The intelligence war in the early stages of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea, commanded personally by Mao Zedong, was highly artistic.

The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea that began in 1950 was a war fought between the Chinese People’s Volunteers and the “United Forces” headed by the U.S. Army, which fully demonstrated the war art and overall combat effectiveness of both sides. In this special and cruel war, the two sides not only competed directly with weapons and equipment, the size of their troops, and combat capabilities, but also had a fierce contest of morale and wisdom.

Among them, the intelligence war between China and the United States before the war started and in the early stages of the war best reflected the wisdom and strategic level of both sides.

In this fierce intelligence war that combines openness and secrecy, the Chinese party and government, and the Chinese People's Volunteers, under the personal command and specific guidance of Mao Zedong, adopted a combination of falsehood and truth, falsehood and truth. They continuously confuse, mislead and play tricks on the other side by overt and covert, tight inside and loose outside, clever use of media channels, etc. They demonstrate the superb art of intelligence warfare and develop a powerful secret front that is incomparable to the other side. Combat capabilities, they have been playing around with the U.S. intelligence agencies and the "United Nations Army" command system, always keeping them in the dark about the Chinese government's decision-making and the volunteer troops' overseas operations, and they have made one mistake after another. Decision-making has prompted the balance of victory to continue to tilt toward the volunteers.

Because this war is a modern war fought under extremely disparate circumstances in terms of military strength, material conditions, and comprehensive national strength between the two warring parties. The impoverished Chinese military and civilians, facing the US military with advanced equipment, not only share the same hatred of the enemy and fight bloody battles with the enemy with heroic spirit that overwhelms all enemies, but more importantly, they need to comprehensively demonstrate our country's "soft power" and use the superb wisdom of the Chinese nation. and military and political strategies to offset the enemy's powerful steel power, and under extremely unbalanced conditions, win the great victory in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.

Mao Zedong said, "The enemy has more steel and less air, but we have less steel and more air." The "qi" here not only refers to the morale of the country's people and the morale of the army, but also includes the ability to use resourcefulness. , aura and momentum.

The following is a brief introduction to several fragments of this intelligence war directed by Mao Zedong himself.

1. Secret operations, large-scale volunteer troops crossed the border into North Korea silently, hiding the truth

In June 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, Mao Zedong, together with the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Central Committee Other leaders of the Military Commission have been studying the situation in North Korea and response strategies for days. After working hard and unifying the thoughts within the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, they quickly made the wise decision to send troops to Korea, resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, and protect the country.

Immediately, the Central Military Commission took quick action and transferred the troops preparing to fight abroad as quickly as possible through various clever and covert means to the areas along the China-North Korea border in Liaoning and Jilin. , ready to cross the border at any time. Even the Ninth Corps, which was preparing to liberate Taiwan on the Fujian front, was ordered to go north to the China-North Korea border. Commander Deng Hua, who had just commanded the troops to capture Hainan Island, also received a secret order and rushed to the Northeast to prepare to serve as a volunteer army. Headquarters leader, go to the Korean front to command troops in operations.

By mid-October, the 4 corps of the 13th Corps of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely the 38th Army, the 39th Army, the 40th Army, and the 42nd Army, and their attached artillery units, were fully prepared to enter North Korea and fight. work, all entering the China-North Korea border line in the departure area.

Even at this time, the Chinese People's Volunteers are about to fight. The Americans and the bosses of the "United Nations Army" headquarters have no idea about the specific movements of our army, and are even guessing about the Chinese army. Are they able to dispatch and do they dare to compete with the powerful and well-equipped US military?

Because all the mobilizations of the Chinese army are under the single-handed control of Mao Zedong and other leaders, they are secretly deployed to the departure area on the China-North Korea border without being discovered by the enemy at all. .

When making the decision to resist U.S. aggression, aid Korea, and go abroad to fight, Mao Zedong issued an order: the dispatch of troops to North Korea must be kept strictly confidential and operated in secret. "Do not indicate to any party that our troops have the intention to go abroad."

Following Mao Zedong’s instructions, during the entire process of mobilizing troops to rush to the China-North Korea border organized and implemented by the Central Military Commission, the local government only knew about the matter at the highest level of the provinces involved, and the scope of knowledge was very narrow. were strictly controlled; the mobilized troops, from top to bottom, implemented a strict confidentiality system and did not disclose any information to the outside world.

While Americans were still immersed in the discussion that "China and Japan have very different opinions on sending troops to North Korea and it is difficult to make a decision," the more than 200,000 troops of the 13th Corps of our Volunteer Army had already arrived in 1950. On October 19, under the cover of drizzle and low dark clouds, they began to travel by day and night, crossed the Yalu River as quickly as possible, and secretly entered North Korea to fight. Even the US intelligence agencies, which have always been all-pervasive, did not discover that the Chinese People's Volunteer Army had secretly entered North Korea.

2. Strictly control media channels, constantly publish contradictory news, cover up the true situation, and make it difficult for the other party to distinguish between truth and truth.

At the beginning of sending troops to North Korea, Mao Zedong gave strict instructions The Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and domestic newspapers, radio and other media must remain silent and listen to the central government. They must not publish any news about the war situation. Even reports on troop mobilization to the border between China and North Korea must be controlled as much as possible and it is best not to publish them.

Mao Zedong made clear instructions: "In the current few months, we will only do things but not talk about them. We will not publicize the matter in newspapers. Only senior leading cadres in the party will know about it so that they can work at work." "

Even in mid-to-late October 1950, when the volunteer army was fully mobilized, Mao Zedong still strictly demanded: "In order to strictly keep secrets, the troops crossing the river will start at dusk every day and wait until the next day. It will stop at 4 o'clock in the morning, and the concealment will be completed before 5 o'clock in the morning, and must be carefully inspected."

The reason why Mao Zedong repeatedly issued orders to keep the troops' overseas operations strictly confidential was to completely conceal the troops' movement. , so as to achieve the unique effect of "surprise attack and victory in the first battle", laying a good foundation for the next battle.

On October 25, 1950, the first battle between the Volunteer Army and the "United Nations Army" broke out in Liangshuidong. The 118th Division opened the scoring. The scale of the battle reached the division level, and the "United Nations Army" suffered a head-on attack. After winning the first battle, China did not hold any activities or news reports to celebrate the victory or "set the first record". The participating troops immediately went into hiding, and the Korean battlefield also temporarily returned to tranquility.

On November 2, although the China National Radio reported for the first time the news of Chinese troops participating in the war in North Korea, the language was understated and nonsense. Because this news was personally modified by Mao Zedong before it was released. The main content was not to introduce the Chinese army to "beat the invaders" at all, but to specifically point out that our volunteers were protecting the Chinese hydroelectric power generation area along the Yalu River. Avoid being attacked. The implication is that those who participated in the war a few days ago were not China's regular army, and their scale was limited. Only a small number of people entered the country and fought a small battle with the Korean People's Army, giving them a slight warning not to cross the border and attack China's hydropower stations.

Because Mao Zedong had already foreseen that once the Americans knew that this battle was fought entirely by the Chinese army, and that many Chinese troops had entered North Korea, they would retaliate at all costs, and a new war between the two sides would begin. A fierce battle is inevitable. When the Volunteer Army is not yet stable, this bad situation should be avoided as much as possible, so as to facilitate the Volunteer Army to start planning the second campaign in accordance with Mao Zedong's instructions.

Therefore, we must continue to use deceptive tactics, maintain a low profile externally, do not hold celebrations, and do not publicize the results of the war to the outside world. Even the scope of domestic knowledge is strictly controlled within a small range within the top management. , continue to remain confidential.

Mao Zedong’s move was indeed clever and completely confused the bosses of the US intelligence agencies and the "United Nations Army" headquarters. Willoughby, the director of the intelligence department of the U.S. Far East Command, after receiving this "intelligence" about the "small battle", he took a long breath and immediately sent a telegram to Washington, which had been worried about China's large-scale troop dispatch to North Korea. He relaxed "Confirm" his previous judgment: the Chinese do not dare and will not go to war with the US military on a large scale, and the Chinese army did not go to fight in North Korea.

How did he know that at this time, the first batch of volunteers, totaling 250,000 people, had been secretly marching in the high mountains of North Korea, and were rushing to the front line with the help of the cover of the mountainous terrain conditions and harsh weather; The second group of 130,000 people is also marching day and night to the China-North Korea border, entering North Korea one after another and rushing to the battlefield where fierce fighting is about to break out.

3. After the volunteers entered the DPRK, they cleverly disguised themselves during the march so as not to reveal their whereabouts and confuse the enemy

In order to strictly keep secrets and confuse the enemy to the maximum extent, in accordance with the instructions of Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission, Before crossing the border, the volunteers must be modified, change their guns, and put on the clothes of the Korean People's Army. Mao Zedong strictly demanded: "All members of the People's Liberation Army must not wear any markings." In this way, even if they are discovered by the other party, they cannot tell whether they are Chinese or Koreans, or whether they are the Chinese People's Volunteers or the Korean People's Army.

In accordance with the requirements of Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission, the troops entering North Korea have made clever arrangements for the way weapons and equipment enter North Korea. In the early days of their march to North Korea, the Volunteer Army gave up carrying some heavy equipment with them, adopted the method of entering personnel and heavy weapons separately and then receiving them again after entry. They allowed heavy equipment to avoid main roads and chose to march through remote roads at night, using flashlights when driving in. All are prohibited.

We are also strict and cautious when it comes to large-scale troops marching in, and we always keep quiet during the journey. Not only are we not allowed to speak loudly, we even have to take off our glasses to avoid being discovered by US military aircraft due to the reflection of the glasses. The target was exposed and bombed; when marching in the mountains, the volunteer soldiers used leaves and branches as camouflage on their heads, so it was not clear from the air that the team was marching.

At this time, the US military mainly relied on aircraft for reconnaissance from the air. Although they had already heard that a large number of Chinese troops might appear, what they saw during several reconnaissance flights was the snow-capped mountains in northern North Korea. Where were the Chinese troops?

In fact, in order to deal with the aerial reconnaissance of the US military, the Volunteer Army cleverly adopted the method of "white confusion" and wore a large number of "white windbreakers" - the white cloaks or white trench coats worn by the Volunteer Army cadres and soldiers. Bedsheets, everyone wrapped in white, blended the marching team with the white earth.

In addition, when the troops are marching, as long as they encounter an emergency or find a US military reconnaissance plane flying in, the commander will blow a whistle, and the soldiers will immediately stop advancing and lie motionless in the snow. What the plane found from the air was the same "white" as before. Where could the volunteers be seen?

Main references:

[1] Li Jinming. Intelligence warfare in the early days of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea [J]. Party History Expo, 2015(05):04~09.

[2] Xia Dongmin, Sun Daotong. Mao Zedong and the formation of the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to send troops to aid Korea [J]. Military History Research, 2010(04):13~22.

[3] Gao Jian. Commemorating the 70th anniversary of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea: These secret past events should not be forgotten [J]. View of Secrecy 2020.10.26