2065438+2008 Education on Confidentiality Awareness and Common Sense

2065438+2008 Education on Confidentiality Awareness and Common Sense

Learning experience on the education of confidentiality awareness and common sense 1

Since the promulgation and implementation of the secrecy law for 20 years, it has played an important role in safeguarding China's national security and interests and ensuring the smooth progress of reform, opening up and socialist construction. At present, China's secrecy work is still facing a severe test. We should pay attention to raising the awareness of secrecy and do a good job of secrecy in various aspects to ensure the deepening of reform and opening up and the smooth progress of building a harmonious socialist society.

First, the current severe test of China's secrecy work

1, the long-term peaceful environment makes people forget the enemy's concept and sense of confidentiality.

At present, in our society, the phenomenon of weak legal concept of secrecy still exists, and the idea of peace paralysis of "no secrecy can be guaranteed", "no secrecy can be guaranteed" and "secrecy is useless" still has a market. Some cadres, including leading cadres, do not have a strong sense of confidentiality, lack political and strategic vision, and pay insufficient attention to confidentiality. Some departments and units do not implement the confidentiality system, and the management measures are not strict, especially in the management of classified computers and networks, and there are hidden dangers of leaking secrets. The responsibilities of some key secrecy departments are unclear and the confidentiality responsibilities have not been implemented. In particular, the phenomenon of "one machine with two functions" is serious, and there is no strict isolation method, which poses a potential threat to network information security. Compared with the past, China's secret-related subjects are diversified, secret vector is diversified, and the leakage channels are complicated. The number of leakage objects increases obviously, the leakage probability increases obviously, and the control difficulty increases obviously.

2. The changes brought by the market economy have brought many new topics to the secrecy work.

First, the ideological concept is complex. With the deepening of reform and the development of market economy, various ideologies and cultures are stirring each other, people's outlook on life and world presents complexity and diversity, people's behavior selectivity and diversity are enhanced, and the pertinence and effectiveness of confidential education are facing new tests. Second, the interest drive is obvious. Some people pursue "money worship", "hedonism" and "extreme individualism". In order to maximize their personal interests and reflect their so-called personal values, they will trample on state secrecy laws and regulations and betray state secrets. Third, the number of secret-related topics has increased. More and more non-public economic units and private enterprises have entered the field of secrecy, and the original secrecy management system has a blind spot. Fourth, the flow of personnel has intensified. Some high-tech personnel and secret-related personnel have jumped ship to foreign-funded enterprises, multinational companies or emigrated abroad, which has brought serious harm to the security of state secrets.

3. The reform of political system has brought new impact to the original safety management.

At present, our party and government are promoting political civilization, openness of government affairs and the construction of a sunny government, which poses new challenges to secrecy. Confidentiality work should not violate the trend and requirements of openness in government affairs, but also ensure the security of state secrets, which requires us to get rid of the old concept of "the more secrets, the safer" and establish a new concept of confidentiality of "openness is the principle and confidentiality is the exception". In particular, the Regulations on the Openness of Government Information, which came into effect in May this year, stipulates that public government information must be made public on legal carriers such as government websites according to law, and of course government information involving state secrets must not be made public. Therefore, we should actively explore a new system of secrecy work that adapts to the socialist market economy and international practices, make the secrecy work system constantly adapt to the new requirements of information disclosure, ensure that the core, focus and advantages are guaranteed, and play a good role in promoting the openness of government affairs in China.

4. The rapid development of high technology makes safety management face new challenges.

With the rapid development of high technology and the wide application of office automation, safety management also needs corresponding changes. First, from static management to dynamic management. In the past, static management was to keep your mouth shut, your file well, and watch the door. Now we should do a good job in the dynamic management of information, network and various secret-related media. The second is to change from relying on traditional means to relying on scientific and technological means. In the past, whether the secrecy work was done well mainly depended on the soundness of various systems. Now it depends on technical means, and a defense system combining technical defense, physical defense and civil air defense should be formed. The third is the change from managing media secrecy to managing information secrecy. At first, the secret-related media were mainly paper, and now there are removable storage media such as CD-ROM, USB flash drive, floppy disk and removable hard disk. Therefore, it is necessary to manage various channels that can store, process and transmit information, such as mobile phones, telephones, computers and the Internet. These changes have made it increasingly difficult for China to keep secrets.

5. Hostile forces at home and abroad continue to split and destroy China.

In order to contain, split, evolve and subvert our country, hostile forces at home and abroad wantonly steal our secrets. First, the subject of stealing secrets is diversified. Hostile forces, intelligence organizations, neighboring countries, multinational companies, etc. steal secrets. Under the guise of sightseeing, visiting, giving lectures and social investigation, there has been a marked increase. Second, the scope of stealing secrets has expanded. The scope of stealing secrets has expanded from the past political and military fields to the fields of economy, science and technology, culture and transportation. Third, the ways of stealing secrets are diversified. Hostile forces not only turned against our internal personnel through various means, but also came to China to steal secrets under the guise of joint venture, cooperative development, academic discussion, cultural exchange and tourism interview. At present, China's national security situation is characterized by the coexistence of traditional security threats and non-traditional security threats, the interweaving of external security risks and internal security risks, and the struggle between stealing secrets and anti-stealing secrets is more acute and complicated.

Two, in strict accordance with the provisions of the "security law", take corresponding measures to do a good job of confidentiality.

1, do a good job in publicity and education

Confidentiality publicity and education is a regular and basic work, and it is also an important content of confidentiality work. First, through continuous and various forms of publicity and education, we will constantly enhance the people's awareness of the enemy's situation, confidentiality and comprehensive prevention, so that the broad masses of the people can consciously establish the vigilance of confidentiality. Second, focusing on the secret education of leading cadres at all levels, we will strengthen the secret education and training for secret-related personnel in key departments, full-time and part-time secret cadres in party and government organs, state civil servants and computer information system managers. Third, according to the development and changes of the situation and tasks, study and improve the content and focus of education, do a good job in publicity and education in a targeted manner, be close to the situation and reality, and keep pace with the times.

2. Pay special attention to team building

Building a cadre team with high political quality and strong professional ability is an important guarantee for doing a good job in confidentiality. First, care for and care for confidential cadres politically, at work and in life, and strive to create a team of high-quality confidential cadres with strong dedication and firm beliefs by retaining people with their careers, feelings and proper treatment. Second, in accordance with the requirements of the professionalization of the security forces, we should further strengthen political theory study and professional training, constantly enrich the content of study and training, enhance the effect of study and training, and comprehensively improve the overall professional quality of the security cadres. Third, grass-roots security workers and managers should conscientiously follow the general requirements of "ensuring safety and development" put forward by the higher security departments, strive to cultivate a rigorous, meticulous, resolute and hard-working style, and strive to work with peace of mind, prepare for war carefully and cooperate sincerely in ordinary posts.

3. Strengthen system construction.

The first is to implement the leadership responsibility system for confidentiality work. It includes three levels and three principles. The "three levels" are: first, the main leaders of the party and government at all levels take overall leadership responsibility for the confidentiality work in their respective regions and departments; Second, the leaders in charge of confidentiality work should bear specific organizational leadership responsibilities; Third, leaders in charge of other work should be responsible for the confidentiality of their business scope. The "three principles" are: first, who is in charge of confidentiality work, who is responsible; The second is in charge of what business, and at the same time lead and manage the confidentiality work in this business; Third, the level of business management, but also the management of confidentiality.

The second is to explore the establishment of a secret management system. Accurately defining state secrets and their classification is an important basis and prerequisite for strengthening confidentiality management. In view of the existing problems such as wide confidentiality scope, high confidentiality level and random confidentiality process, we actively explore the establishment of a practical confidentiality management system that meets the requirements of the development of the situation to prevent the disclosure of state secrets due to inaccurate confidentiality. It is necessary to establish a confidential work organization, strengthen the study of confidential knowledge, and ensure that secrets are determined accurately according to law.

The third is to establish a confidentiality review system for information disclosure. According to the State Council's Regulations on Information Openness, administrative organs should publish government information except those involving state secrets, commercial secrets and personal privacy. Therefore, in information disclosure, we should pay attention to the relationship between openness and confidentiality, establish a confidential review mechanism for government information release that conforms to the actual work of our own organs, standardize the procedures for confidential review, ensure that the information that should be disclosed can be fully disclosed to the society, and prevent the national interests from being harmed by improper disclosure.

The fourth is to implement the supervision and management and law enforcement inspection system. It is necessary to strengthen the management of secret media. Disks, CDs and USB flash drives containing confidential files should be managed like paper media files with the same security level. It is necessary to strengthen the management of various printing houses and copying agencies that undertake the printing business of government agencies and institutions, as well as the confidentiality management of important confidential meetings and major confidential activities; For units that have done a good job in confidentiality, the confidentiality management department should sum up and popularize their experiences and practices in a timely manner, and report and commend them. Units that pay insufficient attention, take ineffective measures, and refuse to rectify existing problems should promptly and seriously informed criticism and urge rectification.

The fifth is to implement a high-tech anti-leakage system. It is necessary to effectively strengthen the security management of computers and their networks, conscientiously implement the approval and licensing system for the security management of computers and their networks, and effectively increase investment in security work. The relevant competent departments and principal responsible persons should stand at the height of the overall situation, raise awareness and be willing to invest, so that the level of safety technology can adapt to the new situation of reform and opening up and rapid development of high technology, and better play the role of "ensuring safety and promoting development".

Learning experience of secrecy consciousness and common sense education II.

April 15 this year is the first national safety education day in China. Various forms of activities are organized throughout the country to publicize and educate the people and raise their awareness of protecting national security. In practical work, our geological prospecting units often use classified results data, which involves the management of classified results derivatives. As a geological data manager of a unit, combined with many years of practical work experience, I want to learn from you through two cases about confidential data management, so as to take a warning in future work, urge you to recognize the grim situation of current confidential work in future work and prevent the occurrence of confidential data cases.

Surveying and mapping geographic information data is related to national security and territorial integrity. Since ancient times, it has been regarded as an artifact of the country and cannot be easily shown to people. In recent years, surveying and mapping geographic information data has become more and more abundant, and its application fields have become more and more extensive. However, these surveying and mapping results not only provide convenience for people, but also bring new problems to safety work. In practice, the leakage of surveying and mapping results has occurred from time to time, and it shows a trend of further high incidence, which seriously threatens national security.

Case 1 Guo, an engineer of a design and research institute, illegally used the networked computer to store and process 7 classified topographic maps and 6 classified topographic maps 16. After investigation, Guo participated in the bidding and construction of many domestic projects before 2008, and Project A provided him with classified topographic maps as a reference for bidding quotation and scheme design. Guo violated the confidentiality regulations, copied it to the networked computer for storage, and kept it as a backup of the project data after use. After the case occurred, the relevant departments gave Guo An a heavier administrative record.

In analyzing this case, Guo was directly responsible for illegally using computers connected to the Internet to store and process confidential information. However, the investigation found that most of the classified topographic maps stored and processed by Guo came from Party A of the project, and Party A did not put forward any confidentiality requirements. According to the requirements of the "Provisions on the Approval Procedures for the Provision and Use of National Classified Basic Surveying and Mapping Achievements", the use of classified basic surveying and mapping achievements shall go through strict application approval procedures and sign a letter of responsibility for security and confidentiality. However, in practice, some units did not strictly manage the classified surveying and mapping results according to the relevant provisions of the classified vector after purchasing them. It's that they illegally scan and copy electronic topographic maps for convenience or other reasons, and even copy them repeatedly, which is a very serious hidden danger.

Case 2: Xu Wei, the president of a geological research institute, increased the unit's economic income and decided to sign a cooperation agreement with a foreign company without authorization, and allowed the company to inquire and borrow a large number of geological data for many times, including 48 confidential topographic maps. After the case occurred, the relevant departments gave Xu corresponding disciplinary and political sanctions.

Analysis of this case is a typical case of violation of relevant confidentiality laws and regulations in economic cooperation and exchange, which leads to the disclosure of state secrets. According to the provisions of Article 30 of the Secrecy Law, if an organ or unit needs to provide state secrets in foreign exchanges and cooperation, it shall report to the relevant competent department for examination and approval and sign a confidentiality agreement with the other party. In this case, Xu had a weak sense of confidentiality and cooperated with foreign companies in violation of regulations. Although there is no intention to reveal secrets subjectively, it has objectively caused the disclosure of classified results, which has caused serious harm to national security and interests.

Through typical case analysis, combined with the actual situation of our unit, I think we should do the following work well:

First, we must control the source. Strict examination and approval procedures, in the case of grasping the needs of those who need it, further strengthen the follow-up inspection and management of the use of classified surveying and mapping results, regularly clean up and destroy classified results, and gradually find out the base.

Second, we should strengthen education. It is necessary to regularly educate employees in various forms of confidentiality, so that they can realize the severe form of current confidentiality work, effectively enhance their confidentiality awareness, master confidentiality knowledge, and gradually reduce the occurrence of illegal cases of confidentiality caused by ignorance and fearlessness.

Third, we must strengthen management. Mainly to do a good job in the management of confidential personnel, secret vector, confidential places and computer information.

The fourth is to intensify inspections. In a planned and targeted manner, the departments that use classified information will be inspected for confidentiality, and violations of confidentiality laws and regulations will be severely investigated, so as to promote education through investigation and prevention through reform. Gradually enhance the overall sense of confidentiality.