saying that they sent too few troops for coordinated operations. Moreover, in the later stages of the war, both sides concealed battle reports from each other. Finally, the Navy gave up its previous rhetoric of ensuring the Pacific Islands were safe and had to turn to the Army, which the Army despised.

The two sides are still competing for military expenditures. It is difficult to imagine that the army will abandon the navy and build its own aircraft carriers, build its own submarines, and transport supplies and ammunition to the defenders on the islands. With such sea and land cooperation, Japan can not Defeated?