Huaihai campaign of seeking knowledge

Huaihai Campaign is the second strategic offensive campaign of the China People's Liberation Army's East China and Central Plains Field Army against the Kuomintang troops centered on Xuzhou, starting from Haizhou in the east, Shangqiu in the west, Lincheng in the north (now Xuecheng in Zaozhuang City) and Huaihe River in the south. The Huaihai Campaign was also the one in which the PLA suffered the most sacrifices, wiped out the most enemies, had the greatest political influence and had the most complicated tactics.

Name: Huaihai Campaign

Geographical location: a vast area centered on Xuzhou.

Time:1948165438+1October 6-1949 65438+ 10.

Participants: China People's Liberation Army and Kuomintang Army.

Result: The PLA won.

Participating troops: 600,000 people from the People's Liberation Army.

Participating troops: 800,000 Kuomintang troops.

Casualties: The PLA suffered more than100000 casualties.

550,000 Kuomintang troops were killed or injured and captured.

The main commanders are: Su Yu, Chen Yi and Du Fu.

Loss rate: 4.06: 1

background

Huaihai Campaign (Xubang Campaign was named by Kuomintang, Huaihai Campaign was named by * * * Producer Party). 1During the Battle of Jinan in September, 948, three regiments of Kuomintang troops assembled in Xuzhou170,000 people lingered in front of the position of Hua Ye's aid troops, afraid to go north to fight Hua Ye. Su Yu believes that this shows that the enemy is avoiding a large-scale battle with our army under unfavorable conditions, and it also shows that the favorable conditions for our army to carry out a strategic decisive battle against the enemy are gradually maturing. Therefore, in the case that the street fighting in Jinan is still fierce, but the victory is certain, at 7 o'clock on September 24, he sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission "Proposal for Huaihai Campaign" (Su Yu's military anthology, pp. 393-394). After careful consideration, the Central Military Commission wired back on September 25th 19 and agreed to Su Yu's suggestion: "We think it is very necessary to hold the Huaihai Campaign." (Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong, Volume 5, page 19). It should be noted that at this time, Su Yu's goal was to encircle the Seventh Corps (Yellow Department) in Huaiyin-Haizhou area, not the whole Xuzhou Group. At this time, the idea of Huaihai Campaign was later called Little Huaihai Campaign. With the development of the war situation, the General Front Committee assessed the situation, and the Huaihai Campaign got bigger and bigger, and finally achieved amazing results. Together with Ping Jin Campaign and Liaoshen Campaign, they are called the three major liberation campaigns.

The Huaihai Campaign started at 1948 1 1.6 and ended at 1949 1.00. * * was divided into three stages.

First stage

1948165438+1October 6, the East China Field Army branch went south. On the 8th, the Kuomintang troops He Jifeng and Zhang Kexia led more than 20,000 people to the battlefield for an uprising. At 438+00 on June 5, our army divided and surrounded the Yellow Corps in Nianzhuang area east of Xuzhou. After 10 days of fierce fighting from village to village, more than 65438+ 10,000 people were wiped out on the 22nd, and Huang, commander of the enemy corps, committed suicide. At the same time, in order to cooperate with the battle, the Central Plains Field Army attacked the Xu (Zhou) clam (Hong Kong) line. 165438+1October16. Take Su County and complete the strategic encirclement of Xuzhou. At this time, the Central Military Commission decided that Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin would form the General Front Committee, with Deng Xiaoping as the secretary to command the Huaihai Campaign in a unified way.

stage Ⅱ

165438+1On October 23rd, the Central Plains Field Army surrounded the Huang Wei Corps 12 Division that came from Central China to reinforce in the Shuangduiji area in the southwest of Suxian County. (stevie hoang Corps originally belonged to Bai Chongxi, a warlord in Guangxi, and there were many contradictions between the two factions, so it was very difficult to mobilize the White Department. ) 28, Chiang Kai-shek was forced to make a strategic retreat to Xuzhou defenders. Herry Liu, commander-in-chief of Xuzhou's "suppression general", withdrew from Bengbu, while Du, deputy commander-in-chief, stayed in Xuzhou for command. 65438+February 1, the enemy abandoned Xuzhou and fled to the southwest. On the 4th, the East China Field Army pursued troops and surrounded Xuzhou with fleeing enemies. On the 6th, the enemy Sun Corps attempted to break through and was annihilated. Sun escaped alone. On the same day, the Central Plains Field Army and the East China Field Army concentrated the superior forces of nine columns and launched a general attack on the Stevie Hoang Corps. After fierce fighting, by 15, more than 20,000 people in/kloc-0 were destroyed, and Huang Wei was captured alive. Since then, in order to cooperate with the Peiping-Tianjin campaign, in accordance with the unified deployment of the Central Military Commission, the Duji regiment surrounded without fighting and the troops rested for 20 days.

The third stage

From1949 65438+1October 6 to 10, the East China Field Army launched a general attack on the besieged Du Qun. After four days of fighting, Qiu Qingquan and 300,000 soldiers were annihilated, Du was captured alive, and Qiu Qingquan committed suicide and escaped.

In this campaign, our army participated in 600,000 troops, and the enemy dispatched 800,000 troops successively, which lasted for 65 days and wiped out more than 555,000 people. In the southern battlefield, Chiang Kai-shek's elite troops were eliminated, and the vast areas of the Central Plains north of East China and the Yangtze River were basically liberated, making Nanjing, the ruling center of the Kuomintang, under the direct threat of the People's Liberation Army.

After the Battle of Jinan, the enemy Xuzhou "suppression general" Herry Liu Group began to shrink its forces. By the end of 10, its four corps, four appeasement areas and 25 armies, with about 600,000 troops, were distributed on two railway lines, namely Longhai and Jinpu, with Xuzhou as the center, in an attempt to stop our troops from going south and cover Nanjing. Its deployment is: the seventh corps (yellow) is in Xin' an town; 13 Corps (Li Mi) is in the east of Xuzhou; The 2nd Corps (Qiu Qingquan) and 16 Corps (Sun) in Huangkou and Dangshan areas were evacuated from Zhengzhou to Mengcheng; The ninth appeasement area (Li Yannian) is in Haizhou; The third appeasement area (Feng Zhian) is in Han Zhuang and Taierzhuang areas; The fourth appeasement area (Liu Ruming) is in Shangqiu; 1 appeasement area (Zhou Yan) is in Huaiyin. This deployment is characterized by heavy troops, easy mobility and rapid reinforcement. On September 25, the Central Military Commission approved the proposal of the East China Field Army to carry out the Huaihai Campaign. 1October 1 1 day, Mao Zedong put forward the operational policy of Huaihai Campaign, demanding that the East China Field Army concentrate its troops as the first step, annihilate the Seventh Corps and complete the intermediate breakthrough. The second step is to annihilate the enemies of Haizhou and Lianyungang; The third step is to fight in Huaibei area. And asked the Central Plains Field Army to deploy the main force to attack the Zhengzhou-Xuzhou section of Longhai Road, and to contain the 16 Corps from being transferred eastward to cooperate with the East China Field Army. In order to annihilate the Seventh Corps and confuse the enemy, so that it could not quickly identify the main targets of our army, Mao Zedong further instructed the East China Field Army to use more than half of its troops as a containment and blocking task according to the characteristics of the enemy's deployment, and threatened Xuzhou from the north, south and west. In this way, we can buy more time and destroy the Seventh Corps. 1mid-October, the Central Plains Field Army sent 2 troops to Jianghan and 6 troops to western Anhui, attracting Bai Chongxi's main force, the 3rd Corps (Zhang Qian) to the south, and12nd Corps (stevie hoang) to the west to cooperate with the Zhengzhou campaign.

1October 20th, four columns of the Central Plains Field Army launched the Zhengzhou Campaign. At this time, the enemy's main force 16 Corps had retreated eastward, and more than 10,000 remnants of the enemy were wiped out. Zhengzhou and Kaifeng were liberated soon. At this time, the main force of the Central Plains Field Army has been able to maneuver on the eastern front. According to the development of the national war situation and the changes of the enemy situation in the battlefields of Central Plains and East China, 1 1 month/day, the Central Military Commission decided that Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping would command the Central Plains Field Army and East China Field Army to carry out the Huaihai Campaign. In this way, our army can participate in the war, including fifteen infantry columns of the East China Field Army, one special warfare column, seven columns of the Central Plains Field Army, and local troops with more than 600,000 people. After the Liaoshen Campaign, Chiang Kai-shek was afraid that all ministries in Xuzhou would repeat the same mistake that Wei Group was completely annihilated. In order to ensure Xuzhou, consolidate Jianghuai and protect Nanjing, on April 4th,1/kloc-0, he decided to shrink the main force of Herry Liu Group to both sides of Xubang section of Jinpu Road, in an attempt to distribute all the mobile corps on both sides of this section with Xubang section as the axis, to stop our troops from going south with offensive defense, and to evacuate to Huainan when necessary to ensure Nanjing. On the 6th, he adjusted his deployment according to this plan. At the same time, the 12 Corps, which belongs to the Central China "Suppression General", was transferred to Taihe and Fuyang areas, and the camera assisted the East. According to the plan of the Central Military Commission to annihilate the Seventh Corps first, cut off the Xubang section of Jinpu Road and isolate Xuzhou, the East China Field Army decided to surround the Seventh Corps in Xin 'an Town and Ahu area with seven columns. Taking eight columns as the delaying task, three of them marched north and south, containing and blocking 13 Corps' eastward assistance, and separating the connection between 7 Corps and 13 Corps. Shandong Corps commanded three columns to annihilate the enemy in the third appeasement area or promote its uprising. Then; Cross the canal and go straight to the east of Xuzhou to contain the enemy 13 Corps, prevent the enemy from aiding xuzhou east, and threaten Xuzhou from the northwest with two columns (under the command of the Central Plains Field Army at the beginning of the campaign). The four main columns of the Central Plains Field Army moved eastward from Suixian and Zhecheng counties, seeking to destroy the fourth appeasement area of Shangqiu enemy, then captured Su Xian, cut off the Xubang section of Jinpu Road, and completed the strategic encirclement of Xuzhou. The second and sixth columns turned to Huaihai battlefield to stop the enemy 12 Corps. The East China Field Army launched the Huaihai Campaign on the night of the 6th as planned, and all the troops advanced to the scheduled goal. When they found that the enemy was shrinking, they immediately turned to chase. Enemy No.7 Corps was delayed to open to the west on the 7th due to the westward withdrawal of Haizhou No.44 Army, while 13 Corps left Xu Dong as planned to be transferred to Lingbi. 1 1 8, Zhang Kexia and He Jifeng, deputy commanders of the enemy's third appeasement area, led three and a half divisions to revolt. Our Shandong Corps successfully crossed the canal, crossed the defense zone and headed for the east of Xuzhou. Herry Liu found that our army was approaching Xuzhou in multiple ways and judged that I would attack Xuzhou from east to west. He was very frightened. He immediately changed the original plan of withdrawing to both sides of Xu Mu, and decided to transfer the 2nd, 13, 16 Corps to Xuzhou on a starry night and stick to Xuzhou. At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek decided to transfer Du back to Xuzhou as the deputy commander-in-chief, and set up the Sixth Corps in the ninth appeasement area in Bengbu, and changed the fourth appeasement area into the eighth Corps, acting in coordination with the Sixth Corps, and advancing to Suxian County along both sides of Jinpu Road as a garrison between Guzhen and Suxian County. On the night of the 9th, according to the change of the battlefield situation, the Central Military Commission asked the field armies in East China and Central Plains to "strive to annihilate the main enemy forces near Xuzhou, so as not to flee south", and made up their minds to annihilate Herry Liu Group, the enemy of Xuzhou. 1 1 month 10, the main force of Shandong Corps annihilated the vanguard division of the Seventh Corps, cutting off the enemy's retreat. 1 1 month 1 1 day, the East China Field Army encircled the Seventh Corps in Nianzhuang area. In order to destroy the Seventh Corps, our army adjusted its deployment. The East China Field Army attacked the 7th Corps with the 4th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 13 columns of Shandong Corps and most of the special longitudinal guns, and blocked the enemy of xuzhou east aid with the 7th, 10,1/columns, and approached Xuzhou from the southeast. Chen Yi immediately instructed the main force of the Central Plains Field Army and the third and eighth columns of the East China Field Army to turn into the Xu clam section. Among them, the fourth column, the third column and the second column of the East China Field Army threatened Xuzhou from the southwest, the second military region of Hebei, Shandong and Henan threatened Xuzhou from the northwest, and the third and ninth columns attacked Suxian County. The main force of the 9 th column went south to prevent the enemy's 6 th and 8 th corps from aiding the north, and 1 column was the reserve. 1 1 month 15 night, the Central Plains Field Army captured Suxian County, annihilated an enemy division, cut off the contact between the enemy Xuzhou and Bengbu, and completed the strategic encirclement of Xuzhou. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China believes that this campaign is an unprecedented battle on the southern line. The victory of this campaign not only calmed the situation north of the Yangtze River, but also basically solved the situation in the whole country. Therefore, on 16, it was decided that Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin would form the general front committee of Huaihai Campaign, with Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping as the standing committee members and Deng Xiaoping as the secretary to co-ordinate all matters in East China, Central Plains and Hebei, Shandong and Henan regions. On November 12th, our army stormed the enemy's Seventh Corps, captured Nianzhuang on the 20th, wiped out the Seventh Corps on the 22nd, and Huang was killed. The enemy of xuzhou east's aid was stubbornly blocked by me, and it could only advance one or two kilometers a day. Eleven divisions of the enemy 12 Corps who came from Queshan to reinforce were blocked by the Central Plains Field Army and could only enter the vicinity of Evonne, south of Huihe River. After the enemy's Seventh Corps was annihilated, Chiang Kai-shek decided to attack Suxian County with the second and 65438 +06 Corps in Xuzhou, the sixth and eighth Corps in Bengbu, and the 65438 +02 Corps in an attempt to get through the ties between Xu and Mu and evacuate the enemy from Xuzhou. As a result, the enemy 12 Corps continued to advance in the direction of Xuzhou. The General Front Committee decided to concentrate all the Central Plains Field Army's encirclement and suppression of the enemy 12 Corps, and the East China Field Army formed two battle groups to block the enemy in Xuzhou and Bengbu respectively, one as the reserve of the Central Plains Field Army's encirclement and suppression of the enemy 12 Corps. 1 1 on 25th, the enemy 12 corps120,000 people were surrounded by 7 columns of our Central Plains Field Army in Shuangduiji area in the southwest of Suxian County. After the enemy 12 Corps was besieged, Chiang Kai-shek could not break through, and Xuzhou and Bengbu had no hope of reinforcements. On the one hand, he made Herry Liu go to Bengbu and ordered the Sixth and Eighth Corps to go north again. On the other hand, he made Du rate the second, 13, 16 Corps to give up Xuzhou and bypass Yongcheng south in an attempt to attack our Central Plains field army. After solving the siege of 12 Corps, * * * fled south together. Mao Zedong foresaw that the enemy might break through Xuzhou and instructed the East China Field Army to get ready. 1 1 On October 30th, about 300,000 people from Xuzhou Du Tuan fled in the direction of Yongcheng. Our East China Field Army pursued the enemy with eleven columns and surrounded the enemy in the Chenguanzhuang area in the northeast of Yongcheng on December 4th. 16 corps broke through on its own and was destroyed by me. The 2nd and13rd Corps immediately turned to defense. Our army surrounded two enemy regiments at the same time, and the enemy of Bengbu still tried to go north to rescue. The General Front Committee adopted the policy of "eating one (), holding one () and watching one (,Liu Ruming)". Six columns of the Central Plains Field Army and East China Field Army 1 column were used to block the enemy's sixth corps, and two columns of the East China Field Army were used as the general reserve. 12, our army launched a general attack on the enemy 12 corps, 15 annihilated the enemy, and captured Huang Wei alive. The aid of the enemy's Sixth Army Corps to the north was blocked. Knowing that 12 Corps had been annihilated, they fled back to Bengbu overnight. At this point, the battle of Peiping and Tianjin has been successfully launched. In order not to make Chiang Kai-shek make a quick decision and transport the enemy of Peiping and Tianjin to the south, the Central Military Commission suspended its attack on Du Group. The whole army at the front of Huaihai took a rest on the battlefield and launched a political offensive against the enemy to prepare for the attack. 1February 17, wrote "Urging Du and others to surrender". But Du and others refused to surrender. In late December, the Northeast Field Army and the Second and Third Corps of the North China Military Region divided their troops and surrounded the Fu Group on the Pingzhang Line. Our East China Army launched a general attack on Du Group on January 6th, wiped out the enemy on the 10th, captured Du, and ended the Huaihai Campaign. The Huaihai Campaign lasted for 66 days and wiped out 550,000 people from 56 divisions of the Kuomintang in the battlefields of East China and the Central Plains, exposing the enemy's Yangtze River defense line and the ruling centers of Beijing and Shanghai directly to our army. After the Huaihai Campaign, the enemy south of the Huaihe River fled south in panic. The 6th, 7th, 8th and13rd columns of the East China Field Army went south, liberated the vast area between the Yangtze River and Huaihe River, and went out to the north bank of the Yangtze River, which created conditions for the subsequent battle of crossing the river.

Logistic organizational support

A huge battle, in addition to proper command and three military lives, also has the key element of logistics support, especially in modern wars. Under the conditions at that time, it was impossible for the producers of * * * to guarantee the campaign logistics by modern means, but they brought human resources to the extreme. If the General Front Committee composed of Liu Chen and Deng Sutan played an important role in the organization and command of the campaign, the achievements of the East China Bureau, the East China Military Region and the Logistics Department of the East China Field Army, which are mainly responsible for logistics support, are undeniable. Among them, Rao Shushi, secretary of the East China Bureau and political commissar of the East China Military Region, Liu Ruilong, deputy chief of staff and commander of the logistics headquarters of Hua Ye, member of the front committee of the East China Field Army and director of the Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu Finance Office (later the logistics commander and political commissar of the Third Field Army) are the main commanders of the logistics work. During the campaign, people in Jiangsu, Shandong, Anhui, Henan and other places supported the war with great material and human resources. Four provinces * * * sent 5.43 million migrant workers, including 220,000 permanent migrant workers, 6.5438+0.3 million second-line migrant workers and 39.65438+0.000 temporary migrant workers in the rear. There are 206,000 stretchers, 880,000 vehicles, 305,000 shoulder poles, 767,000 livestock and 8,539 ships. We raised 960 million Jin of grain and transported 434 million Jin of grain to the front. The support of migrant workers is the most touching scene in the battle. In the third stage of the campaign, the ratio of participating troops to supporting former migrant workers was as high as 1: 9. This unprecedented mobilization of human resources in the liberated areas shows extraordinary endurance. Take the south-central part of Shandong Province, which bears the heaviest burden on migrant workers, as an example. According to the statistics of the Sixth Division, 490,000 migrant workers (permanent migrant workers170,000, temporary migrant workers 320,000, not counting many temporary workers) have been dispatched in this area, accounting for more than 16% of its total population of 3 million. Conventionally, the people's manpower burden for the war should generally not exceed 12% of the total population, that is, there is one migrant worker in eight people, except the old, the weak, women and children, and almost all young and middle-aged men have been mobilized. The mobilized migrant workers account for 16% of the total population, which can be said to exceed the maximum burden limit. Yongcheng, Xiayi and Su Xian are almost mobilized by the whole people. The slogan put forward by the people is "throw everything away, support the front line, endure all difficulties, overcome all difficulties and win the battle."

Result statistics

Huaihai Campaign was the largest of the three strategic decisive battles in the War of Liberation, which lasted 66 days from1October 6 1948 165438+ to1949 10. The Kuomintang army invested seven regiments, two appeasement zones, thirty-four armies, eighty-six divisions, about 800,000 men, and flew 2,957 sorties. Sixteen columns of the East China Field Army and seven columns of the Central Plains Field Army, plus local troops of the East China Military Region and the Central Plains Military Region, number about 600,000. * * * Destroy the Xuzhou General Suppression Forward Command of the Kuomintang Army and its five regimental headquarters, 22 military headquarters, 56 divisions and an appeasement area. The regular army and other troops ***555099 people, accounting for about 69% of their combat troops, including 320355 prisoners,171566. Senior Kuomintang generals above Major General were captured 124, 22 defected and 8 defected. The above results do not include the number of people who broke up and fled. We mainly seized 42 15 guns, 65438 light and heavy machine guns +04503 guns, 65438 long and short guns +05 1045 guns, 6 planes, 265438 armored tanks +05 cars, 65438 cars +0747 cars and 65438 shells. The PLA killed 25,954 people, injured 988 18 people and lost 1 1752 people, totaling 136524 people. The loss ratio between the enemy and us is 4.06: 1. Weapons and equipment losses include 1 tanks, 34 mountain guns, field guns and howitzers, 2 19 mortars and infantry guns, 26 grenade launchers, 1884 light and heavy machine guns, 14588 long and short guns and 67998 various shells. Among the three major battles of Armageddon, the Huaihai Campaign suffered the most casualties of the PLA, exceeding the sum of the other two battles, accounting for 53.8% of the total casualties of Armageddon, and the losses of various weapons and ammunition were also the largest, of which artillery losses accounted for 48.6% of the total losses; The loss of long and short guns accounts for 69.4% of the total loss, the loss of light and heavy machine guns accounts for 6 1.8%, the loss of shells accounts for 68.7%, the loss of bullets accounts for 62.7%, and the loss of explosives accounts for 57.4%. The total number of enemies wiped out was the largest, accounting for 35.8% of the total number of enemies wiped out, and the number of prisoners was the least. The intensity of the Huaihai Campaign is remarkable. Among them, Hua Ye wiped out about 440,000 enemy troops, accounting for about 80% of the total number of enemy troops wiped out in Huaihai Campaign; Hua Ye suffered about 9 1000 casualties, accounting for 67% of the total casualties of the PLA in Huaihai Campaign.

Political and military significance

The failure of the Huaihai Campaign completely lost Chiang Kai-shek's elite main forces in the downtown area, especially the backbone of his own troops-Huang Wei's 12 Corps and Qiu Qingquan's 2 nd Corps, including the 5 th Army and 18 Army, which are called the "five main forces". (The other three forces of the five main forces were the reorganized 74th Division, which was annihilated in Meng Lianggu in May/947, the new 1 Army and the new 6th Army, which were annihilated in Liaoshen Campaign in June/948), thus losing the backbone on which Chiang Kai-shek relied to support the war. The north of Huaihe River was completely liberated, and most of Huainan was also controlled by the People's Liberation Army. Only one important city, Anqing, north of the Yangtze River is controlled by the national army. The People's Liberation Army has pushed the Yangtze River, and the next attack is directed at the core area of Chiang Kai-shek's rule-Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai. As far as the national war situation is concerned, among the five strategic groups of the Kuomintang army after the Liaoshen and Huaihai campaigns, the most powerful strategic groups Xuzhou Group and Northeast Group no longer exist, and the North China Group is also in danger. The remaining two groups, Huazhong and Xi 'an, have also been greatly weakened under the constant attack of the People's Liberation Army, while the newly established Tangborn Group in Beijing, Shanghai and Hangzhou is very weak, and these three groups have become the main groups. Most areas to the north of the Yellow River are liberated areas, and those from the south of the Yellow River to the north of the Yangtze River are basically liberated areas. The Kuomintang had to rely on the natural barrier of the Yangtze River to occupy half of the south of the Yangtze River, but with the loss of the elite main force, it also lacked enough troops to organize effective defense.

With the military defeat, the political crisis of the Kuomintang has further intensified, and the power struggle between various factions has become increasingly fierce. Taking advantage of the extremely unfavorable situation of the Kuomintang regime, Bai Chongxi put forward the idea of "peaceful settlement" on February 25, 1948, which was immediately supported by the Senate of Hubei, Hunan, Henan and other provinces. In this situation, Chiang Kai-shek issued a New Year's Proclamation on New Year's Day 1949, proposing peace talks with China. However, at this time, the initiative to fight or not is no longer in the hands of the Kuomintang. Without Chiang Kai-shek's approval, Sun Ke, President of the Executive Yuan, led the Executive Yuan to move to Guangzhou, announced that the government would move to Guangzhou, and expressed opposition to negotiations with China, calling for continued war with China in an attempt to manage South China with the support of foreign forces. In Nanjing and Shanghai, the center of Kuomintang rule, people's hearts have been floating and uneasy. The Kuomintang government urgently requisitioned and the shipping companies were ordered to assemble ships in Nanjing and Shanghai. Government officials at all levels rushed to Hongkong and Taiwan Province Province. Cultural relics of the Palace Museum also began to leave Nanjing and move to Taiwan Province Province. Prior to this, War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression won 1945, Beiping was recovered, the Kuomintang government took over the Palace Museum again, and the three cultural relics moved southward were concentrated in Chongqing, and 1947 was transported back to Nanjing. The failure of Huaihai Campaign forced the National Government to step up the withdrawal of important cultural relics from Nanjing. From the end of 1948 to the beginning of 1949, the Nanjing Kuomintang government selected 2,972 boxes of cultural relics from the Nanjing warehouse and transported them to Taiwan Province Province. Later, a new museum was built in Shuangxi, outside Shilin, Taipei, for public display. After 1949, a large number of remaining cultural relics were transported back to Beijing Palace Museum 1 10,000 boxes, but 2 176 boxes were still sealed in Nanjing warehouse and entrusted to Nanjing Museum for safekeeping. There are only a dozen people left in the Kuomintang Central Party Department, and 80% of legislators in the Legislative Yuan fled Nanjing. Even the US military advisory group in China is busy evacuating people and their families. Li Zongren recalled: When the battle of Xu Bang came to an end, China's overall victory was a foregone conclusion, and Beijing and Shanghai shook and people were worried. Many public opinion organs at home and abroad, even senior generals in unified operations, think that the future is hopeless. In this case, Chiang Kai-shek, who was attacked on all sides, had to take the strategy of retreating for progress. After careful planning and deployment, on June 5438+0949 65438+1October 2 1, he announced his retirement, handed over the position of President to Li Zongren, and returned to his hometown of Xikou, Fenghua, Zhejiang, for remote control behind the scenes. In the post-war review of the Huaihai Campaign, the Kuomintang military command had to admit that the defeat suffered by the national army had the greatest impact on the overall situation, especially in East China. Because the National Army was completely annihilated in the decisive battle in Xu Mu, the National Army was unable to fight with the main force of the * * * Army. General Badawi, head of the US military advisory group in China, said in his report to the US War Department: Due to the humiliation caused by the failure of the Kuomintang government in the north of the Yangtze River, it is extremely doubtful whether the Kuomintang government can get the necessary support in South China and mobilize the manpower in this area to rebuild the army, even if time permits. The complete defeat of the Kuomintang is inevitable. Si Tuleideng, the American ambassador to China, believes that Chiang Kai-shek's military strength has actually collapsed. For a time, the Guangxi department felt proud and even wanted to do a big job. The significance of the Huaihai Campaign is as Mao Zedong said in his statement on the current situation on the fourth day after the campaign, namely 1949 65438+ 10/4. Now, the People's Liberation Army is superior to the residual military forces of the reactionary Kuomintang government in number, morale and equipment. At this point, the people of China began to vomit a sigh of relief. It is now obvious that as long as the People's Liberation Army makes several major attacks on the remaining Kuomintang troops, the rule of the Kuomintang will soon collapse and perish.

Activity review

Huaihai Campaign was a decisive strategic decisive battle between the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Kuomintang heavily armed group under the condition that troops and equipment were not dominant, and finally ended in the overall victory of the PLA. The PLA's brilliant victory under the condition that the troops and equipment are not dominant and the battlefield situation is complicated and changeable is the result of the correct decision of the Central Military Commission and the General Front Committee, the close cooperation between Hua Ye and Nakano, the heroic fighting of commanders and soldiers and the full support of the people. This is also a miracle in the history of war. In the 1980s, the United States Military Academy at West Point sent a delegation to the former site of Huaihai battlefield, and the evaluation of this result was "incredible". The reason why the Kuomintang failed was that the determination of the high command changed again and again, and the various corps did not cooperate with each other. The most important and crucial reason is that the Kuomintang government has lost the hearts of the people. For this battle, both sides summed up the reasons for victory and defeat. Regarding the Kuomintang army, Herry Liu, commander-in-chief of Xuzhou Suppression General, thought that in this campaign, there were more strategic failures than tactical failures, and more tactical failures than campaign failures. He always lists thirteen mistakes, mainly including: hesitating to advance and retreat, resulting in a temporary battle, rather than a planned and prepared battle, leading to a disadvantage in strength and posture; Concerned about the Jianghuai defense, the result is everywhere worried, everywhere weak, leading to scattered forces; The coordination between war zones is poor, and the transfer of troops is not flexible. In particular, Huang Wei Corps failed to enter the war eastward as early as possible and lost its fighters. Du gave up Xuzhou, which was an adventure, but he couldn't play his brave and decisive spirit and beat the * * * army in lightning speed, so that the whole army was wiped out; Commanders of various units have a mental gap at ordinary times, so they can't cooperate effectively in wartime, so that it is difficult for the army to exert its maximum cooperation even though it is large. The post-war review of the Kuomintang high command department said: the main reason for the failure is the strategic error, and secondly, the tactics have not improved, which makes it difficult to support the strategy. Other aspects, such as the maintenance of sustained combat effectiveness and the comprehensive display of combat effectiveness and counter-intelligence, have made great mistakes. * * * As for the production party, Su Yu 10 pointed out at the enlarged meeting of the front committee held in Hua Ye on October 20th that the victory of the Huaihai Campaign was due to the correct leadership of the Central Military Commission, Chairman Mao and the General Front Committee, the full support of the party, government, army and people in the rear, the coordinated operations of various corps and services, the flexible command of all comrades attending the meeting, and the tireless and heroic fighting of all commanders and fighters. When Chen Yi met with Soviet Ambassador to China Eugene in February 195 1 1, he introduced the Huaihai Campaign and summarized the reasons for the victory in the decisive battle: First, the enemy misjudged that we had no strength and would not concentrate on fighting him. Second, divide and annihilate the enemy in batches in campaign tactics, focusing on melee and night fighting, and give full play to my strengths. Third, the huge and profound support of the people's power has actually turned into 5 million to 800,000, giving full play to the power of the people's war. Fourth, the battle process is very difficult, like cutting the neck with a blunt knife, and it is difficult to annihilate the enemy at once. The correct decision-making in a strategic campaign depends on the courage, dedication and genius of soldiers. Fifth, it played the role of political offensive. In the battle, five enemy divisions revolted and one division surrendered. In the prisoner policy, we should combine principle with flexibility to divide the enemy. Among these reasons, the support of the people is the fundamental guarantee of victory. As Nakano said in the Summary of the Double-Stack Operation, the material supply in the operation was satisfactory, and no unexpected special difficulties were encountered in terms of food and ammunition security or medical rescue. This is a strong guarantee for the success of this operation. Without this guarantee, it is unthinkable to win this operation. Chen Yi particularly emphasized to Eugene that the five million former migrant workers were all people who carried food, ammunition and the wounded, which was our real advantage. The victory of Huaihai Campaign was pushed out by people in cars.

The Huaihai Campaign is a real people's war, and the victory of the Huaihai Campaign is also a real victory for the people.