The electronic interference of the Russian army turned the hippocampus into scrap iron.

Russian electronic interference makes "hippo"

Turn into scrap iron

Some NATO reports finally began to acknowledge the news that the combat effectiveness of the "Hippo" rocket launcher is getting worse and worse. For example, on May 5, 2023, CNN sent a report.

In this report, the Americans admitted through Ukrainian soldiers on the front line that the efficiency of the current "Hippo" rocket launcher is greatly declining. The reason is that the electronic jamming means used by Russian army successfully suppressed the guidance signal of M3 1 rocket launched by Haima rocket.

At the same time, the Russian military's means of hard killing seems to be improving. Some "hippocampus" rockets were shot down by the Russian army, and the shooting efficiency was getting higher and higher.

Ukrainian soldiers on the front line said that since June last year 165438+ 10, the Russian army suddenly increased the intensity of battlefield electronic warfare, which caused great trouble for the Ukrainian army to use the "hippocampus".

"Hippo" debuted at its peak;

In July 2022, NATO gave Ukraine a battalion and 39 M 142 Haima long-range rockets.

Ukrainian soldiers on the front line said that since June last year 165438+ 10, the Russian army suddenly increased the intensity of battlefield electronic warfare, which caused great trouble for the Ukrainian army to use the "hippocampus".

"Hippo" debuted at its peak;

In July 2022, NATO gave Ukraine a battalion and 39 M 142 Haima long-range rockets.

Hundreds of Russian soldiers were killed or injured, and the "Hippo" rocket once became an online celebrity. The tactical ability of the "Hippo" rocket launcher has also been blown to the peak, becoming an out-and-out "Russian artifact". Unexpectedly, the "hippocampus" rocket launcher has now become a "debut is the peak." I haven't heard much about this type of long-range weapon on the battlefield since the Russian mobilization company was attacked at the beginning of the year. ?

Although the Russian military's electronic warfare capability against the "Hippo" rocket has been significantly improved, the Ukrainian side also said that the electronic interference implemented by the Russian army is not completely impossible to confront, and the Ukrainian army is cooperating with NATO technical experts to "counter" the Russian military's interference with the "Hippo" rocket.

The principle of interfering with hippocampus;

Then, how did the Russian army suddenly "understand" and learn to interfere with the "Hippo" rocket launcher? What is the technical principle of implementing this interference? In Ivan's view, it is not difficult to interfere with the "hippocampus" rocket launcher from the technical principle, but from the system:

It is not difficult to say "technical principle". On the one hand, judging from the performance of M3 1 GMLRS (Precision Guided Rocket) equipped with hippocampus rocket, this type of rocket adopts GPS/INS components. Furthermore, considering the high-performance INS (Inertial Guidance) module is expensive and bulky, if it is installed in a 227mm rocket warhead, it will occupy available space.

So the probability of M3 1 rocket is that it is equipped with simple INS, and the main guidance is completed by GPS receiver. This means that as long as the GPS receiver is disturbed, the ground accuracy of M3 1 rocket can be improved from meter level to 10 meter level only by simple INS guidance. For a rocket with a small charge, this ground accuracy is basically useless.

On the other hand, it is difficult to interfere with the reception of missile-borne GPS signals at present, but the problem is not big. The difficulty lies in the need to get the sample of hippocampus rocket launcher, study its guidance components and determine the jamming scheme. However, in the choice of specific jamming principle, the principle of jamming GPS signal reception is relatively mature at present, and there are many technical schemes.

From the technical principle, the current GPS jamming methods can be roughly divided into two categories: one is suppression jamming, that is, using noise signals to interfere with the reception of GPS receivers to ensure that GPS terminals lose their positioning function, and the jamming methods generally include blocking jamming and aiming jamming; The other is deceptive jamming, that is, using modulated false signals to shield real GPS signals, including forwarding jamming and production jamming.

The former needs to receive the navigation signal of vehicle-mounted GPS, independently generate the C/A code structure, and then deliberately form a time delay through forwarding, resulting in positioning errors. The latter can generate GPS satellite signals that meet the technical requirements, and cheat positioning at will through technical means, so that the jamming target "thinks" that it has gone to other places.

Therefore, it is not difficult to interfere with the GPS guidance signal to ensure that GMLRS (precision guided rocket) becomes a brick in principle. But where is the difficulty?

Difficulties in battlefield radio frequency management and battlefield situation awareness;

As far as GPS jammer is concerned, it must be a high-power RF device that scatters signals outward. ?

Since it is a scattered signal, it may be discovered by the other party's electronic reconnaissance means. Even if GPS/INS guided weapons cannot be used in combat, air-to-surface missiles or anti-radiation missiles will follow.

Therefore, in order to make the GPS jammer work continuously, it is necessary to at least ensure the airspace situation awareness, that is, the ground guidance should be able to form a cover for the combat area and prevent the opponent from using anti-radiation missiles to attack the jammer; Secondly, the GPS jammer has stronger interference ability to civil codes, that is to say, if there are a large number of behaviors of holding civil GPS terminals to find anchor points or driving mobile phones to find ways on the battlefield, then the GPS jammer will also interfere with the actions of its own troops.

In other words, if GPS jamming is to be emitted, standard battlefield communication, battlefield radio frequency and civil equipment management are essential.

From this point of view, from July to 1 1 month last year, it was difficult for Russian troops to counter the precision guided ammunition of hippocampus rocket by jamming: on the one hand, there must be some factors that do not know the performance of hippocampus rocket, the specific performance of its missile-borne guidance components and the performance of its guidance components, so it is difficult to arrange tit-for-tat electronic countermeasures.

Of course, it takes time, and it is necessary to analyze the samples obtained by the relevant factories, work out the technical scheme, develop the engineering prototype, run several tests with the prototype and so on. On the other hand, it is more likely that in the first half of last year or so, the Russian army continued the glorious tradition of battlefield radio frequency management and made a mess. A large number of soldiers are running around with civil code GPS positioning equipment.

In this case, how can you let others interfere with GPS signals? Once the jammer is turned on, it will greatly affect the actions of your own troops.

Interference with the interpretation of "hippocampus";

From the above analysis, we can draw a conclusion that the Russian army has successfully interfered with the GPS signal of M3 1 rocket launcher in the near future, which is not only a simple technical confrontation, but also can be regarded as another manifestation of the superiority of the Russian military system to the Ukrainian army to some extent.

To come up with a technical scheme, we must have strong Industry-University-Research integration ability, start with GMLRS samples, and quickly determine the interference scheme.

It only took the Russian army a few months. In the context of conflict, this time and work efficiency is actually relatively high. It shows that on the one hand, Russia is ready to interfere with GPS, on the other hand, it has a lot of experience, and has completed research and development, mass production and practical application in a short time.

Undoubtedly, this is the embodiment of the Russian military's technological advantage over the Ukrainian army with independent national defense research and development capabilities.

After the jammer was sent to the army, how to use it was said. The most important thing is how to do a good job in battlefield RF management.

Such as jammer switch, it is estimated that battlefield warning radar is needed to provide target information; For example, it is found that the ammunition of the "Hippo" rocket launcher is empty before it is turned on.

At the same time, more importantly, why do Russian soldiers run around with various GPS terminals, and it is not fragrant to use "other GPS terminals"?

After this operation, the jammer can successfully jam the GPS signal, but it has no effect on the normal battlefield positioning of Russian soldiers, which is the embodiment of the advantages of Russian troops over Ukrainian military system.

Of course, from the point of view of countermeasures and countermeasures, the recent use of GPS jammers by Russian troops successfully interfered with the guidance signal of GMLRS, which had a certain impact on the strike efficiency of "Haima" rocket launcher, which did not mean that NATO did not have the technical means of countermeasures.

For example, update better GPS guidance components, and even update the guidance components on precision strike rockets as a whole. , can be "one foot high and one foot high" and continue to fight with Russian jamming equipment.

The engagement itself is a process in which such technical means restrict and offset each other, and the spiral upward process is its objective law.

At the same time, the Russian army successfully interfered with the "Haima" rocket launcher, and as a result, the precious GMLRS rocket launcher of the Ukrainian army was completely turned into a brick. It can also be seen that it is relatively easy to confront weapons and equipment similar to GPS guidance.

From this point of view, the Chinese and Russian air forces have been slow to pay attention to smart bombs such as JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Ammunition), and it is not without their own internal considerations.

Although the remote fire guided by GPS/INS can achieve the same high accuracy as the missile under ideal conditions, it is really uncertain whether it can achieve similar accuracy in high-intensity confrontation environment and whether it will turn into bricks like M3 1 rocket launcher of hippocampus rocket launcher. ?

Therefore, it can be seen from here that sometimes the old technology is not necessarily bad.

When you habitually press the button and move your fingers to make the target more than 100 kilometers away disappear, you can't lose the old-fashioned geodesy and installation of artillery. That's basically what I remember