Tell us, is the killing of Yuan Chonghuan by Chongzhen self-destructing the Great Wall? Is the Yuan Chonghuan case an unjust case?

Whether Yuan Chonghuan is a traitor or not is not clear to those who hold Yuan Chonghuan.

The question of whether Yuan Chonghuan is a traitor has been debated for a long time, because many behaviors of Yuan Chonghuan during his tenure were very suspicious, and he was often suspected to be a traitor or a spy.

Yuan Chonghuan is suspected to be a traitor, mainly like the following nine things:

First, sacrifice the "victory" won by Juehua Island.

In the first month of the sixth year of the Apocalypse (1626), when there was a shortage of food in the latter Jin Dynasty, Yuan Chonghuan disobeyed orders and insisted on not evacuating a large amount of food, materials, trench and ships to the rear safety zone, leaving the soldiers and civilians on the island in danger, retreating to Ningyuan City, or even withdrawing into the city in advance. In fact, Yuan's adult had already received the spy report of the invasion of Houjin, so his intention to give up Juehua Island was very suspicious. In essence, in the whole process, it was Yuan's adult who "failed the army, but covered up the defeat for success".

Second, in the face of emptiness, Shenyang refused to cooperate with friendly forces and allies.

In order to break the economic and military blockade of the Ming Dynasty and attack Korea, Yuan Shikai once again disobeyed orders. In the emptiness of Shenyang, he insisted on not rescuing North Korea, refused to cooperate with Dongjiang Town, and did nothing but sit tight to support the enemy. He was urged by the imperial court twice in a row to perfunctory things, which not only made North Korea yield, but also led to the disappointment and chilling of Mongolian tribes in the middle of Ming and Jin Dynasties. It also caused losses to Dongjiang Town, lost the land provided by North Korea, and was cut off from the ordnance and food provided by North Korea. After the attack, Dongjiang Town resettled refugees and lost most of its logistical supplies. These expenses will be borne by the Ming court in the future, which brought a huge burden to the financial resources of the Ming Dynasty, dispersed its allies and gave the latter room for expansion. Yuan's stubborn attitude and bad influence are very suspicious.

Fourth, deliberately introduce the Ming army to death.

Yuan Chonghuan resigned after being criticized for "low morale" for failing to save Jinzhou in the "Battle of Ningjin", and Wang Zhichen took over his post in Shanhaiguan. At this time, Yan Mingtai, governor of Hebei and Liaoning, demanded to give up Jinzhou, and many people in the court opposed the establishment of the "Ningjin Defense Line". At the same time, the front-line generals of the Ming Dynasty also raised objections to keeping Jinzhou. You Shilu, the company commander stationed there, said that Jinzhou was "ruined by rain and uninhabitable" (Record of Three Dynasties and Liao Dynasties 17) and asked to evacuate to Xingshan. The garrison commander of Tashan believes that Tashan is not a defensive place and wants to "relocate"

(Record of Liao Dynasty in Three Dynasties (volume 17). Although Huo, assistant minister of the Ministry of War, thought that Chengdu could not give up easily, according to the opposition of the generals, he couldn't help but sum up: "When thieves arrive, the wall will be clear to all."

Among many suggestions to give up Jinzhou, Yan Mingtai, the governor of Jilin Province, is the most powerful and uses the harshest words: "Jinzhou is a remote and secluded Olympic area, not a short-lived place. It was a pity that the consultation was wrong that day, and half of Gankun was scraped in just a few bullets. It's okay, but it's also in jeopardy. Stealing today, Jinzhou can only be suspended for the actual situation, and the Shenfu is true. It can only be set as a real-life game, and Shenfu Mud is a dead game. " The seven-year record of the apocalypse in July.

In fact, many generals and ministers believe that Jinzhou can't keep it, mainly because of its special terrain. Jinzhou lies between Xiaoling River and Daling River. From Ningyuan to Jinzhou, you have to go through Tashan, Songshan and Xingshan to reach Xiaoling River. If any place is restricted, Jinzhou will be cut off from the rear. Yuan Chonghuan failed to effectively reinforce Zhao Lvjiao during the "Battle of Ningjin" and Hong Chengchou failed to rescue Zu Dashou during the "Battle of Jinsong" because of this geographical defect. During the War of Liberation, Chiang Kai-shek's absolute superiority of land, sea and air was also blocked in Tashan, and finally he could not reinforce Jinzhou and suffered defeat. It can be seen that Jinzhou is too difficult to reinforce. Once besieged, it can't be saved. If Mao Shuai hadn't attacked Liaoyang, the important town of Houjin, Huang Taiji wouldn't have withdrawn so soon. Later, the defeat of the Ming army in Jin Song War was staged in advance. Therefore, Yan Mingtai, the governor at that time, commented on the "Battle of Ningjin", saying: "Fortunately, nothing happened, but it was also in jeopardy", and advocated that "Jinzhou can only be suspended as a virtual situation, only as a live game, and Shenfu mud is a dead game". His argument fully foresees the result of two people who will eventually turn Jinzhou into a "stand-off" in the future, namely Yuan Chonghuan and Hong Chengchou ~!

After extensive and careful discussion by the generals and ministers of the Ming Dynasty and serious and profound summary of practical lessons, Jinzhou finally gave up before February of the following year. It should be said that giving up Jinzhou at this time and keeping Ningyuan not only complied with Yan Mingtai's opinion, but also returned to Sun Chengzong's road of successfully keeping Liao for four years.

By March of the first year of Chongzhen, the Ming army had completely abandoned Jinzhou, Tashan and Xingshan. On May 1 1 that year, Huang Taiji sent Abatai and Yue Tuo to lead 3000 troops, successively destroying Jinzhou, Gao Qiao and Xingshan, and destroying 3 1 station east of the Ming Tombs. This matter is recorded in the old file of Manchu dynasty 10. In addition, the Chronicle of Emperor Taizong of Qing Dynasty records: "In May, Xin Wei, the Ming people abandoned Jinzhou. Baylor Abatai and others led 3,000 troops to Jinzhou, Xingshan and Gao Qiao, and destroyed the 21 ST pier east of the 13 th station. "

Judging from the move of the late Jin Dynasty to occupy Jinzhou and give up, Huang Taiji, who paid a heavy price to capture Jinzhou, actually didn't want Jinzhou at all. The purpose of his attack on Jinzhou is only to destroy the Ming army and plunder the grain in the city, which shows that Jinzhou is not a "brief place" and Yan Mingtai's assertion has become a reality.

Before the "Battle of Ningjin", Yuan Chonghuan wasted national financial resources, sacrificed border guards for Jinzhou, and gave up coordination, resulting in heavy losses for friendly forces and concessions from allies to the enemy. However, after Yuan returned to the government, he deceived Chongzhen with the absurd rhetoric of "defending the defense and fighting, building a chariot and walking". Thirdly, the massive construction in Jinzhou consumed the country's extremely limited financial and material resources, and used silver to build huge pits in Jinzhou, which eventually led to the complete failure of the Ming army in the "Jin Song War". What Yuan Shikai did was a very suspicious traitor.

Five, deliberately weaken the dangerous thistle door

In the seventh year of the Apocalypse (1627), Li Dan Khan moved westward, and after the war in Zhao Cheng, the Mongolian tribes outside Jiyumen surrendered to Houjin. In September of the first year of Chongzhen (1628), the Ming Dynasty made efforts to win over 36 Duoyan families, but failed. At this point, the situation outside the thistle gate became tense, so many ministers in the DPRK proposed that the defense of thistle gate should be strengthened without delay.

However, Yuan's adult mobilized troops to enrich the Commissioner at this time, which did not mean to strengthen the town discipline. There is such a record in Chongzhen Long Edition: "There are 55,345 soldiers inside the customs and 78,340 soldiers outside the customs." But by December, there were "more than 71,000 officers and men, more than 4,200". The so-called "inside Shanhaiguan Pass" is Yuji Town, and the so-called "outside Shanhaiguan Pass" is Liaodong Town. Yuji and Liaoning overseers have been in charge of these two towns. The reduction of troops in Shanhaiguan is to transfer more than 10 thousand troops from Jiyun town to Liaodong town. The soldiers in Liaodong town did not increase, but decreased slightly, because the Commissioner was already engaged in "clearing", eliminating the old and weak ranks and enriching them with the elite inside the Commissioner, so there was no large number of "reductions". This strategy of "better troops and simpler administration" was put forward by Lord Yuan. "Records of Chongzhen" records: "Winter is ugly in October, calling courtiers to Wenhua Hall to show off Jinzhou Army and Yuan Chonghuan's salary; I ask permission. Bi Yanzi, the minister of the household department; He also said,' What happened when you bowed to Huan before, and the troops were wiped out by the clouds and the amount was reduced? Wang Zaijin said,' Decline and elimination will start next year'. "As can be seen from the contents of A Record of Chongzhen, at that time, Yuan Da led the troops to annihilate in Yuji Town, and Yuan Da mobilized troops in advance to enrich the Ningjin line of defense through the elite of Yuji Town.

In fact, if Yuan Shikai had not built Jinzhou and increased his garrison in Jinzhou, the Ming Dynasty would have had the time and financial resources to improve the defensive ability of Yuji Town. However, as Du Shi, an important town in Hebei and Liaoning, Lord Yuan chose to temporarily transfer the defenders of Ningjin to "prepare for the weather" by means of "increasing the garrison and closing the door", which was extremely irresponsible and completely perfunctory. When Huang Taiji really entered Zunhua, Zhao Lvjiao of Shanhaiguan could only bring three or five thousand people to reinforce him, which was enough to show the hypocrisy of Yuan's deployment.

Many people discuss whether Jizhen Town belongs to the direct jurisdiction of Lord Yuan, but it doesn't really matter. It's not that the imperial court didn't know that Ji Town was weak, but that the soldiers were very expensive, mainly to satisfy Yuan's Jinzhou. There is no way to strengthen Jizhen. Under the extremely limited resources of the imperial court, the implementation of Yuan's adult strategy will inevitably lead to "thick" Jinzhou and "thin" Jizhen. With this inclination, many people naturally suggested that the imperial court should pay more attention to Jizhen.

However, Yuan Shikai did not adjust his master plan, but left the dangerous town. Governor Yuan played Chongzhen, saying, "With the Heaven and other places, we should listen to the governor's administration, and I dare not discuss it above the level."

This is a despicable practice, and his irresponsibility eventually led to a breakthrough in Yuji Town. It should be said that Yuan's "thick" Jinzhou and "thin" Yuji Town's master plan is a very indignant failure.

If Lord Yuan did not build Jinzhou, which had just been abandoned, and was taken over by Houjin, there would be no reason for the Ming Dynasty not to strengthen the defense of Yuji Town, nor to weaken the defense of Yuji Town. After the restoration of Jinzhou, the limited financial resources and troops of the Ming Dynasty were consumed in Jinzhou, and the gate of Yuji was naturally empty.

6. Want food resources at all costs.

In the seventh year of the Apocalypse (1627), Lidan Khan moved to the west. After the war in Hohhot, the once-thriving Ministry officially fell to the later Jin. It was in the first year of Chongzhen (1628) that Lord Yuan supervised Hebei and Liaoning. In September of the first year of Chongzhen, Chongzhen made great efforts to win more than 36 families, and later failed. The following year, in March of the second year of Chongzhen (1629), Yuan Shikai proposed to open a horse market for the Harqin department, and to support the department that has not yet bloomed with grain, which was entirely based on grain resources.

After Yuan Xun gave a lecture to open the horse market, Chongzhen thought it was robbing grain, so he issued a series of letters to reprimand: "It is said that the city bought goods, obviously to pick up Dongyi, but also to take money to steal, how can it be allowed?"

Yuan Zhu's defense mentioned Jimen's defense, but the key point was to open the horse market. Yuan Shikai's core meaning is that if the horse market is not opened, "if foreigners (Harqin) are the guide and slaves invade, it never rains but it pours." At the same time, Lord Yuan also promised that the Mongolian tribes he helped "would never dare to lure slaves to commit crimes". However, Chongzhen rejected Yuan's suggestion. Chongzhen stressed: "It is very important to resist foreigners and slaves. How can you be a slave when you buy cloth and silk in the East, knowing that it is the answer? The governor strictly forbids it. " But Yuan Shikai still turned a deaf ear. Later, Chongzhen reluctantly agreed, but warned Yuan's adult that he could only give assistance in the form of rations, as long as he didn't starve to death. Moreover, he combined the reward with extermination, and killed it as soon as there was any abnormality, but Yuan's adult always thought that the Mongolian tribe he rewarded "never dared to lure slaves into Ji Liao", all of which were rewards and help. Unfortunately, the Ministry outside Ji Yumen will not only lead the way for Huang Taiji to enter the fortress, but also prepare hay for him.

The Supplement to Notes on the History of the Ming Dynasty records Chen's experience in Ningyuan, in which he mentioned that he sent a team of 2,000 people to Ningyuan to buy grain, 400 of whom were all secret service posts-"more than 400 people in Jianzhou posts were tied with arrows that didn't draw a bow". What else can we do to buy food for the latter? This was well known in Liaodong at that time. Chen mentioned that the gentry at that time, such as Ru and Xia Ningyuan, knew about it and demanded to take advantage of it. "If you are unprepared, you can kill at night." However, at this time, Yuan's adult ignored Chongzhen's reprimand and openly sold grain to Houjin in Ningyuan. What a bad traitor's behavior. Tan Qian's "National Deficiency" also records: "Yan, three guards are hungry, and three guards are half involved. If you don't restrain yourself, ask the governor to open a fort in Nantai, Qiantun, and exchange marten ginseng. The minister of border affairs can't do that. They only worship Xu Huan. Build a valley without covering it up and plot to commit a crime against Jixi. Although there are spies, I don't believe it. "

To sum up, it can be said that Yuan's adult refuted Chongzhen twice in a row, turned a deaf ear to all the objections of the border officials, and suppressed the opinion of the spy whistle demanding the elimination of grain for the latter. It is a very suspicious traitor behavior to buy food for the late Jin in the famine.

Seven, cut off the material supply of Dongjiang Town to "cooperate", and then the gold occupied the control areas of Ming Dynasty in southern Liaoning and Liaodong.

Lord Yuan applied for the salary and expenses he sent to Dongjiang Town, and Chongzhen agreed, so Lord Yuan got the materials from Dongjiang Town, but instead of sending them to Dongjiang Town in time, Lord Yuan ordered the ports in Bohai not to send a boat to Dongjiang, and not to sell one meter and one fish and Dongjiang. At the same time, Huang Taiji sent his troops to storm Dongjiang Town. In the second year of Chongzhen, Dongjiang Town almost lost its territory in southern Liaoning and Liaodong. By April, among dozens of castles in Liaodong and southern Liaoning, Dongjiang only kept Haizhou, Hengshan, Zhenjiang and Gaizhou.

After the supply of Dongjiang Town was cut off, Jin invaded Ming's control areas in southern and eastern Liaoning. In June of the same year, Master Yuan beheaded Mao Shuai in Shuangdao. At that time, a * * * listed 12 charges, and the name of the last one was: "After opening the town for eight years, you can't recover an inch of land, wait and see to support the enemy, and twelve counts will be beheaded." This is simply turning black and white upside down to the extreme, not to mention the castles and islands occupied by Dongjiang Town. This Dongjiang town was originally led by Mao Shuai with more than 200 people from scratch, and this "town" is from scratch. How can it be called "an inch of land can't be recovered?" In March of the second year of Chongzhen, Yuan Shikai used food to "support the enemy", but when he turned around, he made the whole Dongjiang town hungry. When the friendly forces attacked, Lord Yuan took a "wait-and-see" attitude, but in the end he accused Dongjiang Town of being a traitor with "thick enemies" and "thin friends" and turned black and white.

Eight, kill Mao Shuai, relieve the worries of the Western Expedition for the latter.

As early as 162 1 year before the fall of Quang Ninh, the guerrillas who were being trained were sent deep behind enemy lines and contacted the Liao people to contain and disperse the forces in the late Jin Dynasty. At that time, he only led more than 200 soldiers and sergeants, which was worse than Li Yunlong, according to many netizens. But later, Mao used this team to instigate a massive resistance movement behind enemy lines and was

In August of the second year of the Apocalypse (1622), Mao conquered the cherry vortex and vortex platform.

In September of the second year of the Apocalypse (1622), Mao's army conquered Manpu and the Great Wall.

In the second year of the apocalypse (1622), in October, Mao conquered Yongning and other castles.

In October of the second year of the Apocalypse (1622), Mao and the army of Houjin fought in Diandian, and both sides suffered heavy casualties.

In the spring of the third year of the Apocalypse (1623), the latter Jin counterattacked Lushun Mao and suffered a heavy defeat.

In the third year of the Apocalypse (1623), the Maoists "incited" in the late Jin Dynasty, causing a large number of Liao people to "rebel" and join the Ming Dynasty. Many Baylor ministers in the latter Jin Dynasty thought: "Mao's suffering should end as soon as possible! As long as Long Wen does not die, there will be a day of treachery and rebellion, and the kind people will not have peace. "

In April of the fourth year of the Apocalypse (1624), Mao secretly went north along the Yalu River and entered the Changbai Mountain area. He was defeated in the wars in Gaoling and Sha Song, in which only 16 officers were captured.

In July of the fourth year of the Apocalypse (1624), Mao fought Guzhai, Gupihong and Fenshui, and won three out of three.

In the fifth year of the Apocalypse (1625), the Han people in Zhangtun, which belongs to Haizhou (Haicheng, Liaoning), secretly contacted the Manchu who sent troops to attack this tun (Records of the Emperor's Father, Vol.4 and Vol.8). Meanwhile, this year, Zhenjiang, Fengcheng, Xiuyan, Long Island, Shuang Shan, Pingdingshan, Haizhou and Anshan.

In the sixth year of the Apocalypse (1626), Nurhachi attacked Ningyuan, Mao attacked Yongning, and the latter Jin was forced to return to Li.

In the sixth year of the Apocalypse (1626), after the war in Ningyuan, Nurhachi led a large army to conquer Mongolia in April, and Mao immediately attacked Anshan. Nurhachi was forced to return to Li because of the tight rear.

From the first month of the seventh year of the Apocalypse (1627) to April, the late Jin tried his best to launch a "Ding Mao Battle" against Dongjiang Town in Mao and North Korea at the expense of empty Shenyang. Mao rose up to resist, and achieved "five victories in five wars" in Tieshan, Pingshan, Great Wall and Yalu River, which was finally delayed by Yuan's twice disobedience and refusal to cooperate.

In June of the seventh year of the Apocalypse (1627), when Huang Taiji attacked Ning and Jin, Mao attacked the Great Wall and Liaoyang, forcing the latter Jin to return to Li. After the "Battle of Ningjin", General Yuan also specifically appealed for Mao Shuai: "Who knows that Mao attacked Liaoyang and rotated his troops accordingly, so that it was not Mao Shuai who attacked the enemy, and Jinning was attacked again! Although Mao Shuai was defeated by a soldier, he restrained himself for several years. This is the strongest! "

("Three Dynasties Liao Facts Record" Volume 18, in August of the seventh year of the Apocalypse, Liaodong Governor Yuan Chonghuan spoke; From the Letters of the Two Dynasties (Volume 31), in August of the seventh year of the Apocalypse, Yuan Chonghuan, the governor of Liaodong, spoke. )

Mao Longwen pinned down Houjin's tail like a nail, which made him unable to fight outside for a long time. After several unsuccessful attempts to eradicate Mao, he died in the hands of Yuan's adult, so that he could go on an expedition to Khan and make a detour for a long time. In the past, Mao, the main force of the late Jin Dynasty, led Dongjiang Town to attack and hit the rear. Once Dongjiang Town is not contained, Houjin can make a long-distance attack and fight outside for a long time. So, in the second year of Chongzhen (1629), on June 5, seven days after Mao Shuai was killed in Shuangdao, Huang Taiji announced The Journey to the West, demanding that the Mongolian tribe outside Jiyumen immediately catch up with the shipbuilding ship and prepare to use it to transport grain along the river with the army. This deployment is not before June, which is a sign that the location of jam is determined as Jiyumen.

Yuan's adult first weakened Yuji Town's troops, put heavy troops in Jinzhou to make the troops in Shanhaiguan pass empty, then opened the horse market to prepare food and grass for the invasion of southern Shanxi, and finally killed Mao Shuai, destroyed Dongjiang Town, and solved the latter's worries. This series of measures personally contributed to the latter's first entry into the fortress from Yuji Gate, and completely turned his painstaking "Ningjin Defence Line" into a veritable "Maginot Defence Line". Later, Jin not only bypassed Mongolia in the second year of Chongzhen (1629), but also bypassed Mongolia four times, namely 1634, 1636, 1638 and 1642. The most decisive factors are the killing of Mao Shuai, the disintegration of Dongjiang and so on.

Ten, thistle west incredible failure in defense.

In the second year of Chongzhen (1629), on October 27th, Huang Taiji entered the fortress near Zunhua. The next day, Zhao Lvjiao, a policeman from Shanhaiguan, arrived at Zunhua. However, because Yuan's adult was unprepared for Huang Taiji's move, and he was suspected of deliberately defending Jimen, Shanhaiguan had few troops and only led three or five thousand people to Zunhua.

From the second day of November to the second day of November, Yuan Da's talents rushed from Ningyuan to Qiantunying, and it was reported that Houjin was already besieging Zunhua. On the fourth day of November, Yuan led his troops into Shanhaiguan and died in Santun. On the fifth day of November, Yuan Chonghuan led an army into Hebei as a flag officer. Zhou Wenyu was once a person around Sun Chengzong. The Chronicle of Western Liaoning Entering Wei, written by him in the first person, is a documentary describing the changes in the past, in which there are many first-hand materials, and some key issues can be confirmed by the records inside. On the sixth day of November, Lord Yuan arrived in Yongping. At this time, Zunhua has fallen. On the third day of November, Yuan Zhu abandoned the soldiers in the "General Plan for Destroying Soldiers" and opened the city gate. Governor Wang Yuanya died. Lord Yuan received the imperial edict from Chongzhen in Zhenzhen Town, and had to dispatch and command the reinforcements of various towns. This plot is also very important, clearing a lot of grievances for Liu Ce, the governor of Hebei and Liao, because later interpretation said that he would not fight, which led to the fall of Ji and wronged Yuan's adult. ...

On the ninth day of November, Yuan Shikai arrived in Shuntianfu, Jizhou. On the 10th day of November, Yuan Shikai paid a visit to Chongzhen and said, "Take a rest in Jizhou, carefully investigate the situation, and prepare to blow your horn to prevent the enemy from advancing westward." (Bing Shen in November of A Record of the Ming Dynasty) Among them, Never allow the enemy to cross Jixi is another classic of Lord Yuan after Five Years of Ping Liao and Never Dare to lure slaves into Jiliao. ...

After Yuan's dredging, he began to deploy Jizhou defense. At this time, Liu Ce, governor of Hebei and Liao, and various military forces gathered in Jizhou. Liu Ce, the governor of Hebei and Liaoning, was stationed in Miyun, and You Shiwei, the company commander of Changping, was originally stationed in Changping. On the ninth day of November, Liu Ce led the army to defend Jizhou, and You Shiwei defended Tongzhou Jizhou. However, Lord Yuan scattered his troops around Jixi. He let Liu Ce keep Miyun and You Shiwei keep Changping. Many historical materials recorded Yuan's deployment:

"Liu Cebing, the governor of Baoding, also rushed to Miyun to keep him." In November of Chongzhen, it was ugly.

"Liu Cebing, the governor of Baoding, also arrived and ordered him to guard Miyun." In November of Chongzhen, ugly.

"Send Liu Ce back to the city, dispatch troops and send troops to keep Miyun." Chongzhen changbian

There are many criticisms of Yuan Chonghuan's defense arrangement in the ruling and opposition parties. Sun Chengzong even pointed out that it is an important task to concentrate troops on guarding the front line of the Three Rivers in Jizhou, otherwise the enemy can take Beijing directly after crossing the Three Rivers in Jizhou. Facts have proved that due to the departure of Baoding soldiers and Changping soldiers, Jizhou's defense force is seriously insufficient, and even the most basic investigation and prevention can't be done. As a result, Huang Taiji easily crossed Jizhou and went straight to Beijing. Lord Yuan didn't realize that Founder was chasing troops until November 14th, and the Jixi Western Defense Line, which was highly anticipated by the imperial court, failed completely without World War I..

This matter was mentioned in the Chronicle of Western Liaoning Entering Wei written by Yuan's flag officer:

"On the 13th, I invaded the morning, reported that the slave army had passed Shimengang, and ordered the horse infantry to camp outside the city. As soon as the camp was settled, more than 200 slaves rode in the southeast of our army in four teams. When two days are deadlocked, it is either a thief or a soldier. When the public ordered me to fire, the thief heard the shot, that is, the four teams lined up and suddenly retreated. I don't get a ride back every day, which makes me want to fight or not.

On the 14th, the slave hunting brigade sneaked into the Western Heaven, and the public commanded Liao soldiers to pursue it ... "

What needs to be emphasized is that this defensive war started under the grandiose words of Lord Yuan, and the terrain was favorable to Lord Yuan. Jizhou, with a long history, has a secluded swallow, also known as Yuyang. It dates back to the Zhou and Shang Dynasties: Yanshan in the north and Bohai in the south. It is a battleground for military strategists in past dynasties, and it is called "Jidong Lock Key". There are Panshan in the west, lakes in the south, and Jiulong Mountain and Baxian Mountain in the northeast of Jixian County. Because so many channels set aside in natural moats are like a necessary door, they are called thistle gate. Since ancient times, the establishment of Bingzhen and Guancheng have been the key points in the northeast of Beijing. However, Lord Yuan did not block the post-8 Jin Army in this place and let it go without a fight. The next day he discovered that he was really "incompetent". No wonder the late Jin Tatars like such "heroes" ...

Yuan Shikai himself promised that "the enemy would not cross the thistle" and dispersed the troops that had assembled in the Ming Dynasty, which led the latter Jin army to "sneak over the thistle" without fighting, wasting such a good interception opportunity and letting the latter Jin army go straight to Beijing. This is really doubtful.

Summary:

After knowing so many suspected traitors' actions by Yuan's adult, we can't help wondering what Yuan's adult is up to. If Lord Yuan is a traitor, then everything has a reasonable explanation; If Yuan's adult is not a traitor, then he has done so many traitor deeds with a "loyal service to the country" and a "pure heart", then he is really a fool with the first word in heaven, which is almost impossible. ...

However, in the face of the facts, although we have reason to suspect that Lord Yuan may be a traitor, although it is incredible that he is so stupid that it is almost impossible, after objective and calm analysis, he should not be a traitor, but he is indeed a rare fool.

Just now, when we were analyzing the great traitor Liu Aita, he wrote in the letter that was wrongly classified as Mao Shuai and the late Jin Dynasty: "So, General Mao deliberately rebelled, that is, he asked Yuan Dusi to kill him." One sentence proves that Lord Yuan is not a traitor. Otherwise, why use spies to falsely accuse Mao Shuai? Therefore, after objective and calm thinking, it should be possible to draw the conclusion that Yuan's adult is just a fool, not a traitor.

This fictional "unjust case" means that the Ming Dynasty was a "dark and decadent" dynasty, which led to the "unjust case" of "wronged" Yuan's adult. Because of this, the court literati in Qing Dynasty did not hesitate to fabricate "double-faced spies" to show that there was a "unjust case", but in fact, every charge of Lord Yuan was really established. Master Yuan's crime of being killed in that year was recorded in the long version of Chongzhen in great detail: "The summons to Yuan Chonghuan was invalid, and he relied on deception to steal money from the market, cut handsome for the sake of making money, drove the enemy away, withdrew without fighting, replenished his troops in four episodes, and sneaked into the city, insisting on inviting him into the city, all kinds of evil deeds. Officials of the Ministry of Punishment were ordered to give orders. According to the law, family members were beheaded at the age of 16, and those under 15 were slaves to the hero's family. Today, his wife, concubine, children and brothers are two thousand miles away, and I won't ask the rest. " ("Chongzhen Changbian" Volume 37, Guihai in August of Chongzhen three years, Wang Jiben)

It includes everything that Yuan's adult set for the late Jin Dynasty after going through the customs, but there are no words such as "collaboration with the enemy" and "rebellion", and there is no mention of the fictional "double-faced spy", which is enough to show that the "double-faced spy" was invented by scholars in the Qing Dynasty.

The Ming Dynasty is an enlightened empire with great ambitions and amazing achievements, and it is the new moon of Chinese civilization. That's why so many Manchu emperors used all kinds of despicable means to vilify it, in order to achieve their goal of flaunting Manchu as destiny.

Master Yuan is not a traitor, but his false "unjust case" and "halo" are a brick used by people with ulterior motives to discredit Chinese civilization. People who support Yuan, think about what you are doing. It is blasphemy and provocation to regard such a person decorated with false history and lies as a "hero" of the Chinese nation.