Battle of Dalan Village, Gaoping Province, Vietnam

Battle of Dalan Village, Gaoping Province, Vietnam

The Battle of Dalan Village in Gaoping Province, Vietnam, which took place on the morning of February 1979, can be said to be the turning point of the Chinese and Vietnamese armies on the Gaoping battlefield.

In this battle, the People's Liberation Army suffered 42 casualties and lost 10 Type 59 tanks, which led to the failure to achieve the strategic goal of the entire Gaoping campaign and put the Northern Group troops in a passive position. The Vietnamese army 1 Company killed 26 people and captured 1 person, but won the initiative in Gaoping battlefield.

After the battle,

Dalan village is located about 12km northwest of Gaoping city center in Vietnam. The simple highway from He 'an County to Gaoping City passes through the middle of the village. Wartime is the only way for PLA 123 Division to attack Gaoping City.

Before the war, the Vietnamese army from top to ordinary soldiers thought that the PLA would be defeated (some Vietnamese troops were influenced by propaganda), so they only built defensive positions along some major roads about 10 km deep in the border areas, and the Vietnamese army in the hinterland of the defense zone basically did not prepare for war.

At 5: 00 p.m. on February/KOOC-0/7, after the People's Liberation Army/KOOC-0/2/KOOC-0/Division captured the county town of Tong Nong in Vietnam, the main forces of the subsequent/KOOC-0/2/KOOC-0/Division and/KOOC-0/23 Division continued to advance to the northwest Koutun area of Gaoping City as planned, so as to cut off the main forces of the Vietnamese army in Gaoping.

The 346th Division of the Vietnamese Army, which is in charge of defensive operations in Gaoping Province, was divided and surrounded by our army, and the division headquarters basically lost its command over various ministries. Three infantry companies, 52 tanks and 4 engineering vehicles of the avant-garde troops of the People's Liberation Army 123 Division quickly advanced to the northwest of Gaoping City, and the sharp knife troops 18 arrived at Dalan Village at about 7 am.

If there is no accident, the vanguard troops of 123 division can capture Koutun before noon on 18, and the main force of the Vietnamese army in northern Gaoping Province will become the turtles of our army.

There was an accident. 18 At about 6: 00 a.m., the headquarters of Vietnam's First Military Region adjusted the operational plan of Gaoping troops in time. According to the information provided by the forward positions, the 10 Company, the 9th Battalion, the 85th/KLOC-0 Division and the 346th Division stationed near Dalan Village were ordered to stop the PLA and buy time for the troops and government agencies in Gaoping to retreat.

The 85th 1 9th Battalion 10 Company of the 346th Division of the Vietnamese Army, without the cooperation of the civilian army and the construction of positions, used 60 automatic rifles, 1 guns, 82 recoilless guns and 12 American B4 1 anti-tank rockets.

10 At about 7 am, the Vietnamese army was not ready for battle. Four PLA tanks carrying infantry crossed Dalan Village and headed for Gaoping City.

The two transport vehicles of the Vietnamese army had no time to hide, and people abandoned their cars and got into the mountains on both sides of the road. At that time, the PLA did not find more than 100 Vietnamese troops on both sides of Dalancun highway.

After four tanks of our army carrying infantry passed through Dalan village, the Vietnamese army quickly set an ambush on a 600-meter-long road on the southeast side of the village, with six rocket launchers in front and six machine guns in the middle, and 82 guns without recoil in the village.

As soon as the Vietnamese army finished the combat mission, three tanks of the People's Liberation Army carried the infantry to Dalan Village. When the PLA tank entered the ambush circle, the Vietnamese army commander immediately ordered the 5th platoon of 10 company to attack with rocket launchers, and the machine gunner attacked the infantry on the tank with crossfire.

At that time, when our army tank formation entered Dalan village, only tank rut marks were found on the road surface, and no battle marks were found nearby. In order to reach the target site as soon as possible, the infantry relaxed their vigilance and did not go out to perform the vigilance. The Vietnamese army suddenly fired, and in just a few tens of seconds, three tanks were shot and damaged.

The infantry quickly jumped out of the car to fight, but it was difficult to form an effective counterattack in the encirclement of the Vietnamese army, causing more than half of the casualties at once.

Five China tanks, about 500 meters west of the ambush site, found that the formation in front was attacked, and immediately ordered the infantry to jump out of the car and take up the battle. Tanks move quickly, and each car is about 50 meters apart. At the same time, they used tank guns and vehicle-mounted machine guns to shoot at Dalan village and the road opposite the village.

After the Vietnamese army ambushed the three tanks in front, it quickly used favorable terrain such as ridges and trenches to hide and avoid the fierce fire of the subsequent tank formations. When five tanks were driving on the Dalan highway bridge, the fourth platoon of the Vietnamese army, which had not yet exposed its position, concentrated its fire again, destroying two tanks and injuring 1 vehicle.

The ambushed tank is Guangzhou Military Region 4 1 Tank Regiment directly under the Army 1 Company 3. 1 tank battalion commander Zhou and the occupants of the vehicle were shot and injured. The company commander Gong Chaoqing's tank was also shot. Both he and the driver Lin were seriously injured. Under the cover of infantry, they climbed out of the tank to fight back.

1 platoon leader Jiang quickly commanded the remaining tanks to organize a counterattack after the car of the battalion commander and company commander was destroyed. Soon after, all the passengers on the bus were seriously injured. Commander Wang Jinming made a decisive decision and directed another 1 tank to shoot at the left and right Vietnamese positions to cover the infantry who rushed out of the encirclement.

At the critical moment, Zhang Guoming, head of the 367th Regiment of 123 Division, led two battalions and four companies to Dalan Village with tanks 1 company and two companies. Liu, the instructor of Tank 1 Battalion, quickly cooperated with the Colonel, while Butan cooperated to suppress the fire of the Vietnamese army and supported the tank company 3 and the vanguard infantry unit which suffered heavy losses.

Liu Yuejun, the fourth company commander of the infantry, found that the Vietnamese army had six bunkers in Dalan village and a platoon in the unknown highland southeast of the village. He decisively implemented the tactics of tank fire suppression and infantry three-way assault. After 1 several hours of fierce fighting, four tanks were injured, six people were killed and five bunkers of the Vietnamese army were taken down.

26 Vietnamese troops were killed, 1 captured. The rest of the Vietnamese army lost their helmets and armor and entered the mountains around the village.

From the battle point of view, the battle of Dalan Village is only an episode encountered by large troops during the campaign. The 367th Regiment fought a beautiful anti-ambush with 4 1 Army Tank Regiment 1 Battalion. At this time, if the troops continue to advance in the direction of Zhatun, the main force of Gaoping Vietnamese Army, which is not ready for war, cannot escape, especially the tank troops assigned to the 346th Division of Vietnamese Army, all of which are surrounded by our army.

Shortly after the battle in Dalan Village, Liu, the instructor of Tank Regiment 1 Battalion, suddenly ordered seven tanks that had rushed out of the encirclement and were advancing in the direction of Zhatun to return to Dalan Village for fortification.

As a result, Vietnamese tank troops stationed in Gaoping City fled to Taiyuan from noon to 9: 00 p.m. in June of 5438+09 with a large number of Gaoping officials and their families, leaving only a small number of infantry to defend the whole city, and civilians were forcibly driven into the deep mountains and forests by the Vietnamese army. At this point, our army lost the best opportunity to win the battle of Gaoping.

The post-war investigation found that the reason why the 4 1 Army made such a serious mistake was an objective technical problem.

18 At about 6: 00 a.m., when the tank troops passed Guli Village on the north side of Dalan Village, the troops were also ambushed by the Vietnamese army. At that time, the Vietnamese army interfered with communication, and the tank troops and infantry troops could not keep in touch by radio. In desperation, 4 1 Army Tanker refers to direct contact with the headquarters of the military region by high-power radio.

4 1 Army Command and North Group Command are originally a team with two brands. The commander-in-chief of the regiment is General Ou Zhifu, deputy commander of the Guangzhou Military Region. In order to ensure the overall victory, the military command department reported the enemy situation encountered by the vanguard troops of 123 Division to the Eastern Command.

When commander-in-chief Xu learned of the situation, he ordered the vanguard troops to occupy favorable terrain, attack enemy cars with tanks and resolutely destroy the enemy.

Results 4 1 Army Command misunderstood "avant-garde troops seize favorable terrain" as interposing troops to organize defense on the spot, and then issued this order to 12 1 Division Command and 123 Division Command, which performed the interposition task. However, the 123 Division Command did not know that its tank unit was a direct unit before, and had contacted the Army Command in the case of poor communication, so it directly ordered the troops to organize defense on the spot.

It is this information gap that caused a big gap of 20 kilometers from southwest to northwest of Gaoping Province, which was not bridged until February 25th.

Except for the 246th Regiment, the 346th Division of the Vietnamese Army, which is in charge of the defensive operations in Gaoping Province, and its subordinate units were successfully divided and evacuated, and our PLA troops lost the best opportunity to win the Battle of Gaoping.

Judging from the post-war summary, the Eastern Command did not hold anyone responsible for this mistake. The 2nd Battalion and 4th Battalion of the 367th Regiment performed heroically and was awarded the honorary title of "Hard-core Sixth Company" by the Central Military Commission. Perhaps the leaders are aware of the technical defects of our army.

After the end of the self-defense war against Vietnam, considering that our army has too many command levels, the communication technology of the troops is backward, and it is easy to miss the initiative of the war, the Central Military Commission delegated the defense work in the border areas of Guangxi to the Guangxi Military Region, and transferred troops from the participating troops to form four new border divisions.

In this way, if a new war breaks out in the direction of Guangxi, the border guards will not have to report to the Central Military Commission through divisions, armies and major military regions, but will report directly to the Central Military Commission from divisions and military divisions, thus reducing many complicated links.

In the direction of Yunnan, because the headquarters of Kunming Military Region is not far from the border, the independent division of Yunnan Military Region merged into the sequence of military combat troops and formed several border defense regiments. Kunming Military Region unified command of all armed forces under its jurisdiction, which also reduced complicated command links in the middle.

Generally speaking, the operational command systems in Guangxi and Yunnan have adopted two different reform modes, but the response ability of the troops has become more flexible.

On the other hand, the Vietnamese army won a small-scale victory in Dalan village, believing that Vietnam has the ability to protect itself. It did not pay attention to the reform of the command system and technical upgrading. It just blindly expands its active forces and implements a militarized management system for the whole people. In addition to the sick, the disabled and pregnant women, it also requires civilians over 65,438+06 and under 45 to receive two hours of military training every day.

In the long run, Vietnam's Du?n Group is so militaristic that Vietnam's economy, education and agriculture will inevitably be severely restricted, leading to the gradual decline of Vietnam's comprehensive national strength. After a long period of time, it lacks the support of a solid economic foundation, a developed education system and an agricultural system, and can only decline.

Five years later, when the People's Liberation Army launched the "Two Mountains" recovery war, the overall combat effectiveness gap between the Chinese and Vietnamese armed forces became more and more obvious. Since then, when our army used electronic reconnaissance and detection technology to fight, the Vietnamese army still stayed in the development stage of a military power during World War II!