Volunteers enter Seoul.

180 division's rout is the eternal pain of the volunteers. But what I want to say is that 70 years have passed since 195 1 years ago, and it is time to correct their names. This paper does not talk about personnel, nor responsibility, but only about the battlefield situation, and restores the historical achievements of all the soldiers of 180 Division. Because if we talk about personnel and responsibility, this problem will never be clear.

During World War II, the average attack speed of the US military in offensive campaigns was 5 to 10 km per day. When faced with volunteers in the Korean War, this figure dropped sharply. During the period of mobile warfare, the attack speed of the US military in the offensive campaign was 1.3 to 3 kilometers per day. During the positional warfare, when the volunteers did not have tunnel fortifications, the attack speed of the US military in the offensive campaign was 0.5 to 1 km per day. With tunnel fortifications, this data is zero.

It can be seen that when the US military attacked the volunteers the strongest, it could advance an average of 3 kilometers per day. This stage is the fifth campaign transfer stage.

During the 65,438+09 days from May 23rd to June 65,438+00, the US military offensive advanced 55 kilometers, with an average of 3 kilometers per day, which is the highest level for the US military to fight against the volunteers. However, it should be noted that in the first nine days, the US military offensive advanced about 45 kilometers, and in the last 10 day, the US military offensive advanced about 10 kilometers. In other words, in the first nine days, the US military can attack 5 kilometers per day, and then 10 can only attack 1 km per day.

Advancing 1 km every day is actually equivalent to the autumn defensive war of 195 1, and the situation of the US military facing the strong defensive positions of the Volunteers. And this period of time is the time when Huachuan and Tieyuan blocked wars, including other blocked wars.

In other words, Tieyuan and Huachuan blocked the war, and the temporary field works of the volunteers played the level of prepared solid positions.

195 19 On May 19, Li Qiwei flew to South Korea, where he met with Van Frith, Commander of the 8th Army, Hogg, Commander of the 9th Army and almond, Commander of the 1st Army 10. After the talks, Li Qiwei issued an order:

The 8th Army should launch an attack on May 20th to prevent the right-wing volunteers from breaking through with the right-wing 10 Army, and cooperate with the right-wing troops of the 9th Army to turn into counterattacks, and the right wing of the 9th Army should be protected by the 10 Army.

The 9th Army is in the middle of the road, attacking and occupying the highland west of Chunchuan Basin.

1 Army is the left wing, attacking along the axis from Seoul to Tieyuan, and defending the left wing of the 9th Army.

As can be seen from Li Qiwei's orders, the US military's play style is still the standard Li Qiwei play style, which is lined up hand in hand and step by step. If we follow Li Qiwei's style of play, this history will not be disputed in the handover stage of the fifth campaign. This kind of play is not afraid of volunteers at all, and it can even be said to be a gift to volunteers.

However, before the American army really turned to counterattack, at Van Frith's insistence, the deployment was changed: a large part of Huachuan Reservoir was allocated to the 9th Army. 10 inserted in the northeast to pursue the retreating volunteers and people's army. Korean 1 troops marched north along the coastline and then attacked northwest.

Obviously, Van Frith's play is a typical volunteer play. The US Army 10 Army faces the attack force, the Korean Army 1 Army is responsible for the flank attack, and the US Army's 9 th Army is interspersed with troops to isolate the contact between the 3 rd Corps of Volunteers and the 9 th Corps, cut off the rear road between the 9 th Corps and the "Golden" Corps of the People's Army, and take charge of the blockade. In this way, the 9 th Army of the US Army, the Korean Army 10 Army and 1 Army will form an encirclement network for the 9 th Corps of the Volunteers and the "Golden" Regiment of the People's Army.

However, the Huachuan blocking war of the 58th Division of the 20th Army of the Volunteers blocked the 7th Division of the US Army and the 6th Division of the Korean Army, which were responsible for infiltration, so that the troops in Van Frith's plan to stop the retreat of the Volunteers and the People's Army could not be put in place and planned to go bankrupt. The picture above shows the schematic diagram of the 27 th Army in the fifth campaign transfer stage. Let's take a look at the battle map of 19 in May drawn by the US military. Taken together, it is very obvious that the 9th Army of the US Army will completely block the retreat of the 9th Corps and the "Golden" Regiment of the People's Army after occupying Northeast Huachuan. Regarding the blocking war in Huachuan, look at the perfect trap set by the US military commander. Peng suffered, and a teacher found a way to crack it.

So, what is the relationship between Huachuan blockade and 180 division? This is very important.

Although the US Army advanced 55 kilometers on various fronts from May 23rd to June 10, an average of 3 kilometers per day does not really mean 3 kilometers per day.

Let's look at the situation of the 180 division in the middle line of the campaign, and by the way, let's look at the 179 division.

The United States Army is on the center line of the 9th Army. After launching a counterattack on May 23, it entered Huachuan on May 27, and then the 58th Division of the 20 th Army of the Volunteers launched the famous Huachuan blocking war. In the following 13 days, the 9th Army of the US Army only advanced 10 km.

The 6th Division of the Korean Army was about 48.6 kilometers away from Huachuan on May 23rd, and the 7th Division of the US Army was about 4 1 km away from Huachuan. In other words, in just five days, the two armies advanced more than 40 kilometers. It seems that the offensive is rapid, but there are actually many articles inside.

According to Li Qiwei's initial deployment, all the US and North Korean armies are heading straight for the north, and the 60th Army actually only needs to face the 7th Division of the US Army. Because Van Frith changed Li Qiwei's plan, the center of gravity of the 9th Army of the US Army moved eastward, and the 60th Army of the Volunteers had to face the whole army of the 9th Army of the US Army, namely the 7th and 24th divisions of the US Army and the 2nd and 6th divisions of the Korean Army. See the above picture for the battlefield situation. This picture can clearly see the combat situation of 180 division. I also marked it in the picture, so it is clearer.

On the surface, the 60th Army is an army. In fact, the 179 division belongs to the 15 army, and the 18 1 division belongs to the 12 army. I only have one 180 division. The other two divisions were not ordered to rebuild until the volunteers retreated northward. 179 division is not far away, 18 1 shiyuan was built on 26th.

Therefore, only two divisions in the hands of the 60th Army can fight against two American divisions and two Korean divisions of the 9th Army. In addition to the absolute disadvantage in firepower, it is also at an absolute disadvantage in strength. 1 6,000 people versus an enemy of 45,000 people, the strength contrast is nearly13.

We can imagine that without the 60th Army 179 and 180 divisions, the 7th Division of the 9th Army of the US Army and the 6th Division of the Korean Army could reach Huachuan within one day, that is, on May 24th.

In real history, 18 1 division took a road similar to that of 12 army and arrived in Huachuan on the evening of 26th. 12 Army followed 18 1 Division, the War Department and the 35th Division passed through Huachuan, and the 34th Division was still behind. 12 Army passed through Huachuan, while the 59th Division of the 20th Army passed through Huachuan. On the 27th, the 58th Division passed by Huachuan, and found that Huachuan had been occupied by American troops, so it took the initiative to stop.

If Huachuan is occupied by the enemy on May 24th, the 9th Corps 12 Army, 20th Army, 27th Army, 3rd Corps 18 1 Division, and the People's Army "Golden" Regiment will be surrounded by American troops, and basically the whole army will be wiped out.

People who don't understand the military will tell me. Even if the 180 division delayed the American army for five days, it was defeated after all.

As I said before, according to Li Qiwei's plan, 180 and 179 divisions only need to deal with one U.S. 7th division. According to Van Frith's plan, 180 and 179 divisions only need to deal with the 7th Division of the US Army and the 6th Division of the Korean Army.

In both cases, the US military could not defeat the180th Division.

But history is often made up of many coincidental details. It turned out that the front of the 63rd Army was the 6th Division of the Korean Army. According to Van Frith's plan, the 2nd Division of the Korean Army and the 24th Division of the US Army should continue to attack the 63rd Army instead of the 6th Division of the Korean Army. Because Fu Chongbi, the commander of the 63rd Army, felt that he was in danger of being surrounded by American troops, he jumped out of the encirclement of American troops and retreated northward. In this way, the face-to-face meeting between the 24th Division of the US Army and the 2nd Division of the Korean Army was without any obstacles, and it went directly to the right of 180 Division.

In front of the original 180 division was the 7th division of the US Army. During the daytime fighting on May 23rd and 24th, the 7th Division of the US Army advanced only 2km under the tenacious resistance of the 538th and 539th Regiments of the180th Division.

However, because the 24th Division of the US Army detoured to the side of 180 Division and captured the position of the Chenghuangtang of the 540th Regiment, 180 Division faced the situation of being divided into Jedi on the south bank of the Northern Han River, so 180 Division had to retreat northward and continue to be blocked on the north bank of the Northern Han River.

180 Division, when the 538th and 539th regiments were on the south bank of the North Hanshui River, it was about 5 kilometers away from the North Hanshui River, and the first-line positions of Jiguan Mountain and Chenghuangtang occupied by the 540 regiments were about 6.6 kilometers away from the North Hanshui River. After the 538th Regiment and 539th Regiment retreated northward, in order to be equal to the 540th Regiment, it was equal to that the US military could advance smoothly 1 1 km.

However, there is still a problem. For some reason, the 15 Army did not receive the order from the 3rd Corps to stop on the spot and left Chunchuan area. Therefore, the 7th Division of the US Army did not completely pursue the180th Division, but used the gap left by the15th Army to attack the northeast, and only one division continued to contact with the180th Division. The 6th Division of the Korean Army moved eastward to take over the task of continuing to attack the 180 Division.

Without this huge gap, the 179 division will retreat, just in time to stop alongside the 180 division, and the two divisions can form a whole. 179 division can fight against the 7 th division of the us army alone. 180 division's situation is almost worse. In addition to confronting the 6th Division of the Korean Army, we should also take into account the 24th Division of the US Army and the 2nd Division of the Korean Army. But at least 179 Division will not be easily defeated by the 7th Division of the US Army, and the left wing of 180 Division is guaranteed.

However, this huge gap makes it difficult for the 179 division to retreat in front of the speed of the US mechanized troops, which makes the 179 division have been fighting with the US 7th division, and the situation has become very passive.

But in the desperate situation, the 180 division showed a tenacious fighting style. Under the circumstance that the 24th Division of the US Army detoured from the rear, it fought fiercely with the 24th Division, 7th Division and 6th Division of the Korean Army, and only retreated from Jiguan Mountain to Peibei Mountain and Jiade Mountain, and retreated about 3.5 kilometers. In other words, the 9th Army of the US Army only advanced 3.5 kilometers in front of the180th Division on 24th and 25th.

However, the situation of 179 division is not optimistic. Why did the US 7th Division move eastward? One reason is to take the road to give full play to the advantages of mobility. 179 division and the 7 th division of the US Army are always in a situation where the enemy is in our midst and I am in the enemy. If we slow down, we will be surrounded. There is no way to hold positions and organize defense in such a battle.

On the morning of 26th, the Mapingli position of 179 Division was captured by the 7th Division of the US Army 17 Regiment, about 7.6 kilometers northeast of the rear of 180 Division. On 26th, the 24th Division of the US Army also captured Tanganli, about 9 kilometers northwest of 180 Division, and the road behind 180 Division was completely cut off. However, the main forces of the 24th Division of the US Army, the 6th Division of the Korean Army and the 7th Division of the US Army in front of the 180 Division still failed to make much progress, and the 180 Division still maintained the first-line position of Qudeshan. In other words, the U.S. attack on the front of the 180 division only advanced 5 kilometers from May 24 to May 26. What needs to be explained here is that the battlefield situation at that time was completely staggered. The vanguard of the 7th Division of the US Army has passed through Mapingli, and fought fiercely with the 535th and 537th Regiments of 179 Division in Yuanchuanli and ChangCurie, about 8km away from Huachuan. From south to north, 180 division and 179 division are surrounded by American and Korean troops, and the enemy and the enemy are completely mixed. Learning 180 division, it is best to make the time node accurate to the hour, but it is impossible to write it without tens of thousands of words. This article only discusses the attack speed, so it can only be omitted.

179 Division and 180 Division undertook different tasks, and 179 Division only blocked the enemy. Therefore, after the fall of Mapingli, 179 Division immediately moved to Li Shicang, otherwise the 24th Division of the US Army would cut off their back roads. 180 division undertakes the task of covering and transferring the wounded, and they can only stick to it.

In fact, we can see that even if it was bypassed by the US military, the 180 division only allowed the US military to attack 1.66 kilometers per day on average, which was much lower than the average attack speed of the US military of 3 kilometers in the fifth campaign.

After the US Army 17 Regiment occupied Mapingli, it continued its assault on Huachuan on the 27th, with a distance of about 17.6 km ... By noon on the 27th, the US Army occupied Huachuan. Fortunately, at this time, the 58 th Division of the 20 th Army rushed to Huachuan and took the initiative to stop the rapid progress of the US military.

180 division has several opportunities to retreat northward to get rid of difficulties. Both the book about 180 and the memoir of 180 think this is the key to avoid failure.

But the teacher Zheng Qigui always insisted on carrying out the orders of his superiors and stopped them on the spot. Parking on the spot is a dead end 180 division knows from top to bottom that all divisional cadres and heads of political commissars have proposed to withdraw from the north, but in the end 180 division party committee held a meeting to study and decided to stay in place.

If the 180 division does not insist on blocking, the US military can reach Huachuan on the 24th at the earliest and 26th at the latest. Ma Ping fell on the morning of 26th. If the 180 division is not still holding back the American army, the American army can directly attack Huachuan.

No matter on the 24th, 25th or 26th, at this time node, none of the 9th Corps can reach Huachuan. The 9 th Corps and the "Golden" Corps of the People's Army, which have run out of food, will be surrounded by 100% American troops, and no troops can rescue them. The American army doesn't even have to attack, and hunger can defeat hundreds of thousands of troops.

Therefore, I have always disagreed with the statement that "180 division suffered a fiasco". 180 division was indeed defeated, but it was not a fiasco. What do you mean by fiasco? There are mistakes in command, problems in judgment and improper handling, and it is really impossible to defeat the enemy. This is called a fiasco. Someone will tell me that the 180 division lost three or four thousand people. Why not a fiasco? Then you can check the casualties of various units in the previous anti-Japanese war and the specific losses in the fifth battle of the 3 rd Corps, and then tell me. This article does not list data, so as not to be used by people with ulterior motives.

180 division didn't make any mistakes except the final breakthrough. The whole division knows that blocking is a dead end. 180 division who doesn't know? Then why did they stay? This is the characteristic of the PLA, and there are always troops who take the initiative to sacrifice. 180 division was unwilling to sacrifice and ran away by itself. What about the transferred troops? Especially the wounded? What about the 9 th Corps and the "Golden" Corps of the People's Army?

In fact, this is the case, either 180 division dies, or the wounded and the 9 th Corps die. This is a multiple-choice question with only two options! 180 division finally chose to resolutely carry out orders and die.

This is not a fiasco, but self-sacrifice, which is the overall situation.

It was American platoon leader Barnes who threw the Grenade. Facing the 180 division, the performance of American infantry is still not good. The soldiers hid aside, but the platoon leader was fighting bravely. After the fiasco of the second battle, the American army added a large number of veterans. These company commanders and platoon leaders were the backbone, and these people were also the main force in the subsequent battles. Without these World War II veterans, the fighting capacity of American infantry would be weak.

This article will not expand, but simply talk about the attack speed of the US offensive campaign. It may be premature to really discuss the division of 180. However, as a researcher to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, I appeal whether we should re-examine the issue of 180 division. Our army has always been strict, which is understandable in wartime and previous historical background. For example, the head of the 180 regiment mentioned in the previous article of Watergate Bridge died in Huangcaoling. While praising him, the 20 th Military Discipline still made a very severe criticism.

But things are different now. We can re-examine this history and be more peaceful. There is no doubt that the 180 division was defeated. However, the defeat of 180 division is a sacrifice to the overall situation and should be faced squarely. Is the role played by 180 Division too one-sided? Should we change our thinking? This article does not talk about personnel and responsibility. These things are unclear, but the battlefield situation map will never deceive people.

You will be praised for managing your troops well. The troops will be criticized for their losses. So if it is to save other troops and make your own troops suffer losses, should it be praised or criticized? The consequence of Mr. Zheng Qigui's resolute execution of the orders of his superiors is that he suffered losses and other troops were saved.

Many people accuse Zheng Qigui of mechanically carrying out the orders of his superiors, unaware of the changes and afraid to "accept military orders from outside." This is a big joke. You can't just think about yourself. 180 division can really run, and there are several opportunities. But as long as 180 runs away, the 9 th Corps will definitely be finished. So this is not a mechanical execution of superior orders, but a resolute execution of superior orders.

This is party spirit, absolute loyalty to the party, initiative, courage to take responsibility, not afraid of difficulties, and dare to sacrifice.