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How do you evaluate Mr. Lu Huayu, professor of history at Southwest University, "There are 500,000 people in Shu Han"

To put it simply, there is a big problem in inferring that there are 300,000 soldiers based on 1.5 million households.

But I mainly want to oppose an attitude: I feel that writing this kind of article is just a joke, "concocted every year to achieve the target" (@langxieyangwenli). This article was published in 1991. The assessment indicators at that time were far less clear than they are now. Publishing such a small article has very limited effect. There is some sympathetic understanding: the author is either a Shu fan or a Prime Minister fan, or she is tired of all kinds of Shu fans or Prime Minister fans; after reading the relevant historical materials, she thinks she can provide some new insights. Of course, being published does not indicate quality, it only indicates that it complies with academic standards and asks questions based on existing knowledge.

I would like to explain a few things below: First of all, the ratio of three households to one soldier has its origins, and it is not completely impossible; this is not a very ridiculous statement (§2). However, almost no political power would actually maintain its armed forces with the ratio of three households to one soldier; based on some historical data from the Han, Tang, and Song Dynasties, I speculate that roughly ten to twenty households correspond to one soldier. In other words, despite the great changes in the economy, society, and military system, this ratio was relatively stable from the Eastern Han Dynasty to the Southern Song Dynasty (§3). So the real question is:

Since three households per soldier is theoretically feasible, why in actual history has the ratio of ten households per soldier rarely exceeded the ratio?

I think it has something to do with marginal benefit. Simply put, the contribution of unit troops to the growth of total combat effectiveness follows a curve; at a certain point, the contribution of newly added unit forces to total combat effectiveness will decrease; when it drops to a low enough level, There is no point in conscription anymore. This point is particularly meaningful for understanding medieval military history. It can tell us the economic foundation behind the military "nobility" and can also explain why the armies of Wang Mang, Fu Jian, and Sui Yang Emperors were tactically vulnerable (§4).

Lu Wen’s main problem is that she ignores the marginal curve between the number of soldiers and combat effectiveness. The main mistake in her entire article is the assumption that there is a positive correlation between military strength and combat effectiveness. The more soldiers, the stronger the total combat effectiveness. From this, she acquiesced that a regime must expand its army as much as possible in order to survive; and if Zhuge Liang really wanted to help the Han Dynasty, he would also invest as much troops as possible. Under such erroneous assumptions, she reviewed the scattered historical data and selected materials that were beneficial to her argument, forming the main pattern above.

After reading Professor Lu’s article, I actually felt a sense of fear: after carefully combing through historical materials, historians can still draw some completely wrong conclusions - and the reason may be the lack of Knowledge of other social sciences. When we crawl through historical materials ourselves, we still don’t know what kind of knowledge we need to use, and what common sense we don’t yet have... In other words, when we see other scholars making mistakes, we still have a little more respect for history. Make fun of others less.

2

Let’s start with the saying that there are three households and one soldier. "Old Tang Book·Wenzong Chronicles":

The household registration in Changqing is 3.35 million, and the number of soldiers is about 990,000. Three households in total are entitled to one soldier.

This analysis was made by Wang Yanwei based on the Yuanhe National Accounting Book. It said: In fact, only 3.35 million households are in tax registration and can tax them; and the country theoretically has to bear 990,000 A soldier's support. After all, three taxpayers support one soldier. The implication is that the central government has too few household registrations and too many soldiers, which is a big problem. But on the other hand, in extreme cases, it is not a fantasy that three households correspond to one soldier.

We can also look at it from another angle: Can the taxes of three households really afford a soldier? The data under the two taxes are more complicated. We go back in time to the early Tang Dynasty. Under the rent system, each person has to bear the following annual rent: 2 shi, 2 zhang of silk, and 3 liang of cotton (roughly the same). Assuming that each household only has two dings, under the rent modulation, the state can obtain from three households every year:

Rent 12 shi, silk 12 zhang, and cotton 18 taels.

Mr. Zhang Guogang used the military resource standards in the "Shen Ji Enemies Taibai Yin Jing". Among them, the annual expenditure per person is:

12 stones of millet and 48 feet of silk.

In fact, on average, each household always has more than two ding. The shortage of silk is made up with excess millet and cotton.

Of course, this comparison is very rough, but it seems that it can be maintained by using the taxes of three households to support one soldier - although it may be on the verge of mutiny.

Of course, actual war requires not only soldiers, but also heavy investment in food transportation, equipment manufacturing, casualty care, etc. In addition to raising troops, the country also has many other expenses, including daily royal expenses, official salaries, etiquette, diplomacy, etc. At this time, theoretically, the government can use military camps to let soldiers create some value. But more importantly, the government also has revenue from commercial taxes, local contributions, etc. During the Changqing period, the ratio of three households to one soldier could be maintained. There is also this background: although the central government directly controls a small number of household registrations, based on its authority, local governments There are still a large number of tributes to the governor and Jiedushi.

So, are there any significant differences between the Han Dynasty and the Tang Dynasty? Of course there are differences. The economy of the Tang Dynasty was much more developed than that of the Han Dynasty. However, as the level of production per unit of land increases, the cost of supporting soldiers is also increasing. This is because the overall income of soldiers is usually higher than that of farmers. If this were not the case, either the soldiers would flee and become farmers; or they would rely on their own force to directly plunder the farmers.

In summary, it is not a very ridiculous idea for three households to support one soldier, although no regime will really pursue this ratio.

Lu Huayu is a scholar of Tang economic history. Although she did not cite these Tang Dynasty historical materials in the article, she is obviously familiar with the discussions behind them. She may have thought this way: Under extreme circumstances, three households could raise one soldier; at the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty and the Three Kingdoms period, various political regimes were already struggling to the limit in order to survive, and the Shu Han was certainly no exception. So she Shuhan should be like this too. This inference is of course problematic, but I think many people who laugh at her simply don’t know the economic history background behind it.

3

Perhaps some readers vaguely feel that Lu Wen's conclusion goes against common sense, but many people themselves do not know what common sense should be - or, in general, the household registration What is the ratio of the number to the total number of armed forces? Here we will make an inference based on the material from the later period (700 to 1200 years). This time period was chosen for a reason so that we could have some actual accounts at the time rather than relying on imaginary numbers concocted in a specific context - so the resulting observations would be more reliable.

We will find that there are great differences in the military systems in different periods, the household registrations controlled by the government are very different, and the social structures are also different. However, under the premise that soldiers and civilians are roughly separated, the ratio of household registration to number of soldiers is relatively stable, generally floating in the range of 20:1 to 10:1.

3.1 Sichuan in the Southern Song Dynasty

First of all, we can find that the territory of the Fourth Sichuan Road in the Southern Song Dynasty and the Shu Han are basically consistent - the areas where the Shu Han overflowed did not have a large population:

What was the population of Sichuan Fourth Road in the Song Dynasty? "Miscellaneous Notes on the Government and the Public since Jianyan":

Sichuan has 60 prefectures and 199 counties:

In the second year of Yuanfeng, there were more than 2.1 million households.

In the 32nd year of Shaoxing, there were more than 2.64 million households and a population of more than 7.51 million. (The rate per household is thirty persons.)

In the second year of Chunxi, there were more than 2.58 million households and more than 7.43 million people.