Paper: How did modern China explore the road of China's revolution and construction?

Taking the revolutionary road of encircling cities from rural areas and seizing political power by armed forces is the only correct way to win the revolution in China. This revolutionary road, which is different from the Soviet Union's completion of the October Revolution, was called "Jinggangshan Road" by later generations. But this revolutionary road with China characteristics was not formed in Jinggangshan, but in the central revolutionary base area. Mao Zedong is the main representative of the Communist Party of China (CPC) people. He has made in-depth analysis, thinking, continuous refining and theoretical generalization on the practical experience of establishing the central revolutionary base area. She is closely related to the process of establishing the central revolutionary base area, and is the crystallization of the practical experience of establishing the central revolutionary base area.

First, the exploration of China's revolutionary road began in Jinggangshan, but it was not completed in Jinggangshan.

1927 after the failure of the Great Revolution, how should China take the road of revolution? This is a question that the whole party is thinking about. As we all know, the October Revolution in the Soviet Union was centered on cities, and the proletariat first launched armed workers' riots in the central cities to seize revolutionary power. Influenced by the successful experience of this revolution, young the Communist Party of China (CPC) did not treat the Soviet revolutionary experience correctly, but mechanically copied the successful experience of the Soviet revolution, followed the example of the October Revolution of Soviet Russia, and positioned the revolutionary center in a big city. Then he led and launched a series of urban armed uprisings such as Nanchang Uprising and Guangzhou Uprising. However, under the siege of powerful enemies, these uprisings failed successively. Practice has proved that the China Revolution cannot simply imitate the model of the Soviet Revolution. Some thoughtful party member began to explore a new revolutionary road.

Mao Zedong is an outstanding representative of the Communist Party of China (CPC)'s exploration of a new revolutionary road.

1927 autumn, Mao Zedong and others led the autumn harvest uprising on the Hunan-Jiangxi border. After the rebels captured several cities around Changsha and suffered setbacks, he did not agree with the idea that most people would continue to attack Changsha. On the contrary, he persuaded other uprising leaders to resolutely bring the uprising troops to the countryside in the middle of Luoxiaoshan to preserve the revolutionary forces. As a result, he successfully obtained the support and help of Jinggangshan peasant armed forces and Yuan, and gained a firm foothold in Jinggangshan. Immediately in Jinggangshan district, he led farmers to fight local tyrants and divide fields, carried out agrarian revolution and established workers and peasants' political power, which won the support and support of the broad masses of farmers. In practice, this created the first rural revolutionary base in China-Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base. The mountain village on the border of Hunan and Jiangxi is a weak area of the enemy's ruling power, and the armed forces of workers and peasants and revolutionary forces have developed rapidly. 1in April, 928, the rest of the Nanchang Uprising Army led by Zhu De and Chen Yi joined the Autumn Harvest Uprising Army led by Mao Zedong to form the Fourth Army of the Chinese Red Army of Workers and Peasants (Zhu De served as commander, party representative and secretary of the front committee), which strengthened the revolutionary force in Jinggangshan.

From 1927 to 10, Mao Zedong led the revolutionary struggle in Jinggangshan for one year and two months. During this period, on the basis of summing up the struggle experience of establishing Jinggangshan revolutionary base area and his own understanding of the international and domestic situation, Mao Zedong first established the theory of armed separation of workers and peasants, which scientifically answered the question of the emergence, existence and development of China's red regime surrounded by white regime. This is a great progress made by China producers in exploring the correct revolutionary road. But at this time, Mao Zedong has not yet got rid of the influence of city-centrism. Mao Zedong's troops on Jinggangshan were more forced and helpless than conscious action. He founded the Jinggangshan rural revolutionary base only to preserve the revolutionary forces, as an important factor to seize power in cooperation with urban riots in the future. Why do you say that? Just before the Red Fourth Front Army went down to Jinggangshan, in a report written to the Central Committee by Mao Zedong on behalf of Jinggangshan Front Committee on June 5438+0928+0 1, it was clearly stated: "If Gannan is regarded as a retrogression, this road will never be taken unless it is economically unsustainable. We may have to go to Gannan, but it is entirely for economic reasons. (1) He believes that Gannan is located in a remote mountainous area in the upper reaches of the Ganjiang River, which can only affect one province in Jiangxi, and its political influence is far less than that of Jinggangshan, which is of little help to seize the political power of the central city. Therefore, GongSiJun can't go to Gannan unless absolutely necessary. This proves that in Jinggangshan, Mao Zedong has not got rid of the shackles of the theory of city center, and has not established the idea that the center of China's revolution has shifted from the city to the countryside.

Second, the correct understanding of the correct path of China's revolution comes from the struggle practice of Gongsi Army in guerrilla warfare in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian.

1929 65438+ 10, in order to break the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" of Jinggangshan base area, Mao Zedong and Zhu De led the Gongsi Army to attack Gannan and conduct offensive defense. The Red Fourth Front Army left Jinggangshan in June+10/October 65438+April 65438 and entered Shangyou and Chongyi in southern Jiangxi via Suichuan. 65438+1October 20, occupied Dayu county. The original plan of "encircling Wei to save Zhao" was broken because of the defeat in the battle with the pursuers. Gongsijun had to retreat to the mountainous area at the border of Jiangxi and Guangdong, and then fought with the enemy several times in Pingding 'ao, Chongxian, Yueziwei and Jitan, all of which failed. Gongsijun had to get rid of the enemy's pursuit at a speed of 80 or 90 miles a day and move to Xinfeng, Dingnan, Anyuan, Xunwu and Huichang. On February 9th, GongSiJun ambushed the northern part of Ruijin, using the favorable local terrain, adowa chased two regiments of the enemy's Liu Shiyi Department, captured more than 800 people and captured more than 800 troops, completely reversed the passive situation and advanced to occupy Ningdu County. With the help of the Ningdu Party organization, it has been preliminarily rested and supplemented. On February 18, he arrived at Donggu Revolutionary Base and joined forces with the 2nd and 4th Independent Regiments of Jiangxi Red Army. After a week's rest in the East Valley, my strength completely recovered. Knowing that Jinggangshan fell, the original plan of combining internal and external lines to break the enemy's "social repression" could not be realized. Drawing on the experience of the Red Second and Fourth Regiments, the Red Fourth Front Army advanced to the border between Jiangxi and Fujian through Guangchang and Shicheng. On March 14, the second Huncheng Brigade of Guo, an indigenous warlord in western Fujian, was annihilated in the southwest of Changting. The brigade commander Guo was killed and occupied Tingzhou, an important town in western Fujian. A large number of materials were raised in Tingzhou City, and the reorganization of troops was completed. The Red Fourth Front Army was restored to more than 3,600 people, and it also helped to establish the political power of the Revolutionary Committee of Changting County.

From 65438+1October 14 to March 14 when it entered Tingzhou, Gongsijun fought in Gannan and western Fujian for two months and made a big turn, and got a personal and comprehensive understanding of the natural geography, economic situation, revolutionary foundation and enemy forces in Gannan and western Fujian. Mao Zedong put forward in Jinggangshan that the existence and development of the armed regime of workers and peasants must meet five basic conditions, namely, "(1) has good masses; (2) Have a good party; (3) A Red Army with considerable strength; (4) Having terrain that is convenient for fighting; (5) Have sufficient economic strength. " (2) In this area, especially in the Donggu base area, Mao Zedong was deeply inspired when he basically dealt with the enemy's pursuit in a roundabout way. He strongly felt that it was possible to establish a new and larger revolutionary base area in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian. On March 20th, Mao Zedong hosted an enlarged meeting of the front committee of Gongsijun in Geng Xin Villa in Changting, and made a strategic decision of "Jiangxi Red Army 4th Army, 5th Army, 2nd and 4th Regiment". In the early days of the Kuomintang war, from guerrilla tactics to mobilizing the masses, and even opening up the Soviet regime, congresses were held. ③

At that time, the war between Chiang Kai-shek and Guangxi was about to break out, and a new situation favorable to the development of revolutionary forces appeared in the domestic political situation. Gongsijun took advantage of the enemy's lack of time to take care of the favorable opportunity of the Red Army according to the strategic deployment of the Front Committee. After working in Changting for a period of time, he returned to Ruijin, Du Yu, Xingguo and other places on April 1 day to divide troops and mobilize the masses to help establish revolutionary regimes in Du Yu, Xingguo and Ningdu counties. Mao Zedong also personally directed the agrarian revolution training class in Xingguo and presided over the formulation of the land law in Xingguo County, which greatly promoted the healthy development of the agrarian revolution movement in southern Jiangxi and the development of the revolutionary armed forces. In May and September of the same year, the Red Fourth Front Army entered Fujian twice, and through three attacks on Longyan City, the warlord forces in western Fujian were basically eliminated, which greatly promoted the vigorous development of the agrarian revolutionary movement in western Fujian. After more than half a year's efforts, with the help of the Red Fourth Front Army, the poor peasants in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian were widely mobilized, the agrarian revolution was carried out in depth, and the red regime sprang up like mushrooms after rain. By the end of 1929, revolutionary regimes had been established in Changting, Longyan, Yongding, Shanghang, Liancheng and Wuping in western Fujian and Ruijin, Du Yu, Xingguo, Ganxian and Ningdu in southern Jiangxi. 1in the spring of 930, marked by the establishment of the Soviet government in western Fujian and the Soviet government in southwestern Jiangxi, the revolutionary base areas in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian were basically formed. 193 1 September, after crushing the enemy's third counter-revolutionary "encirclement and suppression", the revolutionary base areas in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian became one piece,1October,1931"First Soviet Congress" Central Soviet area

Mao Zedong's "armed regime of workers and peasants" and "thought of red political power" have been further developed in the practice of establishing revolutionary base areas in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian. Mao Zedong has a new and higher understanding of the significance and development prospect of establishing rural revolutionary base areas. 1April, 929, Mao Zedong, on behalf of the front committee of the Red Fourth Front Army, spoke highly of the significance and role of establishing rural revolutionary base areas in Ruijin's reply to the Central Committee. In view of the fact that some people in the party despise the construction of rural base areas, he profoundly pointed out: "proletarian leadership is the only key to the victory of the revolution. Establishing the proletarian foundation of the party and establishing industrial branches in the central region are the important organizational tasks of the party at present; But at the same time, the development of rural struggle, the establishment of red political power in small areas, and the establishment and expansion of the Red Army are especially important conditions for helping urban struggle and promoting the revolutionary wave. Therefore, it is wrong to give up the urban struggle, but we are afraid of the development of the peasant force and think that it will surpass the worker force in the future, which is not conducive to the revolution. If party member has such an opinion, we think it is also wrong, because the revolution in semi-colonial China failed only because the peasant struggle could not be led by workers, and no peasant struggle surpassed the strength of workers, which was not conducive to the revolution itself. " Here, for the first time, he emphasized the important significance and role of establishing rural revolutionary base areas and developing and strengthening rural revolutionary forces for the victory of the revolution. Immediately, after carefully analyzing the situation between ourselves and the enemy in Jiangxi at that time, he thought that the revolutionary forces in northern Jiangxi, western Jiangxi, eastern Jiangxi and southern Jiangxi were all developing forward, and the continuous expansion of red areas in these areas "caused a situation of encircling Nanchang". This is the first time that Mao Zedong linked the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas with the seizure of urban political power, which initially flashed an important ideological spark of the theory of rural encircling cities and seizing political power by armed forces.

Practice makes true knowledge! Mao Zedong led the Gongsijun to establish the central revolutionary base, which made him realize that the China revolution must take the road of encircling the city from the countryside.

Thirdly, the construction experience of Donggu base area is very helpful for Mao Zedong to explore the road of encircling cities from rural areas and seizing political power by armed forces.

The Jinggangshan revolutionary base area was subjected to the military "encirclement and suppression" and economic blockade by the enemies of Hunan and Jiangxi provinces for more than a year, which caused the life of the military and civilians in the base area to be extremely difficult, and sometimes even the minimum food supply was insufficient. This makes Mao Zedong very headache. This time, the Red Fourth Army went down the mountain to fight guerrilla warfare in Gannan, largely to solve the problem of economic outlet. However, on February 18, Mao Zedong arrived at Donggu Revolutionary Base and found that the situation here was different from that of Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base, which was severely damaged by the enemy. Here, "the reactionary forces have been expelled, and the rights are entirely ours, but there are no open political organs and fixed Red Guards. The postal route is as usual, business and trade are as usual, and the pain suffered by the border does not exist at all. " This aroused Mao Zedong's great interest. During his rest in Donggu, he carefully inspected the struggle history of Donggu base area, inquired about all aspects of Donggu base area in detail, and listened carefully to Li Wenlin's introduction of revolutionary struggle experience in Donggu base area. The struggle experience of Donggu revolutionary base gave Mao Zedong profound enlightenment.

From February 1927 to February 1929, the white regime in the south turned the corner, and the Red Army and guerrillas in the base areas were subjected to continuous enemy repression and "social repression", and generally suffered serious losses or setbacks, but the revolutionary base areas in Donggu continued to grow and develop. The base area has developed from small areas such as Donggu and Yanfu to a vast area of 34 kilometers from east to west and 60 kilometers from north to south. The revolutionary armed forces also started from 25 guns and steadily developed to 500 guns. The smooth development of this base area is due to the fact that they have adopted a series of base area construction strategies that are suitable for the local actual situation and the objective conditions that the enemy is strong and we are weak. This is a combination of open struggle and secret separatism. In this form, "the enemy can't find the target when he arrives, and the party organizations and mass organizations (peasant associations) are completely secret. Before approaching the general uprising, this form was the best, because it won the masses without losing them, and the armed form was not the Red Guards defending the land but the guerrillas. Their tactics are erratic guerrilla warfare ... the enemy can't help it. In this way, guerrilla zones can be extensive, that is, there can be many places to mobilize the masses and secret organizations of the party and the masses can be established in many places. "7. This is a flexible strategy conducive to the development of revolutionary forces in the case of disparity between the enemy and ourselves and weak revolutionary forces. This is in stark contrast to the serious economic difficulties caused by the enemy's continuous military suppression and economic blockade of Jinggangshan base area. Mao Zedong, who is good at learning and summing up other people's successful experiences, deeply felt that under the circumstances of disparity between the enemy and ourselves and insufficient mobilization of the masses, he could not engage in "open separatist regime in a fixed area" as he stuck to Jinggangshan, but should adopt a flexible approach, engage in armed separatist regime like Donggu base area, and use the "guerrilla policy of changing positions without moving circles" to deal with the enemy's attack. This enabled Mao Zedong to find an effective way to deal with the enemy's military attack and economic blockade in the rural revolutionary base areas, strengthened his confidence and determination to establish and consolidate the rural revolutionary base areas, develop and strengthen the rural revolutionary forces, and win national victory, and further strengthened his thought of taking the road of encircling the cities from the countryside.

4. The letter from the Central Committee in September and the successful convening of Gutian Conference played an important role in the establishment of this revolutionary road in Mao Zedong.

1in the autumn of 929, after listening to the report of gongsijun, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent an instruction letter to the front Committee of gongsijun on September 28th. The letter not only affirmed Mao Zedong's "political correctness", demanded to maintain the leadership of Zhu De and Mao Zedong, and made it clear that Mao Zedong "should continue to be the secretary of the front committee", but also fully affirmed that "the rural Red Army comes first and the urban regime comes last, which is the characteristic of China revolution and the product of China's economic foundation". This is a great encouragement and support for Mao Zedong today. Under the correct guidance of the letter, in February, 65438+ 1929, the ninth national congress of China Red Fourth Army was successfully held in Gutian, Shanghang. The meeting conscientiously summed up the rich experience of inner-party struggle since the founding of the Red Army, unified ideological understanding, and unanimously adopted the resolution of the General Assembly, namely the resolution of the famous Gutian Conference. This resolution combined with the specific situation of China * * * Production Party and China Revolution, flexibly and creatively applied Marxism–Leninism, and initially answered the question of how to strengthen the Party's ideological construction and maintain the vanguard nature of party member's proletariat. It initially answered the question of how to build an army with farmers as the main component into a new people's army led by the proletariat in the rural revolutionary war environment. The resolution of the meeting clearly defined the nature, purpose and task of the Red Army in terms of army building, pointing out that "the Chinese Red Army is an armed group that carries out revolutionary political tasks", and this army must obey the leadership of proletarian ideology and serve the people's revolutionary struggle and the construction of base areas; The resolution of the meeting emphasized the importance of the party's ideological construction from the aspect of party building, and comprehensively pointed out the manifestations, sources and correction methods of various non-proletarian ideas within the party from the reality of the party organization of Gongsijun Army. According to the instructions of the Central Committee, a new front committee of Gongsijun was elected at this meeting, and Mao Zedong was re-elected as the secretary of the front committee, thus achieving unprecedented unity within the Gongsijun Party and greatly enhancing its combat effectiveness.

The instructions and resolutions of the Central Committee formed at this meeting further cleared the ideological obstacles to developing revolutionary forces in rural areas, enabling Mao Zedong to concentrate on how to accelerate the development of revolutionary forces. He reviewed the course of revolutionary struggle in Gannan and western Fujian in the past year, saw the rapid development of revolutionary forces in this area and the growth of the Red Army, saw the infinite strength of the revolutionary struggle of the broad masses of peasants, saw the growing consolidation of local red political power and the continuous expansion of the base areas in Gannan and western Fujian, and saw the sharp contrast between the repeated setbacks of revolutionary forces in central cities. This made him further see the bright future of establishing rural revolutionary base areas, developing and strengthening revolutionary forces and winning revolutionary victory. Mao Zedong's thought of taking the revolutionary road of encircling cities from rural areas has taken shape.

1930 at the beginning of the new year, he clearly pointed out in his reply to Lin Biao, commander of the first column of the Red Fourth Front Army, that the theory of "winning over the masses before establishing political power in all parts of the country" was not suitable for the reality of the China revolution. Pet-name ruby This is because China is a semi-colony contested by many imperialist countries, leading to a long-term scuffle within the ruling class. The Red Army and guerrillas may exist and develop, and the small red areas around the white regime may exist and develop. The establishment and development of the Red Army, guerrillas and red areas (that is, local revolutionary regimes) is the highest form and inevitable result of the peasant struggle under the leadership of the proletariat in semi-colonial China, and it is also an important factor to promote the climax of the national revolution. He criticized the view that insisting on proletarian leadership means opposing giving full play to the main revolutionary forces of peasants, and reiterated the view put forward by the front committee of Gongsijun in the letter of April 1929 that without the leadership of workers, the China revolution would fail only if peasants struggled, and any peasant struggle could not be beyond the power of workers to the detriment of the revolution itself. He summed up the experience of the Red Army, guerrillas and revolutionary base areas in various places and pointed out that the implementation of the "simple mobile guerrilla policy" could not complete the task of promoting the climax of the national revolution. Only by adopting the revolutionary struggle line of "establishing political power in the base areas in a planned way, deepening the agrarian revolution, and expanding the people's armed forces through the political development of the township red guards, the district red guards, the county red guards, the local red army and the regular red army" can we achieve the revolutionary goal. He also stressed that "it is necessary to establish the belief of the revolutionary masses throughout the country as the Soviet Union did to the whole world. Only in this way can we give great difficulties to the reactionary ruling class, shake its foundation and promote its internal disintegration. Only in this way can we truly create the Red Army and become the main tool of the great revolution in the future. In general, this is necessary to promote the climax of the revolution. " Attending this actually puts forward the idea of shifting the focus of the party's work from cities to rural areas, launching guerrilla warfare in rural areas, deepening the agrarian revolution, establishing and developing the red political power, and seizing the national political power when conditions are ripe. With the publication of this letter "Inner-Party Communication from Mao Zedong to Lin Biao" (that is, "A single spark can start a prairie fire"), Mao Zedong's thought on China's revolutionary road has risen from practice to theory.

In a word, the China Revolution embarked on the correct road of encircling cities from rural areas and seizing political power by armed forces, which was constantly explored and summarized in the struggle practice of establishing the central revolutionary base area in Mao Zedong. Without the great struggle practice of establishing the central base area, there would be no correct understanding of China's national conditions and no correct revolutionary road for China. She once again proved that it is completely correct to correctly understand the basic principle that Marxism comes from practice.

Precautions:

① Report of Jinggangshan Front Committee to the Central Committee (1928+065438+1October 20th), see Selected Works of Mao Zedong published by Northeast Bookstore, page 1948, page 51-50.

(2) "Selected Works of Mao Zedong" on page 57. People's Publishing House, 199 1 version.

(3) For the report of the front committee of Gongsijun to the Fujian Provincial Party Committee and the Central Committee on the action policy of conquering Tingzhou and the Jiangxi Red Second and Fourth Regiments of the Fourth and Fifth Army (1March 20, 929), see Selected Historical Materials of the Central Revolutionary Base Area, Zhongzhong.

(4) For the letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee (1April 5, 929), see Selected Historical Materials of the Central Revolutionary Base.

⑤ Report of the Special Committee on Hunan-Jiangxi Border (1June 6, 929), see Selected Historical Materials of Hunan-Jiangxi Revolutionary Base.

Today * * * Central Committee's letter of instruction to the front committee of Gongsijun (1September 28th, 929), see Selected Works of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Volume 5, page 447.

Pet-name ruby Attending Selected Works of Mao Zedong, pp. 97-99. People's Publishing House, 199 1 version.