Why did you lose the Sino-Japanese War? There is not enough ammunition to fight for half a day. There are 16 kinds of guns, and I don't know what bullets to load.

Author: Ku Xia Na When it comes to the Sino-Japanese War, military fans often think of the mediocrity and incompetence of Qing generals. If there are many heroes like Deng Shichang in the naval battle, there is really no bright spot in the land war. A lot of information shows that the weapons and equipment of the Qing army are not inferior to those of the Japanese army. Similarly, in the19th century, Afghanistan, Zulu and other indigenous troops still used cold weapons, but they could do great harm to the British invaders. Why is it that the equipment of the Qing army is not inferior, but it has repeatedly collapsed thousands of miles, while the enemy only pays the price of double-digit or even single-digit casualties? The Anglo-Zu War against North Korea: Why can't the Qing Army keep Pyongyang? 1the battle of Pyongyang in September, 894 was a decisive battle between the Qing army and the Japanese army in Korea. Many articles mentioned that the Japanese army was about to run out of grain, hay and ammunition in the fierce battle, but Ye Zhichao, commander-in-chief of the Qing army, abandoned the city and fled, rushing 500 miles to withdraw to China, leaving a lot of materials seized by the Japanese army. That was not the case. 1894, 15 In the early morning of September, the Japanese army launched a general attack on Pyongyang. At 8: 30 in the morning, the Japanese army captured Peony Terrace in the north of the city, overlooking Pyongyang, and then attacked Xuanwu Gate. Pyongyang is very picky. However, the biggest problem facing the Qing army is the lack of ammunition. Ye Zhichao takes Wei, one of the main defenders of North Korea, as an example. There are about 6,000 troops stationed in Sheng Jun, equipped with 20 guns, accounting for nearly half of the total force of the Qing army guarding the city. Before the war, the army made preparations and reserved some ammunition in Pyongyang in advance, including 550,000 bullets of various firearms and 2,400 shells. In addition, soldiers carry 150 bullets per gun, and each gun was originally equipped with 50 bullets. That is to say, each soldier can use an average of 242 bullets (there is still a big gap from the standard of 1 0,000 bullets per gun, and the minimum configuration is 500 bullets), with 70 bullets per gun 1 0. However, in the battle of Pyongyang, less than one day after the Japanese general attack began, Sheng Jun fired 740,000 bullets and 65,438+0,800 shells, which consumed about half of the ammunition. In fact, in the high-intensity battle at that time, each person issued 200 bullets, barely maintaining for half a day. After the Qing army abandoned the city in the battle of Pyongyang, the Japanese army seized 560,000 rifle bullets and 840 artillery shells in Pyongyang, which seemed quite a lot. However, at that time, there were 1.3 million people in various ministries of the Qing army and at least 40 artillery pieces. These ammunition are evenly distributed, with only 43 rounds per capita, and each shot is 2 1 shell, which is completely a drop in the bucket. Take Sheng Jun as an example. Of the 550,000 rounds of ammunition stored before the war, about 340,000 rounds were distributed in the battle, which has consumed 60%. Head coach Ye Zhichao also borrowed 6,543.8+006,000 rounds, which shows that the ammunition of each army was almost exhausted at that time. Judging from the battle of Pyongyang, the ammunition reserves of the Qing army in the battle of Pyongyang were actually quite scarce. If we fight another battle with the same intensity as September 15, we will fight the enemy with our bare hands. Ye Zhichao also reported to the court that there was not enough food in the city for five days. At that time, the situation of the Qing army was really out of ammunition and food, and it was impossible to get supplies or reinforcements in the short term. In this case, the decision to retreat is not entirely unreasonable. However, the generals of the Qing army were poorly prepared before the war, passive and incompetent on the battlefield, and were caught off guard when retreating, which undoubtedly caused unnecessary losses. Lack of ammunition: examples of chronic diseases that affected the combat effectiveness of troops during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 were common in the Qing army. Iktangga, a general of Heilongjiang Province, served as a reinforcement in the Sino-Japanese War, guarding the Yalu River, and later became one of the protagonists in the battlefield. When he went out to war, he led 3000 soldiers and carried 3800 fast guns. He had more than one gun in his hand, so his weapons were quite rich. However, this unit has less than 700,000 bullets, with an average of 182 bullets per gun. Obviously, it is a home game, but the ammunition situation is even more tense than that of Wei Jun in Pyongyang. The average number of bullets carried by other army soldiers on the Yalu River defense line is more than 200. In the case of insufficient ammunition reserves, soldiers will undoubtedly have great concerns, which will affect efficiency and fighting spirit. As a result, the border defense was broken by the Japanese. In the war after the battle of Pyongyang, Iktangga repeatedly asked for ammunition. 165438+1In late October, he asked Heilongjiang to distribute 500,000 rounds of bullets on average, and Jilin Machinery Bureau was responsible for rushing to build 300,000 rounds of bullets. Iktangga said that his troops need to use 2 million rifle bullets and 2 million musket bullets. However, there are not so many bullets in Heilongjiang, and only 1.7 million bullets can be shipped first, which is better than nothing. Emperor Guangxu sent telegrams to Li Hongzhang, governor of Zhili, and Li Bingheng, governor of Shandong, asking Tianjin and Shandong Machinery Bureau to quickly raise bullets and provide help. However, during the whole war, Iktangga only got 1 190000 bullets. At the same time, Emperor Guangxu's troops expanded to more than 10,000 people, and successively participated in the Motianling Campaign and the Haicheng Counter-offensive, and the ammunition consumption increased. This level of ammunition reserves simply can't meet the needs of modern warfare. The ammunition supply level of the Qing army in the Sino-Japanese War was so poor that it must be investigated from many aspects. The ruling class of the Qing dynasty simply did not grasp the operation mode of modern countries. In all aspects of war preparation, from raising war funds to collecting intelligence, from logistics supply to army recruitment, the Qing court adopted extremely rough and primitive methods. For example, at that time, the Japanese army had adopted the logistics system of the modern army and set up stations on the marching route to ensure transportation and replenishment. However, during the establishment of the Qing army, there was basically no logistics force with a clear division of labor, and the supply and transportation relied heavily on the old-fashioned system of civil servants and civilian workers, which was primitive and inefficient. As far as weapons are concerned, before the war, the honest officials overestimated the achievements of the Westernization Movement and thought: "China has as many rifles and foreign guns as the world. For example, at that time, the Linmington gun produced by Jiangnan Manufacturing General Administration was estimated by Qing officials to have built more than one million guns, with an inventory of 600,000 guns. In fact, the models of these guns add up to more than 40,000. As a result, as soon as the war ended, the Qing court quickly found that the weapons inventory was insufficient and had to step up outsourcing. Japanese firepower in the Sino-Japanese Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Moreover, in terms of the types of arms supply, the Qing court officials paid insufficient attention to the balance of supporting facilities, and increased guns for the front line. The types of guns equipped by the Qing army were as many as 16, which aggravated the problem of insufficient ammunition and supporting facilities. Iktangga's army mentioned above, though short of bullets, got quite enough guns. During the war, they obtained 5000 muskets, 500 Mao Se carbines, 1300 Hakkas, 430 renju guns and 300 rifles. In addition to the 3,800 fast guns that he carried when he first debuted, he also added nearly 1 10,000 guns, and on this basis, he expanded his army on a large scale. However, the problem of insufficient bullets has been plaguing this unit. In addition, the equipment of the various units of the Qing army is uneven, and the rear officials purchase and transport arms, paying insufficient attention to the types and specifications, and there are often embarrassing incidents in which guns and ammunition are inconsistent. In addition, in Iktangga, the Qing army lacked a reasonable storage management mechanism, which led to serious quality defects in the limited ammunition. 1894- 1895 At the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, Liu Kunyi, who was supervising the war at the front, found that there was no problem in the upper layer of each box of fast gun bullets, but when it was used in the lower layer, there were often problems such as improper chamber or insufficient medicine. Song Qing, who commanded the main force of the Qing army, also suggested that most bullets were silent. When they were opened for inspection, they found that the gunpowder had turned to ashes. In this case, most bullets are not used for a long time and are not well kept, which leads to deterioration. The same is true of the battle of Pyongyang. It is said that the guns of the Qing army reserve failed or exploded from time to time, which led to the defeat of the battle. Liu Kunyi, of course, the generals of the Qing army also bear a great responsibility. Apart from some generals who are afraid of the enemy and dare not fight, the bigger problem is that they generally lack modern military knowledge, so it is difficult to command troops correctly and give full play to the power of modern weapons. For example, Xu Bangdao performed well in the war and received many positive comments. However, he made a joke in the battle of southern Liaoning, saying that the Japanese army wore paper armor and small guns could not penetrate. Xu Bangdao also made "imitation". After the test, it was found that armor made of four layers of tin sheets, thick Korean paper and messy hair can resist bullets at a distance of about 400 to 500 meters. The problem is that it is beyond the range of many rifles at that time, and the armor is very heavy, so it is difficult to put on or even move. In any country, Li Hongzhang's organizational system, training, logistics, weapons and equipment, and the quality of officers and men are basically consistent with the economic, political and cultural development level of the whole society. During the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Qing Dynasty had not realized what Huang Renyu called "mathematics". The whole military system lacks strategic foresight and military knowledge, and cannot effectively store and transport modern arms, so the failure of the war is inevitable.