Why didn't the European Coal and Steel Community promote the reconciliation between France and the Federal Republic of Germany?

Their failure to play a decisive role in the formation of European integration is one of the most costly mistakes in postwar British history. And this mistake was made by two major political parties. The fundamental mistake is that Britain did not participate in the negotiations that laid the foundation, nor did it try to lead the negotiations in a direction that is more in line with Britain's interests. On the contrary, the British side took it for granted that those "mainland countries" could not cooperate with Qi Xin. This kind of complacency and even arrogance towards former wartime enemies or fragile allies is called "the price of victory".

1950, the labour cabinet refused to participate in the Schumann plan to establish the European coal and steel community. Although they welcome this plan, which is expected to bury the hatchet between France and Germany, considering that only 5% of Britain's steel is exported to western Europe, they doubt the benefits of the plan to the British economy and distrust the meaning of "European Federation" in the plan. Bevan declared, "If you open this Pandora's box, you will never know what kind of Trojan horse will jump out." He excitedly said to those Americans who support European integration: "Britain is not a part of Europe, it is not a country like Luxembourg."

In any case, British policymakers believe that Schumann's plan will fail, and then London can put forward a set of favorable countermeasures. As a result, the European Coal and Steel Community was proclaimed in 1952. This misjudgment was repeated in 1955, when six members of the European Coal and Steel Community invited the British Conservative government led by Anthony Eden to participate in further integration negotiations-in the field of atomic energy or a possible common market. At this stage, the proposed plan is still vague. Harold Macmillan, the foreign secretary, believes that Britain can exert "greater influence" on the negotiations if it fully participates "not as an observer, but as other countries concerned".

However, Rab Butler, Macmillan's main political enemy and Chancellor of the Exchequer, declared that these plans were "full of special difficulties" considering Britain's diversified global interests. In the end, the government only sent a senior official of the Ministry of Trade as an observer to attend the negotiations, without making any commitment. Most other countries send foreign ministers as their representatives. Subsequent negotiations in Brussels will also be sloppy. To make matters worse, in Britain's view, their own pace is basically determined by the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg-they are keen to promote European integration, which was often stifled by the contradiction between France and Germany in the past.

The first promoter of European integration was Dutch Foreign Minister Johann Beyena. Butler later said that he was "very enthusiastic" and "always told you to do this and that". Butler didn't take him seriously: "I want to see how bigger countries do it." An inter-departmental committee led and chaired by the Ministry of Finance studied the idea of a common market in 1955, and came to the conclusion that it did more harm than good to Britain's economy and politics-mainly because Britain is a truly global power and its interests should not be confined to a relatively narrow European circle.

Most people in the British government prefer long-term, and it is widely believed that the Brussels negotiations may break down on their own in view of the violent political turmoil in France. Surprisingly, the cabinet basically did not discuss this issue. According to Butler, "Aidan thought it was boring ... more boring than I expected". The complacent British did not foresee two key developments. First, guy mollet, the French Prime Minister from 1956 to 1, unexpectedly formed an alliance with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

Moller is a socialist, while Adenauer is a Catholic Christian Democrat. However, both of them were committed to the Franco-German reconciliation, and Moeller's determination was further strengthened after Aidan retreated in the autumn of 1956 when Britain and France jointly overthrew Nasser. It is said that Adenauer once said to Moeller, "Europe is your revenge." Adenauer was eager to let Germany return to the European family, and Moeller persuaded the French who criticized the Common Market with the concessions made by Adenauer and the price paid. The benefits of the proposal include granting membership to France and all its overseas territories, and providing preferential conditions for France's inefficient but politically powerful agricultural sector.

Secondly, Adenauer made this happen despite the opposition of Ludwig Erhard, the Minister of Economy. You should know that the latter is praised by many Germans as the designer of Germany's "economic miracle" after 1945. What Ehud wants is a bigger and looser free trade zone, which is open to the rest of the world, which is very commensurate with the diversified trade links between the Federal Republic of Germany and Scandinavia, Britain and the United States. But Adenauer insisted that political factors should prevail over economic factors: the most important thing was to reach an agreement with the French. So Erhard was basically ordered to do whatever it takes. This is the real reason why France can give orders.

In this way, 1957 signed the Treaty of Rome without Britain in March. After three centuries of intermittent war, France and Germany finally achieved peace after the end of Hitler's war 10 years. If Britain participates in the negotiations as Erhard hopes, the situation will be very different, and the result will be less protectionism and more free trade. Or, if Britain is willing to accept a customs union, historian miriam kamps thinks that "they will have no difficulty in negotiating broad exceptions for agriculture and the Commonwealth at this stage, but they will not be able to do so in the future".

Although the crux of Britain is often described as the principle of national sovereignty, it is more accurate to say that-in view of NATO's central position in Macmillan's national defense policy-Britain is unwilling to reduce its sovereignty because of the interdependence between Europe and transatlantic. To add insult to injury to these strategic mistakes, Britain did not expect 1958+ 1 the pace of deepening economic cooperation among the six countries after the establishment of the European Economic Community. Just a few years later, the six countries reached an agreement to build tariff barriers to other countries in the world and formulate a common agricultural policy to protect the agricultural sector; Most of the budget of the European Economic Community is used for the common agricultural policy. Thirdly, France has the ability to give orders to a great extent.

As a result, Britain once again faced its historical nightmare-another continental alliance led by France appeared across the English Channel. By 1960, although the economic consideration of "participating in it" is still mixed, the geopolitical influence of "staying out of it" can not be ignored. An inter-departmental special committee suggested: "If the European Economic Community becomes a truly effective political and economic force, it will become the dominant force in Europe and the only western alliance that can compete with the two superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union.

If Britain stays out of it, its influence in Europe will be correspondingly reduced. In view of the fact that "this will happen at the same time as the shrinking of our overseas territories", the Committee warned that Britain "is in danger of not being able to continue to claim to be a world power". When the European Economic Community just started, it was too late for Britain to realize the consequences of its failure to participate. The seven-nation European Free Trade Area (EFTA), hastily pieced together to counter the six countries, was established too late and its strength was too weak-people jokingly called it a "mess" in Europe.

Britain's fear of the European Community is not only due to the economic reasons it often claims, but also to the political factors of big countries. 196 1 In September, Macmillan's government started the negotiation of Britain's joining the European Economic Community, but its application was rejected by French President Charles de Gaulle in June of 1963-during the rout of 1940, he still regarded his "free France" as an "Anglo-Saxon". De Gaulle's Minister of Agriculture explained the reasons for the veto to the relevant British ministers in a chauvinistic tone:

"My dear friend, this is very simple. There are 5 hens in six countries, 1 rooster. If you join us, hens may become seven or eight. But then there will be two cocks. This is not easy to do. " Later, Britain always blamed France for their failure to join-this is completely in line with the historical laws of the past. And it's not unreasonable: obviously, the other five countries don't want to go against Charles de Gaulle, especially Adenauer, who attaches great importance to the Franco-German alliance. But the Macmillan government is also calling the shots because London always overestimates its bargaining power.