Comparison of Military Power between China and Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Where is China Weak?

During the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, China's national strength became stronger and weaker, but China's and Japan's military strength became stronger and weaker. China's weakness was not in weapons, but in the organizational system, the quality of officers and men and the lack of understanding of modern war laws. China's national conditions are worse than Japan's, Japan is fully prepared, and China is rushing to fight; The Japanese regime is stable and the China regime is shaken; Japanese national unity, China fragmented. Due to military strength and national conditions, Japan won and China lost.

In the history of war from ancient times to the present, there are many examples of wars in which the few win the most and the weak win the most, but more are battles between the two sides of the war in terms of strength and various conditions. In 1938, less than a year after the outbreak of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, Mao Zedong asserted in On Protracted War that China would not win this war quickly or perish, but it would be a protracted war, and the final victory belonged to the Chinese nation. The later war process proved that Mao Zedong's judgment was completely correct. According to Mao Zedong's analysis, there are "military strength, economic strength and political organizational strength" of both sides, the comparison of national conditions between China and Japan, the influence of international relations, etc. In short, the strength and various conditions of both sides. It is from the comparison of these conditions that Mao Zedong reached the conclusion of protracted war. His analytical method is a good inspiration for us to study the Sino-Japanese War.

"War is a competition of strength", first of all, it is a competition of military strength. The army is the basic tool of war, so we have to compare the military strength of both sides first.

in p>1893, the Japanese army had seven divisions with nearly 7, people. In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Japan mobilized its reserve forces, with a total of 24, troops and more than 15, servants. More than 17, troops were sent to China to fight against North Korea.

China's military names are complicated, and it is difficult to find exact statistics, but the total number should be more than 1 million. The old Eight Banners and green camp were vulnerable, and only one third of the troops had combat capability. The Japanese Chiefs of Staff once estimated that the effective strength of China's army was 35,. In 1898, after the Sino-Japanese War, the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Housing once counted 36, people in the provinces to train and defend the army. As far as quantity is concerned, China's army is obviously superior, but its combat effectiveness is not only determined by quantity, especially after the modern industrial revolution. Equipment, establishment, training, quality and education of officers and men, morale, strategy and tactics have a greater impact.

in terms of equipment, the Japanese army is superior to the Chinese army in general, but it is not as far apart as many people think. On the one hand, the equipment of the Japanese army is far less than that of the western powers; On the other hand, China's weapons and equipment have also been greatly improved in the 3-year New Westernization Policy. The biggest weakness of Chinese army weapons and equipment is that the types and specifications of weapons are too mixed, which brings great difficulties to logistics supply and actual combat.

In other respects, China's army is indeed far behind the Japanese. During the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Japan's military system and organization had been modernized, but China's army followed the battalion system of the original Xiang Army, with a single arm. This establishment was suitable for the Xiang Army, which had few new weapons on both sides, to fight against the Taiping Army. However, when it was used in foreign wars, its weaknesses of ineffective command and poor coordination were fully exposed, which was in sharp contrast with the Japanese divisional system. China's army has no strict command system, no headquarters, no staff officers, and its combat deployment depends only on the supreme commander slapping his head. The armies are stationed in one place at ordinary times, and they are not subordinate to each other. They lack training and have never cooperated in military exercises. The Japanese personnel concluded: "The command of the Qing army was disordered, and there were many conflicts, but the internal friction weakened the fighting capacity of the enemy. It is unknown."

The educational level of Chinese and Japanese soldiers is very different. Half of the senior Japanese army officers have either entered their own military schools, studied military affairs in Western Europe, or inspected military affairs in Europe. However, none of the senior generals of the Chinese army have been to the new military school, and most of them are old-fashioned military commanders who come from various ranks. Although China armament school also produced some students, it did not give them the right to command the army. The education penetration rate in Japan is very high, so the education level of Japanese soldiers is much higher than that of China soldiers. Modern warfare needs not only new weapons, but also modern strategies and tactics, and needs to understand the laws of modern warfare, and the knowledge of modern warfare can only be mastered by knowledgeable people and specialized research. It is no accident that the Qing army made repeated mistakes in tactics, because China officers did not understand modern wars and their education level was too low.

let's look at the navy again. When the war broke out, the Japanese navy had 32 warships and 37 torpedo boats with a total tonnage of more than 59, tons. Beiyang Navy has 22 warships and 12 torpedo boats with a total tonnage of 41,2 tons. In addition, Beiyang warships are inferior to Japan in power, speed, age and artillery, and only Dingyuan and Zhenyuan armored ships can pose a greater threat to the Japanese army. The establishment of the navy and the education level of officers are more modern than those of the army, and there is little difference with Japan, but compared with Japan, there are still several weaknesses that cannot be ignored.

firstly, it is the defect of the head department of the navy. Although the naval yamen was established in 1885, the five ministers of the yamen, Yi Wei, Yi Kuang, Li Hongzhang, shan qing and Ceng Jize, all held other important positions, and none of them were specialized officers of the naval yamen, which was almost empty. Moreover, none of the ministers of the navy was born or trained in the navy, and Ding Ruchang, who served as the prefect of Beiyang Navy, had no special training in the navy. In this case, it is really difficult to formulate a correct strategy, and it is also difficult to cooperate with the army.

second, the navy is not unified. Although the strength of Beiyang Navy is inferior to that of Japan, it can be close to that of Japanese Navy if several ships capable of maritime operations in Nanyang and Guangdong are added. However, the navy did not form a unified command and did not belong to each other, resulting in scattered forces. After the naval battle in the Yellow Sea, Li Hongzhang tried to transfer the Nanyang ship to strengthen his strength, but failed. When the Weihai Navy surrendered, there was also a joke that the commander Niu Chang asked for the return of the Guangc ship originally belonging to Guangdong.

thirdly, it is precisely because of the defects of the head department that the China navy lacks clear and thorough plans and strategies and lacks the consciousness of competing for sea control rights. In fact, it is a defensive strategy and a passive defense strategy. Before the war, the Japanese formulated Lu Haijun's operational strategy according to three situations: naval victory, stalemate and failure, and clearly competed for sea control. So China's navy is passive everywhere.

people, weapons and organizational system are the three elements of an army's combat effectiveness, and they are all indispensable. Since the Westernization Movement, China has only focused on the renewal of weapons and military technology, but neglected the changes in system and people, which became the basic weakness of the Qing army.

The China Army is not a real national defense force. For a long time, its role has been internal rather than external. Although this situation has changed since the New Westernization Policy, it is not a fundamental change. When the reality requires it to turn to the outside world-to defend against aggression, it is far from handy. Many problems in the army are related to its functions. Japanese scholar Daosheng Fujimura commented: "Beiyang Army is equipped with mauser and Krupp guns, so in terms of weapons, it is superior to the Japanese army using Murata rifles and bronze mountain guns. But it is just an army for civil war and demonstration. It has no supplies, transportation institutions and military station equipment necessary for modern wars. Therefore, it can't concentrate its troops in one place, and its mobility is too low, and great confusion always occurs when troops are transferred. In this case, it is impossible for it to carry out mobile warfare, and retreating to defense has become the center of its operations. " ⑤ Pethick William N, the American adviser of Li Hongzhang, once said: "China has never been concerned with foreign wars, and its soldiers are scattered in all provinces, and the governors are in charge. The Ministry of War officials have no right to dispatch and meet. When the soldiers are scattered, they are divided, so they cannot compete with foreign countries. Japan switched to western France, and the army and navy were under the control of ministers, so they could work together to build a strong body. The middle and the east are different. "

After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, many officials in China saw the differences between the Chinese and Japanese armies. Li Hongzhang said at the negotiating table that the Japanese victory "proves that the European-style organization and methods of fighting in Lu Haijun are not unique to the white people, but can also be applied and succeeded by the yellow people". Yuan Shikai said: "This time, the military affairs were not caused by Serenade, but by incompetence, weakness, and lack of skills. The particular patient was that the military system was complicated, the powers were divided, and the discipline was lax. No matter how motivated, he could not be a teacher of restraint." Zhang Zhidong said: "The reason why the German Army is attached to Taixi is that there are no soldiers in the whole country, and all the officers in the generals' camps are from schools."

In a word, the military strength is weak in the middle and stronger in the day. China's weakness is not mainly in weapons, but in organizational system, the quality of officers and men, morale and lack of understanding of the laws of modern warfare.