Why did everyone become capitalist after the collapse of the Soviet Union instead of continuing to be socialist?

Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate?

The disintegration of the socialist camp

The crisis in the Soviet Union was against the background that the communist system in Central Europe and Central Europe encountered crises at the same time. happened next. In every country there are many common causes of crises, as well as special ones. The Hungarian Communist Party disintegrated after Kadar's death. Ceausescu was shot without trial or investigation in Romania. The 80-year-old Jaruzelski still lives in his own home in Poland and is respected and cared for by most of his compatriots. Honecker was expected to spend several years in prison before his death. Zhivkov was arrested at his home.

There is an idea that first links the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Soviet Union with the disintegration of the socialist camp. In this regard, events in Poland and the GDR played a special role. The Berlin Wall fell, the communist systems of Poland and the Democratic Republic of Germany fell, and neither the Warsaw Pact, the Economic Cooperation Council, nor the Soviet Union could exist. In this regard, the failure of communism in Eastern Europe was not only related to Western pressure, but also to the Catholic Church. The head of the Catholic Church, Pope John Pavel II, signed a secret agreement with Reagan to fight Soviet rule in Eastern European countries. One Reagan adviser affirmed that this was "one of the greatest secret alliances of all time." These are huge exaggerations. Various contacts and agreements between the Vatican and the White House undoubtedly existed. Solidarity and Walesa's seizure of power in Poland caused many difficulties for the Soviet Union. But there was much more reverse causation: as the crisis in the Soviet Union developed, its pressure on the Eastern European countries eased, and "moderate revolutions" occurred here one after another.

The Soviet Union's "external empire" in many ways caused more difficulties than advantages to the Soviet Union's external and internal stability. In the early 1980s, Kissinger pointed out this point when analyzing the future of the Soviet Union after Brezhnev's death. He wrote in the autumn of 1982: "On the one hand, the Soviet international policy has not been a terrible success. It is said, and not just a joke, that the Soviet Union is the only country in the world surrounded by hostile communist countries. The satellite orbit provides The factors were not working for the development of the Soviet Union, but for the decline of the Soviet economy.” (Newsweek, Issue 48, 1982) Gorbachev sought to reduce the Soviet Union’s obligations in the outside world—in Africa and Cuba, in the Middle East. and Asia, in Eastern European countries and Afghanistan, in an attempt to enhance capabilities within the Soviet Union. However, the political and economic crisis in our country is developing too fast, and its reasons have little to do with the status of Poland and the Democratic Republic of Germany, and little to do with Reagan and Pavel.

Gorbachev’s role

The Soviet Union went bankrupt when Gorbachev was the captain of our ship. Towards "reform" and "new thinking". It is true that the sea was not calm at that time, and the danger sometimes came from the left, sometimes from the right, and sometimes went straight along the channel. There was no better way to command the ship, and the captain himself was not very confident. At the same time, the big ship is too bulky and not so strong. It cannot travel at high speeds, carry heavy loads, or make sharp turns. As a result, the captain was unable to steer, and our ship lay on the rocks, losing its flag and being partially damaged. This is a generally very succinct picture of events between 1985 and 1991. However, many Western observers offered a more succinct assessment. They believe that it was Gorbachev who only used the power of his will to reverse the course of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe, ended the Cold War, changed everything in his country, and opened up the road from totalitarianism to democracy. It was Gorbachev who abandoned "Brezhnev Doctrine", withdrew the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, abandoned Marxism-Leninism and class struggle, and put not narrow national interests in foreign policy but all mankind value in the first place.

Among Gorbachev's staunch supporters are some Russian authors who have also written about his role in overthrowing totalitarianism, about his great historical achievements, and even about his role in destroying totalitarianism. The country and the system he wanted to reform later failed. Indeed, he single-handedly removed the totalitarian monolith of Soviet society. However, he failed to control the boulder. The boulder with its rivets missing rolled down, breaking the seemingly indestructible foundation, scattering many people and many institutions, and pressing them underneath. Gorbachev's opponents also usually blame Gorbachev alone for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union. They judged him more pointedly, not in terms of his "merits" but in terms of his "crimes" or "betrayals." “Could Gorbachev alone destroy an entire country?” ex-diplomat Smolyakov shouted to Gorbachev himself at a meeting of the Gorbachev Foundation. “It’s very possible. , if this person is the General Secretary." There are even many people who have gone through the entire "reform" road with him who blame Gorbachev for the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev himself never admitted that he was trying to disintegrate the Soviet Union, nor did he admit that his actions objectively helped this tragedy. He usually placed all the blame for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union on Yeltsin and the democrats, on the State Extraordinary Committee, and even on the governments led initially by Ryzhkov and later by Pavlov. "I cannot bear the responsibility for the collapse of the Soviet Union." Gorbachev repeated this sentence many times on different occasions.

I believe that Gorbachev’s behavior during his years in power went through several stages in terms of motives and effects. In this respect, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union was never the explicit purpose, nor the hidden purpose, of his work. In the first phase, Gorbachev sought to ease Cold War tensions and accelerate Soviet economic development. Subsequently, he turned his focus to developing national and party democracy, and to all the work included in the concept of "socialism with a human face". It is also Gorbachev's credit to develop glasnost and re-examine many of the past dogmatic and hypocritical evaluations of the Soviet Union's history. However, Gorbachev did not act cautiously and disorganized. He overestimated his own strength and possibilities, and underestimated possible hostilities. He rarely thought about ways to overcome the difficulties that arose. He did not rely on the support of the people. He immediately started to do so many things while ignoring as many factors and circumstances. Tragedy was inevitable. In the last two years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev's main motivation was no longer reform, but issues related to his personal power in the country and the Soviet Union. His main achievement during this period was his refusal to concentrate on the use of force. Overall, Gorbachev made many mistakes. His role in the disintegration of the Soviet Union was significant, but not as much as those who disliked him claimed. Below I attempt to list only what I consider to be the most serious of Gorbachev's mistakes.

Wrong priority. As early as 1985-1986, Gorbachev had inappropriately prioritized work. The main problem that workers, farmers and employees look to leaders to solve is low living standards. This is the basic link. If you grasp this link, you can pull out the entire chain of other issues. Only policies that rapidly and significantly improve living standards and quality, especially at local levels, can ensure solid support among residents for the new leadership and create prerequisites for solving other problems. However, as we all know, Gorbachev put the task of accelerating the development of machine manufacturing industry at the top of his economic work. In domestic policies, the task of combating alcoholism and striving for "healthy lifestyles" and opposing "unearned income" is given top priority. However, machine building was already a priority even in the early 1930s. It is impossible to resort to crude administrative measures to combat alcoholism and "unearned income" without causing popular dissatisfaction. In order to change the status quo, Gorbachev put the program of democratization, openness and political reform at the top of the list from 1987 to 1988.

This was supported by most intellectuals, but not by ordinary citizens whose material conditions continued to deteriorate. Under the conditions of glasnost and democratization, when the state power was lost due to the lack of thoughtful and hasty political reforms, the dissatisfaction of the country's residents came to the surface and was directed against Gorbachev himself and the Soviet leadership. . Because of this, Gorbachev has become the main target of criticism from all parties since the end of 1989, not only from conservatives but also from democrats. This was a big shock for him personally.

Under the influence and pressure from below, Gorbachev began to change economic policies. The campaigns against "unearned income" and against alcoholism ceased. Decisions were adopted to expand individual labor practices, cooperative practices, and private trade. The first batch of cooperative cafes, snack bars, and restaurants appeared in the city. Private residences are allowed to be bought and sold freely on the outskirts of the city. Privatization of urban housing began. Villa construction has been added. Many restrictions on the use of horticulture and home garden economics have been lifted. All of these are steps in the right direction. However, concurrently there are an increasing number of other destructive processes, more destructive than constructive. What we are talking about here is the reckless and hasty introduction of market relations into the Soviet economy, which destroyed many political systems that were based on the prestige of the Soviet Union. The slogan of strengthening Soviet power was combined with the demand to weaken "the leadership and guiding role of the Soviet Communist Party." "All power goes to the Soviets!" Sakharov stood in front of the entrance of the conference hall of the First People's Congress of the Soviet Union holding a large slogan like this. However, the 1989-style Soviets were not prepared to run the country; they were created and worked merely as a "conveyor belt" for the party. The suggestions and attempts to compensate for the weakening power of the Soviet Union are to increase the personal power of the "reform leaders". Such suggestions and attempts were based on the establishment of a Soviet presidential system and were unsuccessful. It is impossible to establish some new power system that is stronger than the Politburo and the General Secretary without relying on the country's existing party institutions. Gorbachev, as the "reform leader", can only guarantee the people's confidence in themselves if he achieves real results in the economy and in improving the living standards of the country's people, as well as in all other fields of activity that are important to the people. independent support and rely on their own political capital and prestige. However, Gorbachev in 1989-1990 no longer had such political capital. Therefore, the weakening of the power and prestige of the Soviet Union was accompanied by the weakening of Gorbachev's power - whether he was the General Secretary or the President of the Soviet Union. While Gorbachev was under increasing pressure from both liberals and conservatives, he accepted the people's mandate in the general election. He fell into a political dead end and could not find a reasonable exit.

Overly hasty democratic reforms. Gorbachev was too hasty when it came to democratization. Similar to Khrushchev, Gorbachev was extremely impatient and advocated improvisation. At the same time, the transition from an authoritarian system to a democratic system, and from extreme centralization to a decentralized market economy, is not only a large-scale practical political task, but also a scientific and theoretical issue. Democracy, which is a complex system of relational procedures and traditions, cannot simply manifest itself in a country in accordance with the wishes of its leaders. The power structure of democracy is much more complex than that of authoritarianism, and being a democratic leader is much more difficult than being a dictator or monarch. The establishment of a democratic system in Western countries requires 200 to 300 years of struggle and revolution, and requires the accumulation of experience and cultural development. When Deng Xiaoping called on the Chinese people to build a modern society in their country, he said it would take 100 years. This was a realistic attitude. In the Soviet Union, the required period may be shorter, but it will still be at least 25 to 30 years. Some of Gorbachev's opponents accused him of staging a "counterrevolutionary coup" or establishing some kind of "superpower." However, these blames are wrong. Gorbachev's purpose was not clear to him, and it did not go further than vague good intentions.

None of Gorbachev's supporters and aides could articulate these aims clearly. It is true that Gorbachev reduced the power of the party apparatus. In the summer of 1990, I was elected as a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and began to spend part of my time in the Old Square. Party organs, whether at the central or local levels, have no real power; they just work ineffectively according to custom. Even the apparatus of the Soviet President had no power at that time, it had not even been formed. The Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union also has no actual power. I was elected as a representative of the Supreme Soviet in 1989. The country developed a powerless system. Under such circumstances, some people and institutions that had no influence on the country as early as two or three years ago filled the power vacuum with almost no hindrance. In any case, these were not Gorbachev's people. Gorbachev failed to reverse these processes of state disintegration.

Gorbachev’s ideological weaknesses. Ideology was one of the main pillars of the Soviet state and society. Therefore, any major reform required an ideological foundation. This is a difficult but not hopeless task for the leaders of the Soviet Union. The universal principles of socialism can coexist with the reasonable requirements of the market economy and the new relationship with private ownership. However, Gorbachev was not an expert on ideology, and he did not understand any formulation of socialist theoretical issues. Gorbachev grasped the extremely simplified Marxist-Leninist dogma and failed to push forward this substitute for socialist ideology. Gorbachev was an extremely superficial person in all aspects of his treatment of economic science, political science, sociology, social psychology, and management science. Indeed, Gorbachev proposed the slogan "New Thinking." However, he did not create any "new thinking." In "Perestroika and New Thinking", Gorbachev did not propose a new concept worthy of attention. Gorbachev declared that the development of the Soviet Union had deviated from the "basic direction of world civilization" before 1985. Therefore, the Soviet Union, which was "isolated from the rest of the world," must be integrated into a new world community. The author of this book called on Soviet citizens to live in the future "in accordance with world law and the laws of the civilized world." However, all of this is empty talk and often absurdly abstract concepts. These concepts are as wrong and dangerous as the Soviet leaders' attempts to impose Soviet socialist laws and principles on the entire world. Gorbachev's call for all countries in the world to build their own relations on the basis of national principles is also a purely abstract concept. Western experts looked for a "cunning" that they could not understand in these declarations, and then they talked with amazement about Gorbachev's "lack of cunning". But this is not a compliment. Of course, Gorbachev did add a new tone, moderation, and wisdom to international policy, and he also raised a new set of controversial topics. How will things play out? All this, pessimists assert, is window dressing and "new thinking" a propaganda gimmick. However, the "moderate revolution" in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany are no longer propaganda. The West welcomed these events with encouragement but also with confusion. How to explain the Soviet Union's unexpected concessions? What are the prospects? One Soviet scholar wrote: "The first act of the drama that began when Gorbachev came to power was played." The second act was the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.

Brezhnev was not an ideologist, but he had an ideological headquarters headed by Suslov. However, Gorbachev did not have such a headquarters. Ligachev, Yakovlev, and Medvedev have all done ideological work in the Politburo. They are completely different people, and they each have their own ideological views. If the evidence provided by the memoirs is to be believed, Gorbachev's main ideological authority was his wife, Raisa Maximovna. She once defended her PhD thesis in applied sociology. The helplessness of Gorbachev's ideology caused confusion and unease even among the most thoughtful observers in the West.

Robert Hill wrote as early as 1990: "Gorbachev's difficulty is that certain questions have no answers." Sociologists have not yet made any relevant suggestions. Socialist political economy is full of outdated concepts and cannot keep up with the logic of life. How could the new Soviet leaders replace old incentives with a new labor ethic? Openness might have made writers feel as comfortable as drinking, but for ordinary people lining up to buy real wine, Gore Bachov's ban on alcohol probably caused greater anger than the anger against Stalin caused by their sudden revelation. Gorbachev was left behind not because of the opposition of the KGB and the army, but because of social protests. Gorbachev himself admitted that he should control a society that was almost impossible to control. No one can doubt Gorbachev's candor. However, the atmosphere in society is becoming increasingly tense. Many people began to ask the question: "Have you ever thought about starting all this?" ("America" ??magazine, Issue 10, 1990, page 94)

We see that Gorbachev has already begun to solve these problems Problem, however, there was nothing he could do to solve even a small part of it.

Weaknesses of Gorbachev’s team. During the Soviet regime, our country cultivated strong leading cadres in science and technology, the military field, and certain production departments, but it did not cultivate strong leading cadres in the field. In terms of general will quality and intellectual level, the people around Stalin were weaker than those around Lenin. This degradation continued into the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras and is still occurring under Gorbachev. During the Gorbachev period, there were no longer people like Kosygin, Gromyko, Andropov, and Ustinov. Those people determined the level of political leadership in the 1970s. Gorbachev often replaced top leaders, but after he kicked out less incompetent leaders, he replaced them with more incompetent but more obedient people, although these people soon followed him A conflict occurred. Gorbachev did not recognize people. What's worse is that he also has a bad characteristic that is not allowed for a political leader: almost every time he meets with the people around him, cultural activists, and people's representatives, Gorbachev always Talks to oneself most of the time, without giving the interlocutor a chance to speak. Sometimes, Gorbachev invited people to ask for opinions, but he himself spoke for an hour, two hours, or even three hours, and then said goodbye. He doesn't like hearing negative news, and he doesn't even like it when members of the Politburo report to the General Secretary. Gorbachev was slow to respond to criticism, as his most popular cultural interlocutors would later point out. Gorbachev was not a despot or a dictator, he was an approachable man. But he is not good at being a strong democratic leader. He presided over most meetings imperiously; there was a strange combination of internal distrust and external confidence. He always predicted rather than acted, postponing many of the most important decisions. As a result, it "went through the motions," but in a completely different direction.

Time lost and inaction. Gorbachev admitted in his memoirs that he lost the first two years of his leadership to perestroika. This is a time for conversation and reflection, not reform. Vigorous reforms only began in 1987-1988, but they were carried out in a hurry and in different directions, so they had little effect. Gorbachev's work has been extremely intense in recent years. He grasped everything, but did nothing to the end. In the second half of 1989, Gorbachev's actions began to take on a defensive character. Within another six months, active defense gave way to concessions. Gorbachev gave in to pressure from conservatives, radicals, and the West. He allowed conservatives to establish their own Communist Party of Russia, and he allowed radicals to occupy decisive positions in the power agencies of the Russian Federation. To the West, he ceded former Soviet territory in Germany and Eastern Europe without any compensation.

An American politician later wrote, "He made concession after concession at our feet." Gorbachev occupied the post of President of the Soviet Union and did nothing for a long time. As a politician, his prestige was among all classes of residents. Decline rapidly. "Gorbachev fell into a vortex of his own making." "The greater the difficulty, the more Gorbachev's power becomes a formality." "The question is not whether Gorbachev will fail, but when and how this failure will happen." "Gorbachev's power is only in the political field, but there is no system in place in factories and farms." "Gorbachev's presidency is the kingdom of a funny mirror." This is only a partial excerpt from a Western newspaper article in June 1990. In the second half of 1990 and 1991, Gorbachev's political concessions continued, and his bankruptcy became inevitable. However, due to the power of state institutions, this bankruptcy means the bankruptcy of the system. Under the conditions of 1990-1991, for Gorbachev, action meant the use of force. But he was unable and unwilling to do so. Later, Gorbachev said that his moral beliefs prohibited him from using force, even to save the country at a critical moment. It is difficult to agree with such an argument as a general principle. However, the use of force under the conditions of 1991 could lead to worse results. Therefore, it is unfounded to talk about the "Gorbachev factors" in the collapse of the Soviet Union and to accuse him too harshly. However, as a reformer, there is no basis for exalting him. The disease Gorbachev set out to treat was serious and neglected. Treatment should have begun as early as the 1950s. However, Stalin's terror was too destructive, and his tyranny left a political, moral, and cadre vacuum in his wake. The degradation of elites and negative cadre selection continued after Stalin's death. Under these conditions, what could Gorbachev do?

The collapse of the Soviet Union and Yeltsin

The struggle for power and influence between Gorbachev and Yeltsin The struggle, in the final stages of "perestroika", almost became the main factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union, of which Yeltsin was on the active side. Gorbachev was like a caretaker at this time. He could only shout and gently wave the weapons handed to him, but he did not want to use them. The possessions entrusted to him were quite precious: power, party and state. But Gorbachev felt that neither Yeltsin nor the democrats were such dangerous opponents, and there was no need to shoot them. Although Yeltsin was on the offensive side, he was completely unarmed and acted as a statesman even though he did not quite understand why he was fighting.

Yeltsin never believed that he was responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union. He always claimed that the leaders who gathered in the Belovezh jungle in December 1991 only confirmed the death of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin placed the main responsibility for the disintegration of the Soviet Union on "conservative elements in the Soviet Communist Party" and Gorbachev. However, Yeltsin did not express regret for the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union. For him, these political and ideological structures were not values ??that he should defend. What he wants to fight for is power in a certain irrational sense.

Gorbachev himself brought Yeltsin into the Moscow power structure. The conflict between him and Yeltsin became acute as early as the autumn of 1989, but at that time it was more manifested as the conflict between Yeltsin and Ligachev. Gorbachev was also under pressure from the "conservatives", so he kept Yeltsin in high-level positions in the Soviet Central Committee and ministers. However, he said: "I will not let you do more. Get involved in politics." But Yeltsin returned to larger politics in 1989 amid a wave of social sentiment. His conflict with Gorbachev intensified, but at that time he got rid of the internal structure of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union. Yeltsin led the "democrats" and tried to use any inappropriate steps taken by Gorbachev to criticize him. But Gorbachev did not engage in any political struggle with Yeltsin's "caucus", although he had many opportunities and reasons.

By the beginning of 1990, the image of Gorbachev as an unreliable, weak and incompetent leader had been formed not only among the people, but also among Party and Soviet activists. He talks a lot but doesn't solve the problem. Instead, many felt that Yeltsin was a stronger, more charismatic leader who could put the country on the right track and end poverty and crime, abuse of power and corruption. Western observers and Soviet scholars worriedly observed Yeltsin's increase in prestige and political progress. They felt that Yeltsin was an unpredictable and rude leader, a conceited member of the People's Party who lacked a program and useful ideas. A Western analyst wrote: "The Soviet Union will one day fall into the hands of this cunning, vain man, who has a strong desire for power and the flexibility to achieve his own goals. But his experience cannot convince people that Russia will be better off because of it.” However, it was Yeltsin who fit most people’s psychological requirements for a strong leader at the time.

The emergence of democrats is not so much a powerful political movement as it is the emotions and tendencies arising from political openness. Without the leadership of a strong and authoritative leader like Yeltsin, this faction would not be able to compete with the Soviet Union, which had been weakened and lost its prestige. Even the "constructors of reform" all together cannot build a dynamic party and political system. The new People's Deputies of the Russian Federation elected in 1990 also failed to achieve this goal. However, it was this democrats, based more on radical sentiment than on actual political power, that destroyed the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union. The situation in the Soviet Union in 1991 reminds people of the situation in Russia in 1917. The bankruptcy of the monarchy brought several bourgeois democratic parties to power. The influence of the Bolsheviks was not great. Even in the summer of 1917, the Bolshevik Party was still an absolute minority in the capital and localities. The Kornilov Rebellion, like the Emergency Committee, accelerated the radicalization of the masses. However, the decisive factor in the revolution was the powerful image of Lenin, who led the Bolsheviks and convinced them that they could and must seize state power. Yeltsin played the role of Lenin in 1991. As early as 1990, some of Gorbachev's aides suggested that he personally lead the democratic faction, that is, split the Soviet Union. But Gorbachev failed to take this step. He had neither the ability nor the temperament to lead the people. Yeltsin successfully played this role in 1991. However, like Walesa in Poland, he is not capable of playing other more complex roles.

The Instability of the Soviet Union's Foundations and Load-bearing Structures

In observing the events of 1991, what we all saw was the unquestionable facade of the Soviet Union as a great world power. Strong, incompatible with the weakness of the forces and movements that destroyed this superpower. The Soviet Union was an extraordinary country among a host of other countries. This is a new type of country, this is a historical challenge, this is a new economic, political and ethnic relations system, this is a new social plan, its emergence and development have determined the face of the 20th century in many aspects. It seemed that only some extraordinary force on a world scale could inflict serious losses on the Soviet Union.

Doubts about the strength and stability of the Soviet state existed early on, but disappeared after World War II. Of course, the October Revolution was well prepared and was accomplished in 1917 by a small party led by a radical Marxist-Leninist group. Most observers at the time believed that the Soviet government led by Lenin would soon collapse. But the Bolsheviks shocked the world. They succeeded in establishing Soviet power in almost all of a country as vast as Russia, and then won a brutal civil war. In the last 20 years, they built a strong state, a strong and centralized economy, and a well-equipped armed force. The Soviet state was not only able to achieve victory in the Great Patriotic War, but it was also able to quickly restore its war-damaged economy and build a nuclear industry.

It has established powerful military, political and economic groups in Europe and Asia, and also established military bases in Africa and Latin America.

In 1990, the Soviet Union had 20 million party members. It has a monopoly on information, publishes thousands of newspapers and magazines, and has tens of thousands of propagandists and agitators. The party controls all the country's radio stations and television channels. The Soviet Union has huge financial and economic resources and leads the world's most powerful national security system and the world's most powerful military. Such countries suddenly begin to decline and disintegrate, seemingly due to weak impacts. The fate of a powerful country can only prove one thing - the foundation it is built on is not strong enough and stable enough, and its load-bearing structure has shortcomings. If the foundations can be washed away and weakened, if the load-bearing structures are damaged by corrosion, then this can lead to the collapse of the building itself, no matter how majestic and solid it looks from the side.

The Soviet dictatorship in the Soviet Union was very harsh and all-encompassing, but the country persisted from the beginning, not only during the great suppression, but also under the pressure and temptation of ideological doctrines. in the belief in this doctrine by a large part of the party and by broad strata of the population. Communist doctrine and all the main principles of building the first socialist country in history are not only based on faith and trust, they also need to be proven. What we are talking about here is not things in the underworld, eternal life in heaven, God and the immortal soul, but a new and more righteous life, happiness and well-being on this earth, the elimination of war and violence, freedom and happiness. On the one hand, the attractive ideological doctrine, on the other hand, the coercive power of the state - these are the two pillars of the Soviet state, its load-bearing structure is the Soviet Union, which leads and defends the new Ideological doctrine.

The main argument of the doctrine was stated most clearly by its founders Marx, Engels and Lenin - to achieve higher labor productivity than capitalism and to achieve a higher living standard of working people than capitalism. The greater the expectations for this doctrine, the greater the disappointment.

The first crisis of Soviet power occurred in 1921. If Lenin had not implemented the "New Economic Policy" and revised the doctrine itself, no dictatorship at that time could have saved the Bolsheviks' defeat. The lives of workers and farmers have improved, the party's prestige has increased, and the country has been strengthened.

The second crisis of the Soviet regime began at the end of 1928 and lasted for five years. The crisis was overcome, not by some new liberalization in economic and political life, but by mass terror. The wealthy peasants were summarily eliminated as a "class" and the remaining peasants were forcibly united into collective farms, a process that began under the strict supervision of the party and the state. In collectivization, political motivations were primary, not economic ones. Therefore, some poor peasants who opposed collectivization