It would be better if the war that Zhuge Liang actually participated in could be supported by historical data, and it would be great if there could be additional comments. Please list with 1.2.3.4...

It would be better if the war that Zhuge Liang actually participated in could be supported by historical data, and it would be great if there could be additional comments. Please list with 1.2.3.4....

The fourth battle took place in August of the eighth year of Jianxing of the Shu Han Dynasty (the fourth year of Wei Taihe) (AD 230). The Wei soldiers divided into four groups and launched an offensive. Cao Zhen left the Ziwu Road to attack Nanzheng from the north; Sima Yi followed the Han River to the west and approached Nanzheng from the east, preparing to meet Cao Zhen in Hanzhong; Zhang Jiao left the Xiegu Road to attack Yangpingguan, attack Hanzhong from the west, and Cao and Sima The two armies formed a situation of attacking from three sides ("The Biography of Cao Zhen" and "The Biography of Hua Xin" in "Three Kingdoms" all said that Cao Zhen came from Ziwu Road, but did not mention Zhang Jia, nor who led the Xiegu army; and "The Later Master" However, it is said in the Biography that Cao Zhen came out of Xiegu and opened his jaws to Ziwu; the "Zhang Jia Biography" did not mention this matter. I thought about it over and over again and thought that the "Post Master Biography" might refer to some private records of Shu, and there was no war between the two sides. , so I may have misremembered the "position" of the generals [Because the Wei, Shu, and Wu books of "Three Kingdoms" were not written by Chen Shou at the same time, errors are inevitable; and before Pei Songzhi's annotation, the three books had been circulated independently. ]; and Zhuge Liang's focus was on the Ziwu and Hanshui troops, so I "sent" Zhang Zha all the way to Xiegu without permission. This is just my personal opinion. If you have any new discoveries. Or your opinion, I hope you can tell me); there is also a less important road, which is from Wuwei. No leader can be found in each biography, and Wuwei is far away from Hanzhong and Yizhou. I was a little confused at first, but later in " "The Biography of Wei Yan" contains records of Wei Yan's battle with Fei Yao and Guo Huai in that year, but in other biographies it is impossible to find when Shu and Wei sent troops again in that year. In addition, Zhuge Liang often restricted Wei Yan and did not allow him to lead troops independently. From the looks of it, it should have been when Zhuge Liang was unable to identify the four-pronged Wei army that was attacking Shu, so I presumed that this route was led by Fei Yao and Guo Huai and attacked Wudu and Yinping directly from Qiang territory (from the time and location) It all makes sense. If you have any objections, I would like to hear them.) In response to Wei's simultaneous attack, Zhuge Liang stationed his troops at Chenggu and Chiban to wait for the two Wei armies from Ziwu and Hanshui. He was blocked by Yangpingguan all the way in Xiegu (the defender was unknown); he sent out troops from Fei Yao and Guo Huai. Wei Yan led his army west to Qiangzhong to resist. In addition, Zhuge Liang recruited Li Yan to lead an army of 20,000 and stationed in Hanzhong for reinforcements. The result of this battle was that it had rained heavily for more than 30 days, and the troops marching into Hanzhong were unable to advance to fight the Shu troops due to the cutoff of the plank road and the flooding of the Han River. In September, Emperor Wei Ming Cao Rui ordered Cao Zhen and other troops; only Fei Wei could send troops. Yao and Guo Huai may have been far away and were not affected by the heavy rain. They arrived as scheduled and had a fierce battle with the Shu army led by Wei Yan at Yangxi, and were defeated by Wei Yan.

From this battle, we can see the difference in national strength between the two sides. Even though Wei defended Wu in the southeast, Wuwan and Xianbei in the north, and Qiang in the west, it was still able to advance in four directions to attack Shu. The momentum was huge; Zhuge Liang allied with Sun Quan in the east, leaving no troops in the south to defend against the barbarians, and allied with Qiang troops in the northwest. In this way, the troops were saved, and they could only divide their troops when they left Qishan, and they only gave Zhao Yun very few troops, who could only be used as suspicious troops. However, Zhuge Liang seems to be very confident about this battle, because "The Biography of Li Yan" records that "Liang Yi will go out to the army next year, and Yan Yi will be ordered to protect the affairs of the central government." Zhuge Liang has not yet started the war, he is already ready to attack Wei next year. It seems that the battle has been won.

There is a reason for Zhuge Liang's confidence. Zhuge Liang had already noticed Wei's attack and started preparations at the end of the seventh year of Jianxing. In December of the seventh year of Jianxing's reign, he built Seoul City in Mianyang and Lecheng City in Chenggu. These two fortresses formed a horn to protect the east and north sides of Nanzheng, the first county in Hanzhong, and blocked the attack routes of Cao Zhen and Sima Yi (but to the west of Nanzheng there is the world-famous Yangping Pass, so there is no need to waste Build a city again). Zhuge Liang did not hold on to the two cities, but stationed the main force in Chenggu and Chiban, so that he could freely deal with the two Wei armies of Cao and Sima (of course, this also shows that the Shu army was insufficient in strength and should not divide its forces to resist); this action was my opinion. The opinion shows that Zhuge Liang intends to fight in the field, and also shows Zhuge Liang's confidence in field fighting. Looking at Zhuge Liang's repeated military campaigns, he was never defeated in the field battles he personally commanded, and no Wei general was able to defeat him; whether it was Wang Shuang during the Battle of Chencang or the second expedition to Qishan that I will talk about next. Sima Yi and Zhang Jia (Guo Huai during the Battle of Wudu and Yinping and Sima Yi during the Battle of Wuzhangyuan did not dare to fight with him in the field; and as soon as they came out of Qishan, Comrade Ma Di violated the military discipline, otherwise the outcome of the battle might have changed. ).

When Zhuge Liang took the offensive, the Wei army basically adopted the strategy of holding on, holding on, and holding on to the end. Only Sima Yi suffered once, so when Zhuge Liang sent troops for the last time, he would rather pretend to be a woman than fight. Therefore, I really want to see the war between the two sides when the Wei State takes the offensive. At that time, the Wei army will not come all the way to hold on without fighting (just like watching a football game, the offensive battle is the most exciting, and the defensive battle is very boring) ); If it doesn’t rain, I wonder what will happen? It's very suspenseful, but it's a pity that God doesn't like it.

The fifth battle was in February of the ninth year of Jianxing of the Shu Han Dynasty (the fifth year of Wei Taihe) (AD 231). Zhuge Liang besieged Qishan (I privately call it Erchu Qishan). There are only twenty-five words about this battle in "Three Kingdoms" and "The Biography of Zhuge Liang": "In the ninth year, Liang returned to Qishan, transported wood and oxen, and withdrew his army after running out of food, he fought with Wei general Zhang He and shot him dead." People's feeling is: Zhuge Liang returned without success again. However, these twenty-five words cannot fully reflect the true situation of this battle. The reason why Chen Shou did not dare to write about this battle in detail is because at this time, Zhuge Liang's opponent was changed from Cao Zhen to Sima Yi - when Chen Shou wrote about the Three Kingdoms The emperor's grandfather, and because the emperor's grandfather was defeated by Zhuge Liang; although Chen Shou was an excellent historian, he would not casually gamble with his own life and future, and of course he was not willing to distort the facts, so he chose to omit one Big chunks of content.

As I said before, Zhuge Liang has been preparing to attack Wei for a long time. He started preparations after he captured Wudu and Yinping in the spring of the seventh year of Jianxing. Even if there was a large-scale invasion from Wei, he would not Stopped preparations to conquer Wei; and unlike when he left Qishan, Zhuge Liang completely let go of the rear affairs and let Li Yan take full charge of management, while he concentrated on conquering Wei. It can be said that after two years of preparation and without the interference of political affairs from the rear, Zhuge Liang was about to take action. Changes also occurred in the Wei State at this time. Great Sima Cao really fell ill, and the new commander-in-chief of the three armies was replaced by General Sima Yi.

For the course of the war, I refer to the "Han Jin Chun Qiu" and "Zi Zhi Tong Jian" cited by Pei Songzhi of the Jin Dynasty. "Spring and Autumn Period", there are no major changes). Zhuge Liang besieged Qishan, and Sima Yi was ordered to lead his army to resist. After arriving at Shanggui, Sima Yi left Fei Yao and others to lead 4,000 elite troops to guard Shanggui, while he led his army to the west to rescue Qishan. From here on, Mr. Sima Yi’s series of behaviors puzzled me and made me laugh a bit.

When Zhuge Liang heard that Sima Yi had arrived, he left troops to attack Qishan (I thought there would be a lot of troops left, because the Qishan Fort in Qishan was famously easy to defend and difficult to attack, so Zhuge Liang probably divided his troops at least in half). Then he led his army east to find Sima Yi. However, they didn't meet Sima Yi until they arrived at Shanggui, but Fei Yao and others came to meet Zhuge Liang (it seems that the number of troops brought by Zhuge Liang was not enough to scare the four thousand elite soldiers of Wei. I don't think Zhuge Liang was the reason why Fei Yao and others were so arrogant) He only brought 10,000 soldiers, so Zhuge Liang took advantage of Fei Yao and other 4,000 so-called elite soldiers to occupy Shanggui (so easy) (What is Mr. Sima doing?) (The result of this battle for the Shu army was to gain Tianshui in the upper reaches of the Wei River. The most important town in the county is Gui, so Zhuge Liang can directly go out of the Xie Valley to attack the martial arts in the southwest of Xi for the last time, because he can transport grain by going up to Gui and down the Wei River, and no longer needs to capture Chencang), and harvest the wheat around Gui. After replenishing military supplies (what on earth was Mr. Sima doing?), he walked eastward and met Sima Yi on the east side of Shanggui. It turned out that Mr. Sima was walking eastward. I'm so baffled! ! ! ! ! Sima Yi is indeed an expert. I cannot understand his profound strategy with my intelligence. I really don’t know why he went east to save Qishan from the west? Could it be that Mr. Sima Yi knew that the earth was round, so he planned to circle behind the Shu army to attack? After Mr. Sima met Zhuge Liang, he gathered his troops and retreated to the danger without fighting. Zhuge Liang did not want to deal with this "unpredictable" Mr. Sima anymore and returned to the army. Mr. Sima followed Zhuge Liang again to fight (although it seemed to be chasing, but when he opened his jaw, he said "advance and don't dare to push". He just kept a certain distance and followed. Perhaps it was Chairman Mao's "The enemy advances, we retreat, the enemy retreats, we retreat" Let's use the "advance" strategy, haha); after "catching up" with Zhuge Liang, Mr. Sima "went up the mountain to dig camp again, refusing to fight" (I thought it was Zhuge Liang who stopped to wait or turned back to greet Sima Yi, so Mr. Sima hurriedly climbed the mountain to dig camp. , stick to the danger).

When his generals felt that they were too cowardly and accused Sima Yi of being cowardly and demanding a battle, Sima Yi ordered two groups to attack the Shu army on Xinji day in May (it would not be a strategy to anger the generals, but even if , it seems to be of no use), the result is that the Wei army was defeated (although I said it simply, this is the result of the comparison of the commanding ability and military talent of the commanders of both sides), Mr. Sima fled back to the camp and continued to defend. According to the "Han, Jin, Spring and Autumn Annals", the trophies Zhuge Liang received were: "Three thousand heads of armor (the heads of three thousand officers of the Wei army, big and small!!!), five thousand collars of black armor (these are not ordinary soldiers)" (worn), 3,100 horned crossbows (just by looking at these data, we can infer the strength of the Wei army) (the record of this battle in the "Book of Jin" instead states that Sima Yi defeated Zhuge Liang and killed more than 10,000 Shu soldiers. . I think if it is really as written in the "Book of Jin", then this is a great victory comparable to the Battle of Jieting. It is impossible not to record it in the Wei Book of "Three Kingdoms" by Chen Shou, and Xi Jinping, the author of "Han Jin Chun Qiu" Chisel was from the Jin Dynasty, and he would not and would not dare to deliberately describe Sima Yi's victory as a defeat. Therefore, I think that the content of this record by Fang Xuanling and others may be an official record of the Jin Dynasty that was beautified. Believe it. Sima Guang and others may have the same view as me, so "Zizhi Tongjian" uses the records in "Han Jin Chun Qiu" instead of "Jin Shu"). I believe that Zhuge Liang's actual combat capability and military command ability should be affirmed when he came out of Qishan. I have not found specific records of the specific troop strength of the two warring parties, but from the Wei army generals who thought it would be a shame not to go to war and Fei Yao and other four. Judging from the fact that a thousand soldiers dared to attack Zhuge Liang, the Shu army should not have many troops, and Sima Yi's strength must be several times greater than Zhuge Liang's. In addition, Pei Songzhi quoted the words of "Yuan Zi", "Liang led tens of thousands of people" ( Yuan Zi also said that Zhuge Liang's troops "stop like mountains, advance and retreat like wind." How many ancient commanders and generals can be described like this? In the article about Zhuge and Sima, it was mentioned that "there were tens of thousands of infantry soldiers" and "the soldiers were less than 50,000" (more than 40,000 soldiers, and the military type was basically infantry). I thought that Yuan Hong was from the Jin Dynasty (he was Sima's family). People during the reign of the world), Zhang Yan can be said to be a native of the Wu state at the same time as Zhuge Liang. Both of them are neither from the Shu state nor from the Wei state. What they said should be more objective (in addition, the fifth incident of Guo Chong quoted by Pei Songzhi It is said that Sima Yi had more than 300,000 soldiers and Zhuge Liang only had 80,000. Although the five things Guo Chong said are as unreliable as what Pei Songzhi refuted, Guo Chong was a man in the early years of the Western Jin Dynasty, and what he talked about They are also Sima Yi's descendants, Fufeng King Sima Jun and others, so the number of troops may still be used as a reference) So I think Zhuge Liang's troops in the six battles should be around 40,000 to 80,000, the legendary "one hundred thousand." "Soldiers" may be a bluff "claim" or an exaggeration by the State of Wei (Liu Bei's large-scale personal expedition to Soochow only had more than 80,000 troops [I am based on the records quoted by Pei Songzhi in "Fu Zi" in "Liu Ye Biography"). This is a battle. What Liu Ye, the foreign minister of Shu and Wu, said should be more in line with the facts], and the entire army was wiped out. How many people would be left to Zhuge Liang? In addition, according to the records cited by Pei Songzhi in "Book of Shu" in "The Biography of the Later Master". , when the Shu Kingdom fell, there were only "one hundred and two thousand armored soldiers" in the whole country [Although Jiang Wei may have lost a lot due to his repeated attacks on Wei and the fall of Hanzhong, Jiang Wei's loss was at most 20,000 to 30,000, and he should have added more troops to make up for it. ; and Liu Chan did not listen to Jiang Wei's advice to increase the garrison strength in Hanzhong. The maximum number of troops in Hanzhong should be about 10,000 to 20,000, so the total total military losses would only be 40,000 to 50,000 at most. The number of troops in Zhuge Liang's period should be similar, so Zhuge Liang's It is impossible to lead 100,000 troops. I think the statement of more than 40,000 is the most credible. According to this, the Shu army, excluding the troops left to attack Qishan, the number of troops fighting Sima was no more than 20,000 to 40,000). How big the army of Wei is, I think it will never be less than the army of Shu. When they left Qishan, Cao Rui led 50,000 troops to guard Chang'an. Although there is no record of how many troops Cao Zhen and Zhang Jiao had, Cao Zhen was ordered to supervise Guanyou, and Zhang Jiao was ordered to supervise all the armies. The combined strength of the two of them would not be small, so it is always There are at least about 100,000 soldiers; Sima Yi's troops will not be as many as 300,000, but he fought with Zhuge Liang in the last two times. The Wei State was more vigilant towards Shu than the previous times, and After suffering such a disastrous defeat in the Second Battle of Qishan, they still had enough troops to hold on and pursue Zhuge Liang when he withdrew, and his troops should not be less than 100,000.

When there is a big gap in military strength, the person who prevents the enemy from fighting and can only stand firm, or who can defeat the enemy as long as the enemy fights him, is he still a person with problem with his command ability? Can't he still be called an excellent military strategist? Do you have to take risks with so-called "ingenious schemes" to be considered a good military strategist and have excellent command ability? I'm a bit confused by some of the arguments.

Originally, the second expedition out of Qishan was promising, but problems arose in the rear of Shu. Li Yan sent someone to inform Zhuge Liang that it was difficult to transport food due to constant heavy rain, so he asked Zhuge Liang to withdraw his troops as soon as possible. Zhuge Liang heard that it was difficult to transport food and grass, so he withdrew his troops and set up an ambush to kill Zhang Jaw who was pursuing the Shu army on the way (it is easy to say, but it is difficult to do. Zhang Jaw was a famous general of the Wei State who had been on the battlefield for a long time. Although "Wei Lue" Zhong said that he did not want to pursue, but Sima Yi forced him to pursue, but even as "Wei Lue" said, Zhang Jia was not someone who would be ambushed easily, and many people used ambush tactics to prevent enemy pursuit during the Three Kingdoms period. , but I didn’t see anyone who could kill the enemy’s leading generals. Only Zhuge Liang killed the enemy’s leading generals twice [Wang Shuang and Zhang Jia]. I thought this showed that the person who set up the ambush was great. This did not mean that he had no command ability. What people with military talent can do is not easily accomplished by ordinary generals).

But when Zhuge Liang was on the way to withdraw his troops, Li Yan said, "The army has enough food, why can't we just return?" Moreover, the emperor reported that Zhuge Liang "wanted to lure thieves into fighting". Li Yan "wanted to relieve himself of the responsibility for not doing anything, and to show his fault for not making progress"; and "Zizhi Tongjian" said that Li Yan "also wanted to kill Supervisor Yun Cen Shu to relieve himself of the responsibility for not doing anything." I think Li Yan's performance shows: 1. The military rations are sufficient (Li Yan himself said it). 2. The heavy rain may have affected the time or human and financial resources for transporting grain, but it did not make it difficult to transport grain as Li Yan said (so Li Yan wanted to kill the grain transport official Cen Shu to silence him). Both of these points can be found out immediately, so Li Yan hurriedly opened up for himself before Zhuge Liang came back. However, Li Yan's method was too clumsy. As soon as Zhuge Liang showed the letter Li Yan wrote to him, Li Yan couldn't Justifies it. I really don’t know why Li Yan did this, and the method is too stupid (I guess it’s because Li Yan and Zhuge Liang are both Liu Bei’s important ministers, and Liu Bei’s division of labor between them is that Li Yan is in charge of military affairs, and Zhuge Liang is in charge of political affairs. Now Zhuge Liang is in charge of everything. Caught, Li Yan may have been a little unbalanced. In addition, Zhuge Liang's second appearance in Qishan was a victory and he defeated Sima Yi. Seeing that he was about to achieve great success, Li Yan was a little jealous. Jealous people often do things regardless of the consequences; of course; This is just my guess, a family opinion, only Li Yan himself knows).

I am going off topic again. Most friends say that Zhuge Liang is not good at employing people, and the first one mentioned must be Ma Di. Yes, it is indeed Zhuge Liang's fault to use Ma Su or not to use Ma Su correctly, but it is impossible for people to be without faults. I think even Liu Bei, who is highly recognized for his employment of people, also used people inappropriately, such as Li Yan. Li Yan is really talented, there is no denying that (Ma Di is also talented, there is no denying that), but he behaves like a fool when it comes to transporting food (I think his excuse is like a kid playing tricks, not like he has a brain) Things that people do), I think judging from this incident alone, Li Yan is also an exaggerator, and Liu Bei also hired the wrong person (according to Zhuge Liang's table in "The Biography of Li Yan", Li Yan also had two When Zhuge Liang left him to guard the rear before Zhuge Liang sent troops, he took the opportunity to blackmail Zhuge Liang and asked for promotion and weight; this person ignored state affairs and only focused on fame and fortune, Xuande really misjudged the wrong person); and this time Li Yan asked the Shu army to withdraw under good circumstances. , in a sense, is the same as Ma Su's fault. The difference is that Ma Su caused the Shu army to defeat, while Li Yan only caused the Shu army to give up a favorable situation; however, Li Yan intended to make the Shu army withdraw, and Ma Su's wish did not It was not that the Shu army was defeated, but the nature was different. So I think it is harsh and unfair to Zhuge Liang to always criticize Zhuge Liang for one of his mistakes (Zhuge Liang's emphasis on Li Yan is not only because Li Yan is indeed talented, but also because he believes in Liu Bei; and perhaps because of Ma Di, Zhuge Liang is even more Believing in Liu Bei's ability to recognize people, Zhuge Liang completely handed over all major military and political matters in the rear to Li Yan and the people Liu Bei valued when he left Qishan. He devoted himself to fighting, but the result was very disappointing. This person Liu Bei reused and used to help Zhuge Liang made Zhuge Liang's Northern Expedition go bankrupt again.

I think it was precisely because of Li Yan's low-level behavior that the cautious Zhuge Liang became more cautious, and made Zhuge Liang even more afraid to let go of power. It also made Zhuge Liang feel helpless. When he sent out troops for the last time, he had to take care of both the front and the rear. " "I work hard and sleep late at night, and I am punished by more than twenty people, and I personally take care of them all" until they die of exhaustion; although Zhuge Liang had been worried about it before, he didn't worry about it. So I think the main reason Zhuge Liang died from exhaustion was Li Yan).

Secondly, most people think that Zhuge Liang did not select any talents and question his ability to employ people. I thought that after the establishment of the Three Kingdoms, the three countries did not select any special talents. They were basically the descendants of old ministers and generals. I think this is because when the power reaches a certain scale and the situation becomes relatively stable, those in power have almost no chance to contact middle- and low-level talents, and it is unlikely that Liu Bei will be shut down; The main way is through the recommendation of ministers, but at this time, ministers who have the power to recommend people in power rarely have contact with middle- and low-level people, and most of them can only contact the children and relatives of high-ranking officials (the sons of high-ranking officials rarely have real connections). Talent, only relatively speaking, there are talents, such as Lu Kang, Zhong Hui, etc.); in addition, the so-called filial piety and integrity recommendations have mostly evolved into recommending officials' children to win the favor of their bosses. Under such circumstances, it is unlikely that Sima Hui talked about Crouching Dragon and Phoenix, Xun Yu recommended Guo Jia, Zhou Yu recommended Lu Su, etc. This is the so-called hero in troubled times, and this has been true in all dynasties (many Heroes are only middle- and low-level figures. Cao Cao can barely be regarded as a middle-level figure; although Liu Bei is a royal relative, he can only be considered a low-level figure; when Zhuge Liang lived in seclusion, he was a man in his twenties who had never had any work experience and only farmed at home. , even though he has a brother who is an official, he can only be considered a lower-class person). In addition, when people talk about talents, they mostly refer to those who fight. After the establishment of the Three Kingdoms, there were fewer wars, so these combat talents had little opportunity to perform (if Jiang Wei hadn't repeatedly started wars, Deng Ai's talents would have been buried). Therefore, it is rare to find any military talents. Jiang Wan, Fei Yi, Jiang Wei, Deng Zhi, Wang Ping, etc. promoted by Zhuge Liang are all good talents, but they all have their own strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, it is not objective to criticize Zhuge Liang for not being able to select talents. I think that in the middle and late stages of the dynasties (many still in the early stages), there were no talents (even if there were, they tended to be political talents rather than military talents). This is the mechanism for selecting talents. The problem is a common problem in a relatively stable political situation, and it is not just a problem of the ability of a certain person in power (you must know that there are not many people who have both civil and military skills. I think there are two ways to understand both civil and military skills. One is to have both political strategy and general strategy. The second is a person who possesses both strategy and military strategy, as well as overall strategy. The former [the word "general strategy" can be equated with the latter) can be called a person who possesses both civil and military skills in a broad sense, while the latter refers to a person who possesses both civil and military skills in a narrow sense, which is the so-called handsome man. It is believed that during the Three Kingdoms period, only Cao Cao, Zhou Yu and Zhuge Liang could be said to have both civil and military skills in the narrow sense. Lu Su and Lu Xun were just barely able to do so. Zhang Liao, Lu Meng and Guan Yu were not so good at it. They could at most be called generals. Looking at the Three Kingdoms, there are only Cao Cao and Zhuge Liang who are both civil and military. Zhou Yu and Lu Su have no political achievements. If Soochow must have a representative, then Lu Boyan can barely do it. I don’t think he needs to be both civil and military to be considered a talent. Anyone can do it as long as he has one skill. Talent. But the above is just my personal opinion. Friends who have different opinions should not be angry) (People like Tianbian and I who like to make random comments will definitely not be appreciated by Zhuge Liang. They will only be like Liao Li, Lai Min and others. He was also punished by Zhuge Liang).

The sixth battle took place in February of the twelfth year of Jianxing of the Shu Han Dynasty (the second year of Wei Qinglong) (AD 234). After two years of preparation, Zhuge Liang left the Xiegu, and according to Wugong Wuzhangyuan, he and Sima Yi Regarding Weinan, I also asked Wu Guo to send troops together (I privately called it the last battle). After Sima Yi learned the lesson from his last disastrous defeat, he would rather die than fight this time and wanted to wait for Zhuge Liang to run out of food. However, because it was inconvenient to transport food, Zhuge Liang "divided his troops into farmland to form a base for a long-term garrison. The cultivators were mixed among the residents of Weibin. But if the people are safe and secure, the army will be selfless." I thought Sima Yi had miscalculated again this time and wanted to wait for Zhuge Liang to run out of food. However, Zhuge Liang was self-sufficient in the territory of Wei by growing the same food as the people of Wei. He planned to stay there for a long time and use the Weishui River as the border of Shu and Wei (really cannibalization). But Sima Yi could only wait and had no strategy to retreat from the enemy. It was only because Zhuge Liang died of illness due to overwork that Sima Yi was not embarrassed.

There was almost no direct confrontation between the two sides in this battle. The only close contact could only be the retreat of the Shu army after Zhuge Liang's death. Sima Yi led his army in pursuit. The Shu army counterattacked with "anti-flag and drum", and Sima Yi hurriedly After retreating, the local people proverbed, "Zhuge will die and Zhongda will be alive." Zhuge Liang's deterrent power in the enemy country is undoubtedly clear. How many people in Chinese history can make the enemy fear like this? (Sima Yi is a treacherous, daring and courageous man. Who is he afraid of? Of course except Zhuge Liang) (As I said before, the opponent's reaction is the most objective and true reflection of Zhuge Liang's military ability) And Sima Yi looked at Zhuge Liang. After laying out the ruins of the military camp, he sighed: "He is a genius in the world!" I thought this was the true feeling revealed by Sima Yi inadvertently. Sima Yi had no other military failures in his life, and he was able to deal with all other opponents with ease, except against Zhuge Liang; Only Zhuge Liang failed miserably, left him helpless, and reduced his prestige in front of his generals (his generals actually criticized the commander in person, which shows the commander's prestige). I think judging from Sima Yi's past performance, he is a confident guy and an offensive figure (whether he persuaded Cao Cao to further attack Shu after winning Hanzhong, and when Cao Cao proposed to move the capital, he suggested joining forces with Wu to defeat Guan Yu, or destroying Meng Da and Gongsun Heping) Yuandu showed that this person was confident, good at attacking, and liked to attack). However, facing Zhuge Liang, Sima Yi's self-confidence was obviously insufficient, and the "attack" he was good at failed miserably in the first time, and he did not dare to use it in the second time. This should be It can also explain Zhuge Liang's excellent military ability in commanding operations.

Some people say that it was the right strategy for Sima Yi or Wei to go on the defensive and wait until Zhuge Liang had enough food. However, if I look carefully, among the six battles, only the Battle of Chencang was not prepared by Zhuge Liang, and it was only about one month. They retreated when they ran out of food; and in the Second Battle of Qishan, although they retreated "when they ran out of food", it was actually Li Yan who lied about the situation. Strictly speaking, it was an internal conflict in the Shu Kingdom, not about running out of food (besides, Li Yan lied about the situation) It was due to the inconvenience of transporting food, not the lack of food and grass); as for the other four battles, except for the Shuhan Defense War, which was a defensive war, there was no record of food and grass problems in the other three battles (at least I haven't found it yet), especially Zhuge Liang's last battle. The food situation (in the last battle, judging from the fact that Zhuge Liang stationed in the fields for a long time in the territory of Wei, made good friends with the people, and was not eager to attack, it seems a bit like Liu Bei's "thick tree of kindness to win the hearts of the people" at Jiameng Pass. While the Wei army Grain and fodder still need to be transported from the rear. The standoff for more than a hundred days will consume huge amounts of manpower and material resources. If the stalemate continues, which side will suffer? What do you think? Therefore, I thought that the Shu army should have sufficient food and grass, but the roads to Shu were difficult and dangerous to transport. Wei's defensive strategy was not very ideal. It was not a correct strategy as many people said. The only battle of Chencang that was truly successful was the Battle of Chencang. However, it was not Zhuge Liang's well-prepared large-scale Northern Expedition, but a dredging campaign. Speedy battle of the road. The Wei State has ten times the national power of the Shu State. Facing Zhuge Liang with only tens of thousands of troops, not only cannot he annihilate him, but he is also allowed to come and go freely. He can only defend and hold on with a large number of troops. As soon as Zhuge Liang withdrew his troops, he They celebrated with great joy, but they did not dare to force Zhuge Liang to win like Zhang Liao pursued Sun Quan (although there were two pursuits, the pursuing generals were overturned).

After Zhuge Liang's death, there was still the problem of Wei Yan. I don't want to talk about who is right between Wei Yan and Yang Yi here, but I want to talk about why Zhuge Liang didn't let Wei Yan be his successor. Of course, this is not like Zhuge Liang in "The Romance of the Three Kingdoms" who saw that Wei Yan was going to rebel early, but it was determined by Wei Yan's character and behavior. I thought that Zhuge Liang reused Wei Yan. During Zhuge Liang's reign, Wei Yan could be said to have always been an important figure among the generals, both in terms of official position and degree of reliance (and I thought that because Wei Yan "showed the system but refused to allow it", he "always said he was cowardly, sigh" It is a big taboo to belittle those in power if you hate yourself. I think it is because Zhuge Liang did not care. If it had been another person in power, Wei Yan might have been punished and demoted long ago; it was not Zhuge Liang that Liao Li and others were demoting). But why didn't Zhuge Liang let Wei Yan take over the military power in his place? I thought this was because of Zhuge Liang's understanding of Guan Yu's failure. Maybe Zhuge Liang wanted to say what this had to do with Guan Yu? Let me first take a look at the description of Wei Yan in "The Biography of Wei Yan": "Yan was good at raising soldiers, extremely brave, and had a noble nature. At that time, everyone avoided him.

"Look again at the description of Guan Yu in "The Biography of Zhang Fei": "Wei's counselor Cheng Yu and others are called Yu, and he is the enemy of ten thousand people." (Both of them were brave, good at nurturing soldiers, and they were both arrogant and looked down on others.)? Guan Yu lost his life in Jingzhou because of his arrogance and discord with his colleagues (Mi Fang, Fu Shiren, etc. made him lose his life). One of the reasons for the loss of Jingzhou, Liu Feng, Meng Da, etc. were one of the reasons for their capture and death). Zhuge Liang naturally understands this very well. Looking at Wei Yan, his character is the same as Guan Yu, and even if his ability is not as good as Guan Yu, he should be. Not much different; but his relationship with his colleagues is worse than Guan Yu: Needless to mention Yang Yi and Fei Yi; Dong Yun and Jiang Wan may be because Wei Yan is usually unruly and rude (think about Lian Quan) Zhuge Liang, who was in charge of both the government and the public, dared to criticize, what words did he not dare to say?) Moreover, the relationship was not harmonious, and even Jiang Wei and Wang Pingping, who were both military generals, were unwilling to stand by him. All this can be seen. Wei Yan's people are concerned. What do Zhuge Liang think will happen if such a person takes power? Guan Yu's lessons learned from the past (Zhuge Liang must have remembered them deeply), will Zhuge Liang feel at ease?

I once saw someone say that Zhuge Liang The inability to reconcile the relationship between Yang Yi and Wei Yan is due to Zhuge Liang's incompetence. I think this is too extreme. This is due to the personalities of both parties. Zhuge Liang can only persuade or persuade at best. The main thing is that the two must restrain themselves and understand each other (besides, Wei Yan is also obviously Not only were they at odds with Yang Yi), Zhang Liao, Yue Jin, and Li Dian said in the "Biography of Li Dian" that "Jin, Dian, and Liao were all at odds with each other." In the end, they cooperated with each other based on official affairs and the overall situation, not Cao Cao's. Intervention; it is also an order from a superior. Zhang, Le, and Li can cooperate with each other for public and private reasons, while Wei Yan disobeys and disobeys. If he refuses, I think this just shows that he is at work. He is protecting the safe retreat of the entire Shu army, but he wants to see it as a matter between him and Yang Yi. It can be said that there is no distinction between public and private.) From this point of view, Wei Yan was obviously not as good as Zhang Liao and others, and was not enough to entrust him with big responsibilities. In addition, Zhou Yu and Cheng Pu on the Soochow side were also an example: According to Lu Meng, Zhou and Cheng once had a bad relationship to the point of "several defeats in state affairs", but later on. It was not Sun Quan's intervention, but Zhou Yu who conquered Cheng Pu with his own talent and magnanimity. This is the style of a general; Wei Yan could not convince Yang Yi with his own talent, and even drew his sword to kill Yang Yi, which is vivid with a book. He is rough and lacks the demeanor of a general, which also shows that Wei Yan is not qualified for the big task. (I think it is correct for Zhuge Liang to retreat. Because Zhuge Liang's prestige in the army is definitely not comparable to that of Wei Yan. This shows that although Wei Yan is "good". "Raise the soldiers", but he did not obey Zhuge Liang's orders, so "the army was dispersed" can be seen. Then Zhuge Liang's death shook the morale of the army and hit morale that Wei Yan could not stabilize, so I think Wei Yan wanted to continue Leading the battle was overly sure of his own ability without objectively analyzing the military situation. In my opinion, Wei Yan often said such blindly confident words) In short, although Wei Yan's result was unjust and regrettable, in the final analysis, as Chen Shou commented, "Look at his actions." , follow the rules, bring disaster and take the blame, all by yourself."

Looking at the six battles, most people who criticize Zhuge Liang's military talents mainly believe that he frequently sent troops, wasted people and money, and had no results. I think it's because they regarded all six campaigns (or five) as the Northern Expedition, and regarded Zhuge Liang's battles that were not the Northern Expedition as the Northern Expedition, which naturally failed to meet their requirements.

First of all, regarding the frequent sending of troops and the waste of people and money, I have analyzed it before. The second and third times were not the Northern Expedition. Although the time of sending troops was tight (December of the sixth year of Jianxing and the spring of the seventh year of Jianxing), they were both The scale was not large, the preparations were not much, and the expenditure was not much (the third time was profitable again); only the first, fifth, and sixth Northern Expeditions could be called, and the three times were launched in the first month of the sixth year of Jianxing and the first month of Jianxing 6th. February of the ninth year of Xingxing and February of the twelfth year of Jianxing were regularly separated by three years, so it was not an unprepared and violent attack (compared to the almost every year of Cao Cao and other small princes who had separatized the Central Plains). In terms of combat, it’s not much). According to Chen Shou's words: "When he died of illness in the autumn, Li Shu thought about it and believed it to be true. To this day, the people of Liang and Yi still hear the words in their ears. Although Gantang's chants about Zhao Gong and Zheng's songs about Zichan are incomparable. also.

"Is this the kind of love a man who has wasted his people and money can get? Secondly, as for the results of the battle, I have said before that the battles of Yinping and Wudu can be said to be easy and complete, and they can almost be said to have won the two counties without any blood; the second time they came out of Qishan, they not only occupied the upper reaches of the Wei River Tianshui focused on Zhengui and other places, and severely damaged the main force of the Wei army. Some people may think that such results are too small, but I think they are too demanding. It took Cao Cao more than 20 years and many hardships to unify two-thirds of the world. , Do you want Zhuge Liang to shake Cao Cao's 20-year-old foundation in just five or six years? This is what is said, it is easy to talk but hard to do, and it is not painful to stand and talk. This is no longer a period of warlords, like Cao Cao in the last ten years? There was no progress during the year.