Why did the battle of Songhu fail?

The reasons leading to the failure of the Battle of Songhu mainly include the following aspects:

First, the strategic guiding ideology

1, Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing Kuomintang government could not stand on their own feet. They pinned their greatest hope for strategic campaigns on the intervention of western powers and tried to "promote peace through war" with the help of others. Their standpoint is fundamentally wrong.

2. From the beginning, Chiang Kai-shek took East China and Shanghai as decisive battle sites and took the initiative to attack. One of the important strategic intentions is that Shanghai is not only the largest city in China, but also an international metropolis, and it is "a place where Chinese and foreign views are valued". "International perception" is very important, and the Shanghai War will inevitably lead to the intervention of western powers. So I decided to "fight hard at any sacrifice." Jiang believes that the Sino-Japanese dispute can be solved as a whole by implicating the interests of various countries in Shanghai through the Battle of Shanghai and urging the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and other big countries or international organizations to intervene in mediation, thus achieving the "peaceful" goal of safeguarding existing sovereignty and administrative territorial integrity.

3. When answering a reporter's question at the beginning of the Battle of Songhu, Chiang Kai-shek said: "The current war is not only China's own war, but also the war of all countries that have entrusted their lives to sacred and inviolable treaties, especially those countries that have vast commercial interests in China. Now their interests are being destroyed, representing the countries that have been expelled." Shanghai is an international trading port. "The destruction of Haikou is not good for any country".

4. Nanjing National Government hopes and believes that the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and other big countries will "fulfill their obligations stipulated in the international treaties they solemnly signed". Therefore, "fighting the enemy with all one's strength in Shanghai will not change Westerners' disregard for China's heart, and may lead to mediation or even armed intervention by European and American countries".

However, Chiang Kai-shek forgot that any imperialism is an egoist, and they will never sacrifice their own interests for the people of China. They will only take China's interests as a bargaining chip to safeguard their own interests and be ready for betrayal at any time. In the modern history of China, which one is not? To expect the western powers to stand on the side of the people of China wholeheartedly is tantamount to trying to hide something from the tiger.

Second, the strategic and tactical principles

1, China's army has been in a passive position in the whole war, except for taking the initiative to attack at the beginning of the Battle of Shanghai and Shanghai, and has also taken more defensive positions in the main operational stage of the campaign. Passive defense When the enemy is strong and we are weak, simply fighting the enemy and fighting positional warfare can only be a dead end.

2. Chiang Kai-shek was passively defended and beaten in the Battle of Songhu, and it was very stupid to dam the flood of aggression with the flesh and blood of 700,000 troops. As can be seen from the map, the Shanghai-Nanjing-Hangzhou Triangle is like a giant turtle, with Shanghai as its glans and Hangzhou and Jiangyin as its feet. Shanghai is actually a peninsula sandwiched between Hangzhou Bay and the Yangtze River estuary, while the turtle tail is Nanjing and the turtle back is the Taihu Lake basin with a river network.

3. Without the right to control the sea and the air, throwing more than 700,000 troops into such a peninsula with a small area, dense water networks and swamps can only be passively beaten, and there is no room for manoeuvre, which just adapts to the strategic plan of Japanese militarism to make a quick decision and annihilate.

4. Songhu battlefield is flat, there is no danger to defend, it is not easy to build ground fortifications, and it is difficult to defend. Under this condition, China's hundreds of thousands of troops did not deploy in depth echelon, nor did they implement campaign maneuvers. In addition, the first-line troops were too close to the coastal banks and were attacked by Japanese naval guns for a long time, which increased the casualties in vain. After August 23rd, all the troops in China were bitten by the Japanese. They often fight for the gains and losses of one city and one place, so their subjective initiative is greatly limited and they are unable to change the battlefield situation. The only active attack was defeated by poor organization and command, and there was no turning point from then on.

In the whole battle, Chiang Kai-shek adopted the tactics of refueling one after another, only counterattack without strategic attack, and the battle mostly took the form of short-term surprise attack. With such rigid strategic and tactical guidance, how can China's army not be passive everywhere and be subject to people everywhere? And how can a passive defense army that has lost the initiative not fail? The initiative of China's army in the battle can't make up for Chiang Kai-shek's passivity in strategic guidance after all, and it is bound to fail.

Third, campaign command.

1, Chiang Kai-shek and China's high command made a major mistake in the Battle of Shanghai and Shanghai, that is, they did not pay enough attention to the strategic location of Hangzhou Bay.

2. Although Chiang Kai-shek imagined at the beginning of the battle that the Japanese might land from jinshanwei and outflank the China army front, he still built simple fortifications along the coast and kept troops under surveillance.

However, as the fighting intensified, the troops defending Hangzhou Bay were gradually transferred to support the two major battles in Shanghai. Both Chiang Kai-shek and German military advisers believe that the Japanese army has been fighting head-on in Shanghai, and there will be no more troops landing in Hangzhou Bay. When the Japanese really landed in jinshanwei, Jiang panicked and was reluctant to make a decision to withdraw. It was not until four days later that the whole line collapsed and the whole army was wiped out that Jiang ordered the troops fighting in Shanghai to retreat in an all-round way. Retreat missed the opportunity and hastily ordered, which eventually led to a shameful situation of a mountain defeat.

Fourth, weapons and equipment.

1, the backwardness of weapons and equipment is an important factor for the defeat of China's army in the Battle of Songhu and even other battles in the frontal battlefield of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression. China's army failed in the first stage of attack, the second stage of defense, the third stage of counterattack and retreat, lacking heavy artillery and bombs. On the other hand, the Japanese army has an absolute advantage in weapons and equipment.

2. Aircraft, heavy artillery, warships and tanks fight in all directions from land to sea and sky, and China's army can only fight back. The range of heavy artillery on Japanese warships is more than 10 km, and the heavy artillery often makes China's army lift its head, and everywhere it goes, it is bloody. The most advanced German Krupp mountain gun of China's army at that time had a maximum caliber of only 75 mm and a range of only a few kilometers, which could not be compared with Japanese naval guns at all.

3. China's army often concentrated 1 company's mountain guns to bombard Japanese ships, but they could not penetrate the thick deck, leaving only a flame and a spot on the warships. When China artillery bombed enemy strongholds and positions, it was hit back by Japanese heavy artillery. Even before the erection was completed, Japanese artillery came to suppress it, which made China artillery have to hide in their own land.

The final bomb either missed the target or didn't work at all, because the power was too small and the enemy fortifications were strong. Apart from tanks, soldiers in China have hardly seen them. When they first saw this "roaring" land monster on the battlefield, they could not help but feel fear of death. They can go up and get grenades to die, and most of them are shot down before they get to the front. Facing the Japanese tanks, China's army was filled with indignation, but it was helpless.

China lost its air superiority because of fewer planes. As the navy is almost completely annihilated, we have no control over the sea, and the enemy is free to come and go, how to fight, and where to fight. China soldiers are determined to kill thieves, unable to save the day, but they are beaten and bombed. How can such a battle be unbeaten?

5. Tactical concept and combat quality.

1, the Chinese army's overall tactical concept is outdated and backward, and its combat quality and military training are poor. Without common sense of modern war, they are still fighting the Japanese army in the old way of civil war.

2. Officers and men do not know how to fight enemy planes, tanks and forts, nor are they good at hiding themselves, nor do they know how to evacuate and disguise themselves. They just blindly emphasize courage, not afraid of death, omnipotent spirit, relying on bloody courage.

The troops from Guangxi came to the front from the rear. They refused to hide or lie down when they saw Japanese planes dropping bombs. Someone stood up straight and pointed at the plane and cursed. Many people died in vain before they officially went to war.

China soldiers are far inferior to Japanese soldiers in military technology, training level, discipline and effort. Therefore, it is not surprising that China's army, relying on its own city and people on its own land, paid twice or even three times the price of the enemy.

VI. National Defense Mobilization and Military Command System

1, China's national defense mobilization system, peacetime and wartime conversion system and military command system are far behind Japan.

2. At that time, there were 17 resident divisions in Japan. At ordinary times, the strength of each division is more than 1 1000, and it is expanded into special divisions in wartime, and the number of personnel is expanded to more than 24,000 to 28,000, that is, 380,000 to 740,000 in active service. In addition to reserve soldiers, Japan's military service system also includes 880,000 reserve soldiers and more than 2.4 million supplementary military service personnel, totaling more than 4.48 million military service personnel.

3. At that time, there were only 2.03 million active servicemen in China, and there was nothing in reserve and reserve. Therefore, after the first round of engagement between the Chinese and Japanese armies, the Japanese army's subsequent combat power will be greatly reduced, but the Japanese army can still maintain a considerable level in the second round after rapid consolidation.

4. The Japanese army not only has a complete troop supply system, but also has a high level of logistics support system and mechanization, which is far behind the Japanese army. The average time of four Japanese reinforcements was less than 10 days, and the farthest was even the distant northwest Yanmenguan troops. It takes less than 10 days on average to stop the attack, board the ship for thousands of miles, and then sail to the Shanghai theater for assembly. In this regard, it fully shows that the army in the mechanized war era must

5, lean soldiers can only fly with mechanized wings. On the other hand, China's troops wearing sandals, walking and riding are often attacked by Japanese planes, causing casualties. On September 1 day, the 20th Army of Zhan Sen was ordered to set out for the battlefields of Songhu and Shanghai. It started from Guizhou on two legs and walked all the way to Chenxi, Hunan before taking the boat. It took 37 days to get to the front by train from Changsha.

6. The Kuomintang army command sequence is chaotic, the organization is bloated, and its responsibilities are unclear. The army, division, brigade and regiment are under the jurisdiction of the war zone, and then the army will be added, and the legion will be formed after mid-September. Some armies often have only 1 division, that is, commanders or teachers. The transmission of orders, instructions and reports is time-consuming and laborious, which is not conducive to combat. In the later period, the evacuation command system was almost paralyzed, and the troops were like headless flies, chaotic and disorderly.

Seven, intelligence reconnaissance

1, an important reason for the defeat of China's army is that the information is ineffective, the enemy's situation is unknown, and the means of reconnaissance and intelligence are extremely backward.

2. Kuomintang spies always focus on the inside rather than the outside, and they focus on overthrowing the * * * production party and the so-called "troublemakers". With the war, they collected in a hurry, but of course they couldn't find anything.

3. Before and after the Battle of Songhu, Chiang Kai-shek was killed many times because of informers, the sky fell apart and top military secrets were leaked many times. The most outrageous thing is that Huang Xun, a Japanese spy, has been lurking in the high command for a long time, serving as the confidential secretary of the Executive Yuan and stealing a lot of confidential information, but for a long time, the Kuomintang secret service was unaware of it.

4. China's radio communication is also very backward. Some things can only be transmitted by telephone or manually, while China's planes have no means of receiving and talking, let alone aerial reconnaissance. China has no sources of information inside the enemy.

5. However, Japanese spies in China are extremely active, sending signals, receiving information, setting off fireworks, guiding enemy planes to bomb and firing guns, attack force. The Japanese know China's coastal areas, towns and villages like the back of their hands, and some of them even know them better than the China authorities themselves.

6. Before the September 18th Incident, a Japanese tactical instructor hired by the Army University said after drinking, "jinshanwei in China, Dapeng Bay in Guangxi and Beihai are all good places to land.

7. "China has sent people to jinshanwei for reconnaissance and field tactical training many times, but the conclusion is that jinshanwei is too deep for ships to land, which is not suitable for landing. But in the end, the Japanese army chose to land here, flanking the China army in one fell swoop and winning the war. The enemy has ears and eyes, while we are almost blind and deaf. You can only ride a blind horse and go to a deep pool in the middle of the night. How can we not fall into disaster?

VIII. Internal Unity

1, factional struggle and cronyism have always existed in the Kuomintang army, and the final defeat of the Battle of Shanghai and Shanghai cannot be said to have nothing to do with it.

2. Feng Yuxiang and Zhang Zhizhong were passionate about the Anti-Japanese War, so they were distrusted and changed their generals halfway. 18 Army Luo Department was transferred from the 9th Group Army to the 15 Army led by Chen Cheng, and Zhang Zhizhong, commander of the 9th Group Army, did not answer the notice. Gu (Zhu Tong), Chen, Luo and Hu (Zongnan) are all confidant of Jiang. Because Zhang Zhizhong was not Chiang's clique, his opponent's Central Army could not adjust its command, and even was humiliated and wronged and resigned angrily. Chiang Kai-shek used to cross the front-line commanders to direct operations. Later, local troops launched a counterattack, while the Central Army watched the fire on the other side and waited for failure. This, and so on, aggravated the passive beating of China's army.

Introduction to the Battle of Songhu:

1 The Battle of Songhu (also known as the August 13th Battle and the Second Shanghai Incident in Japan) was the first large-scale battle between China and Japan in War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, and it was also the largest and most tragic battle in the whole Sino-Japanese war.

2. The battle of Songhu began in August 1937 13. After the Lugouqiao Incident, Chiang Kai-shek took the initiative to fight back in Shanghai in order to change the direction of Japanese invasion from north to south to east and west, so as to facilitate long-term operations. About 800,000 troops from China and Japan went into battle, and the battle itself lasted for three months. The Japanese army invested more than 200,000 people in 8 divisions and 2 brigades, and announced more than 40,000 casualties. China's army invested more than 800,000 people in the most elite Central Teaching Corps, 87th Division, 88th Division,148th Division and 62nd Brigade, and counted 300,000 casualties by itself.

3. In the Battle of Songhu, the Japanese army suffered heavy losses because of the stubborn resistance of the Kuomintang, which laid the groundwork for the Japanese army to avenge and create the Nanjing Massacre. For China, this campaign marked the real beginning of the undeclared but all-out war between the two countries, and the regional conflict after the Lugouqiao Incident escalated into all-out war, completely smashing the Japanese plan of "destroying China in three months".