What was the fatal mistake of the Japanese defeat in the Midway naval battle?

First of all, the failure of the Japanese army in midway is not only the failure of intelligence and command, but also the overall and comprehensive failure. Why do you say that?

First, there was no effective socialized production system in Japan at that time. Because it is too long for anyone to understand, I won't expand it in detail here.

Second, there was no truly feasible talent selection system in Japan at that time. Nan Yun's poor command is indeed the most direct cause of Midway's fiasco, but he can become the commander of the aircraft carrier formation, which can't be said to be a mistake in the employment system in any case.

Third, at that time, Japan did not establish a truly effective information exchange and communication system. Not only did it not be established, but fundamentally speaking, the Japanese at that time were used to ignoring information exchange and communication. As the frontline commander of this war, Nan Yun did not participate in the formulation of the attack plan, which is definitely a big joke in the history of world war.

So apart from these factors, what mistakes did Nan Yun make as the direct decision-maker of the midway action?

This bird will elaborate one by one according to the degree of influence of mistakes on the war.

The first mistake, which is also fundamental, does not attach importance to investigation and search.

As we all know, the Japanese intelligence department is not good and does not do its duty, but Nan Yun himself made a big mistake of not paying attention to intelligence. On the morning of the Midway air raid, he didn't do enough search and deployment. If he had sent a two-phase search earlier, it would have been possible to quickly find an undetected mixed fleet of enemy agents, so that Nan Yun could strike first without being hit. At least when he knows that Jumo and Reagan's search engines can't take off on time, he should immediately send other planes to fill the gap in that direction. Some people say that the tradition of the navy is that cruisers act as search engines. Is tradition more important than the lives of hundreds of the best pilots in Japan and the safety of Japan's four largest, most advanced and most expensive aircraft carriers? Americans all let the bombs on the ship work part-time as reconnaissance planes, but Nan Yun didn't dare or expect to do so. Moreover, at 7: 20, when Reagan's water machine report found that the American fleet and ship type were unknown, Nan Yun didn't know what he was busy with. It was not until 7: 47 that he asked the reconnaissance plane to take a closer look and confirm the ship type. Knowing ourselves and ourselves is the basis of all tactics. The main force did not move, and the scouts went first. This is basic military common sense. Nan Yun paid so little attention to the enemy's search work, but he just concentrated on deploying his own pieces, which he never thought of.

Nan Yun's second mistake was his deployment of aircraft forces. According to his deployment, each aircraft carrier is equipped with various types of combat aircraft, and each attack wave is composed of four aircraft carriers in proportion. When out, four empty mothers were released at the same time. This deployment scheme makes the fleet extremely fragile during the recovery of fighters and after the recovery of fighters, because at that time, four aircraft carriers were too busy to let their fighters take off immediately to cover the airspace above the fleet. Once attacked by enemy planes, only. At the same time, it also means that during this time, no matter how urgent the situation is, aviation can't attack enemy aircraft carriers.

At this time, the practice of the United States is to join the escort aircraft carrier in the conventional aircraft carrier formation, which is responsible for the take-off and landing of the direct cover fighter units above. Nanyun's mobile forces are not among the escort carriers, but there are still other ways to consider. For example, Nanyun can concentrate all the fighters on one aircraft carrier and take off in several teams in turn to escort the fleet and attack the waves, so as not to find that the fighters can't take off at the critical moment of the battle. In this arrangement, when the attack wave is dispatched, the four empty mothers are released together. The effect is the same as that of Nanyun, but the security is much better. Nanyun can also weave two planes on the empty mother into the first attack wave, and the other two planes into the second attack wave. This scheme will increase the take-off and recovery time of the aircraft, make the aircraft that has taken off hover in the air for a long time, and shorten the range of each attack wave and the attack distance of the aircraft carrier, but it is better than Nanyun's scheme. Nan Yun chose the simplest and most irresponsible deployment plan, which laid a fatal hidden danger for the fleet.

When the damage assessment of the first wave of attacks on the island's facilities was poor, Nanyun decided to carry out air strikes again. However, the bombers of the second attack wave were originally equipped with torpedoes and ready to go to sea. If you attack the land, you must unload the torpedo and replace it with a bomb. Then there are the famous two bomb changing orders.

When more than 100 American planes on Enterprise and Hornet took off to attack the Japanese fleet, the Japanese navy soldiers were scrambling to change the bomb types and recover the first attack wave and the original direct cover formation aircraft. The decks of the four aircraft carriers are full of bombs and torpedoes, and there is room for planes to land. Fighter Zero can't take off at all. When the U.S. dive bombers flew over the Japanese fleet, the Japanese had just completed the recovery of the first attack wave, the original direct cover formation operation and bomb replacement operation, and the air was fresh. ) So the American dive bomber was able to drop bombs smoothly, and three Japanese empty mothers were blown into three fires in a few minutes.

In fact, at that time, the aviation training of the US military was seriously inadequate, and the quality of the aircraft was not high, so that it was difficult for the aircraft to fly even in formation. The plane keeps falling behind. When the enterprise and the large fleet of more than 100 planes taking off from Bumblebee flew over the Japanese fleet, there were only 30 planes left, all of which were dive bombers, and there was not even a fighter escort. If the Japanese army can maintain a fleet of more than 20 aircraft in zero war, the American army will have no chance at all. The first few waves of the American attack wave are all like this. Either there are only lone torpedoes and bombers, or there are only lone fighters, so they are easily sent away by the Japanese old birds and fleet air defense firepower. If the sky above the Japanese fleet is not so clean this time, then this wave of only 33 American bombers will never drop bombs on the Japanese fleet calmly.

Nan Yun's third mistake was misjudgment.

Some people say that this campaign is wrong from the operational strategy formulated by the base camp. It wants to break the American fleet and attack midway. As a result, Nanyun was busy at both ends. But in this bird's view, although this strategy is inappropriate and problematic, it may not be impossible if Nan Yun directs it properly. If Nan Yun can give priority to breaking the American fleet and ensure that this fleet will not be attacked by American aircraft carriers and fighters on the midway island, and then consider the Midway Raider, that is, breaking the American fleet and the defense forces on Midway Island one by one, then this strategy is entirely possible. But Nan Yun's poor command and misjudgment ruined everything.

Let's see, the fleet has been attacked by American planes in midway, and the search engine also reported the discovery of the American fleet, showing that the position of the fleet has been exposed at two points: 1. The American fleet didn't stay on the island as planned.

So, what should be done in this case? We should give up or at least temporarily give up the Midway Raider and try our best to annihilate the American fleet. Midway won't run away by itself, but the American fleet is a real threat. It is true that the report from the reconnaissance plane is vague, such as "unknown ship type" and "possible aircraft carrier", but no matter what kind of report comes from the reconnaissance plane, Nan Yun should always pay attention to the possibility that there may be more than two enemy aircraft carriers in the nearby waters. In this case, we should never continue to carry out the Midway Raider mission, but should first consider taking care of the formation of American warships, and should continue to send search planes to search whether there are other American troops nearby. Does Nan Yun have reason to think that Americans are stupid enough to send only one aircraft carrier to die?

Nan Yun's fourth mistake was that when changing bombs, the navy soldiers were not strictly ordered to pile the unloaded torpedoes and bombs in a safe place, but were asked to pile these inflammable and explosive dangerous goods on the deck casually like that. Of course, this can speed up the time of changing bullets, but are there enough people writing safety regulations? Is the program used to wipe your ass? If these inflammable and explosive articles were not piled up on the deck of the Japanese aircraft carrier when the American aircraft attacked, a limited number of bombs could not have blown up the Japanese aircraft carrier so badly. Even if several holes were blown out of the deck of the Japanese aircraft carrier and several planes were killed, the Japanese army could put out the fire, temporarily retreat and retain its military strength. However, Nan Yun played with safety regulations, and as a result, his aircraft carrier formation was annihilated by the enemy with only a few bombs.

Nan Yun's fifth mistake was that he didn't attack with all planes immediately after he found that the enemy's task force had an aircraft carrier. These planes should be dispatched regardless of whether they are equipped with suitable strike weapons or not, or even without the cover of fighter planes. This is risky, but isn't it much less risky to be attacked by enemy carrier aircraft when the plane is lying on the deck scrambling to refuel and change ammunition? Does Nan Yun have reason to expect others not to attack at this most vulnerable moment? Although the 99-type warship attack is poor in attacking ships if it carries bombs, at least it is better to send it out to bomb the enemy to create some trouble and buy some time for its fleet. What's more, the skills of Japanese naval pilots at that time were quite excellent. Yamaguchi took over the command after the collapse of the Sankong carrier, forcing a small number of 99 ships on the dragonfly to attack York City with bombs, which may cause great trouble to York City. If Nan Yun ventures to send four aerial carriers to attack York City with bombs, it may lead to the complete loss of combat capability in York City, so at least the sinking of the Dragonfly can be avoided in the end. At this critical juncture, Major General Yamaguchi's judgment is the only correct one. Nan Yun ventured in a place where he shouldn't, but chose a self-righteous and safer road. If this naval battle can still be won, unless Japan opens a plug-in.

These mistakes made by Nan Yun are basically low-level mistakes that a person who knows the military should never make. Even some of them are written in black and white in Sun Tzu's Art of War. I really don't know whose pig brain the little devil has studied the art of war for so many years. Has the word LAM Raymond volcano been made into a little flag and stuck in your ass?