Who will be held responsible for the failure to establish a micro-credit risk monitoring and early warning mechanism for people out of poverty?

In order to better understand and implement the Administrative Measures for Risk Compensation of Poverty Alleviation Microfinance in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (Revised) (hereinafter referred to as the Measures), the relevant policies are now interpreted as follows:

1. Background of the promulgation of the Measures

(1) Guangxi poverty alleviation microfinance has entered a centralized repayment period, and the activation of risk compensation has been put on the agenda.

in p>219, the balance of poverty alleviation microfinance in our district was 16.893 billion yuan, accounting for 82.75% of the total loan balance (23.274 billion yuan), especially in the third and fourth quarters, there were 335,9 poverty alleviation microfinance loans due and 15.279 billion yuan, accounting for 9.44% of the loans due in the whole year. Some poverty alleviation microfinance loans are overdue, and it is urgent to clarify the compensation standards and activation procedures of risk compensation.

(II) In 218, the evaluation of the effectiveness of the national poverty alleviation and the feedback to Guangxi pointed out that the risk compensation system for poverty alleviation microfinance in Guangxi was not perfect. The audit found that a county failed to formulate measures for the management of risk compensation for poverty alleviation microfinance according to regulations.

The Notice of the Leading Group for Poverty Alleviation and Development of the Autonomous Region on Printing and Distributing the Work Plan for the Improvement and Implementation of Guangxi Problems in 218 (Gui Fu Ling Fa [219] No.7) requires the Guangxi Banking Insurance Regulatory Bureau and the Finance Department of the Autonomous Region to lead the leaders to improve the management measures of risk compensation for poverty alleviation microfinance at the autonomous region level and guide the county level to improve the risk compensation system.

(3) cities, counties and financial institutions have repeatedly put forward adjustment opinions.

with the changes in the situation of poverty alleviation microfinance, cities, counties and lending banks have repeatedly requested to revise the original Measures for the Administration of Risk Compensation Funds for Poverty Alleviation Microfinance in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (Gui Cai Nong [217] No.58) in order to reasonably determine the proportion of risk compensation, and clarify the activation procedures of risk compensation, loss identification standards and other matters.

II. Purpose of revision

The purpose of this revision is to encourage and urge relevant departments and lending banks to do a solid job in the recovery of poverty alleviation microfinance according to laws and regulations, so as to minimize the loss of state-owned assets.

due to the influence of superior policies and historical factors, Guangxi poverty alleviation micro-credit failed to be strictly examined when it was admitted, and the post-loan management was not as strict as that of similar commercial loans. If the recovery of problematic credit cannot be properly done in the final recovery stage, it will inevitably cause huge losses of state-owned assets.

Therefore, through this revision, it is necessary to give full play to the policy-oriented role of financial funds, and urge all units at all levels to strictly implement the spirit of the speech made by the leaders of the autonomous region at the 219 video conference on microfinance for poverty alleviation in the whole region, and "compact the responsibilities layer by layer and force the work to be implemented"; Urge lending banks to "effectively assume the main responsibility of poverty alleviation microfinance management, and strictly do a good job in loan review, issuance and recovery in accordance with regulations"; Urge relevant departments to make full use of policies, give maximum support to lending banks within the scope permitted by laws and regulations, and do a good job in risk prevention and control, recovery and disposal of poverty alleviation microfinance.

three, Policy basis

(1) Notice on Promoting the Healthy Development of Poverty Alleviation Microfinance (Y.J.F. [217] No.42)

(2) Notice of the State Council Poverty Alleviation Office of China People's Bank of China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, China on Further Standardizing and Improving the Management of Poverty Alleviation Microfinance (Y.J.F. [219] No.24)

(3) Notice on Innovative Development for Poverty Alleviation.

(4) Guiding Opinions on Comprehensively Doing a Good Job in Financial Services for Poverty Alleviation and Development (Yinfa [214] No.65)

(5) Opinions of the State Council on Strengthening the Management of Local Government Debt (Guo Fa [214] No.43)

(6) Notice of General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing Emergency Response Plans for Local Government Debt Risks (4). Notice of Local Financial Ombudsman Offices on Implementing the Interim Measures for Local Government Debt Supervision (FB [216] No.175)

(8) Notice of the Ministry of Finance Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Justice, the People's Bank of China, the China Banking Regulatory Commission on Further Regulating Local Government Debt Financing Behavior (FB [217] No.5)

(9) Financial Rules for Financial Enterprises (Decree No.42 of the Ministry of Finance Notice of the State Administration of Finance on the Handling of Enterprise Income Tax on Special-purpose Financial Funds (Cai Shui [211] No.7)

(11) Notice on Further Promoting the Work of Poverty Alleviation Microfinance (Gui Kai Fa [216] No.7)

(12) Supplementary Notice on Steadily Promoting the Work of Poverty Alleviation Microfinance (Gui Kai Fa [216] The first chapter is the general principle, which explains the background of the formulation of the Measures and defines the object and scope of risk compensation payment. The second chapter is the risk compensation management Committee, which defines the county-level risk compensation management organization, rules of procedure and responsibilities of each unit; The third chapter is the source and supplement of risk compensation, which defines the source, supplement mechanism and disbursement procedure of risk compensation; The fourth chapter is the daily management of risk compensation, which defines the responsible department of daily management, the three-party management mechanism, the monthly report system and the compensation ratio; The fifth chapter is the activation of risk compensation, which defines the loss identification standard, negative list system, activation procedure of risk compensation, rejection mechanism of draft, materials needed for business, etc. The sixth chapter is the performance evaluation of risk compensation, which defines the evaluation requirements and buffer mechanism; The seventh chapter is guarantee and supervision, which clarifies the supervision mechanism and accountability basis; The eighth chapter is the supplementary provisions, which clarify the document interpretation mechanism and other additional provisions.

V. Key issues to be explained

(1) Compensation ratio of risk compensation.

judging from the situation in other provinces, Yizhang County, Chenzhou City, Hunan Province, where the national poverty alleviation microfinance work is well carried out, has invested a total of 43 million yuan (including 224 million yuan for household loan enterprises), and compensated 9% of the household loan funds, but did not compensate the household loan enterprises for using poverty alleviation microfinance. As of June 13, the county's risk compensation of more than 43 million yuan was only 45, yuan. Judging from the situation in our region, the poverty alleviation office of the autonomous region, the financial supervision bureau and other relevant departments have all proposed that the risk compensation ratio should be set at 7%, but the opinions of cities on the risk compensation ratio are different. Nine cities including Baise, Hechi, Wuzhou, Chongzuo, Guilin, Laibin, Yulin, Qinzhou and Fangchenggang agree that the risk compensation ratio should be 7%, while Liuzhou and Hezhou suggest that it should be implemented at 5%-7%, while Nanning and Fangchenggang agree that it should be implemented at 5%.

in order to achieve the policy objectives of reasonably sharing the credit losses, ensuring that there is no systematic risk, compacting the collection responsibility of lending banks, and improving the loan recovery rate as much as possible, taking into account the opinions of all parties and the risk situation of poverty alleviation microfinance in our region, this method adjusts the risk compensation ratio from the original 5% to 7%, and retains the provision that the risk compensation is not subject to quota management.

(2) clarify the difference between risk compensation and guarantee.

the relevant documents of the central ministries and commissions have repeatedly stressed that risk compensation should not be confused with guarantee money. Risk compensation comes from financial funds, which is a kind of compensation funds given by the government to encourage relevant subjects to invest resources, engage in business activities and complete specific tasks in areas encouraged by policies. The guarantee fund is the fund that needs to bear the repayment obligation when the debtor fails to fulfill the repayment obligation according to the contract. Both of them are fundamentally different in nature and accounting treatment. According to the above provisions, risk compensation funds cannot be confused with guarantee funds and cannot directly compensate poor households for overdue loans. Otherwise, it will violate the provisions of the central document and touch the policy red line of implicit debt of local governments. Therefore, in the relevant provisions of these Measures, it is clear that risk compensation only compensates the reasonable losses of the lending bank and is recognized as the income of the bank.

(3) compensation for the reasonable losses of poverty alleviation microfinance.

the term "reasonable loss" as mentioned in these measures refers to the loan loss after excluding the loss caused by abnormal factors, which conforms to the routine situation of poverty alleviation microfinance business activities. The government establishes a risk compensation mechanism, which is intended to compensate financial institutions for the extra risks they bear because of relaxing credit conditions. However, some lending banks have relaxed their credit conditions, and at the same time, they have also relaxed their post-loan management, which has led to the accumulation of micro-credit risks for poverty alleviation until they become bad. Therefore, the losses caused by poverty alleviation microfinance should take into account not only the access risk brought by the government's push, but also the influence of lax management and poor collection of loans by lending banks and the illegal issuance of individual rides on poverty alleviation microfinance. This part of the poverty alleviation micro-credit loss is unreasonable, and the county will coordinate and solve it by itself according to the causes and responsibilities. In addition, this method has formulated a buffer mechanism, and adopted the method of combining the horizontal comparison and threshold of the loss rate of poverty alleviation microfinance in counties in the whole region. For counties with the loss rate of poverty alleviation microfinance exceeding 1% and higher than the average loss rate of poverty alleviation microfinance in the whole region, their new poverty alleviation microfinance losses will not be included in the scope of risk compensation for the time being.

(4) the activation time of risk compensation.

Risk compensation is the last pass to reduce the losses of lending banks, and the compensation amount is calculated based on the amount of bad debts. In order to encourage and urge all parties to speed up the progress of collection, increase the intensity of collection, and minimize the loss of state-owned assets as much as possible, the activation of risk compensation is based on the completion of bad debt identification. If the county-level collection work is carried out smoothly and complete supporting materials are collected and sorted out in a short period of time, bad debts can be identified in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Administrative Measures for the Write-off of Bad Debts of Financial Enterprises (217 Edition) (Caijin [217] No.9) issued by the Ministry of Finance, and risk compensation can be applied. The design of this system is mainly to prevent some units from slacking off, slowing down the collection work and directly delaying the start time of risk compensation.

(5) the requirement of exhausting recourse.

according to the spirit of relevant national policies and regulations, lending banks should, with the assistance of relevant departments, find out the property under the names of poor loan households or enterprises, apply for sealing up, detaining and freezing in accordance with relevant laws and regulations, actively follow up the litigation procedures, and execute relevant property as soon as possible. The above-mentioned property includes but is not limited to: deposits in all bank accounts under the name of poor loan households or enterprises (except those that are not allowed to be deducted by law), land (forest land) use rights, related resource contracting rights, real estate, steel structure factory buildings, machinery and equipment, vehicles, equity, other current assets and fixed assets.

(6) delay in exercising the right of subrogation.

according to article 73 of the contract law of the people's Republic of China, if the debtor delays in exercising its due creditor's rights, thus causing damage to the creditor, the creditor may request the people's court to subrogate the debtor's creditor's rights in its own name. As for the micro-credit for poverty alleviation used by household loan enterprises, poor households have not used loans and have no repayment ability, and enterprises have debts to poor households because they get funds from poor households, and the rights and obligations between them are not exclusive claims. This situation meets the conditions of subrogation litigation. Lending banks can sue enterprises directly to the court according to this provision, and list poor households as witnesses or third parties. If the lending bank delays in exercising subrogation and misses the opportunity to collect the money, which causes the enterprise to transfer its property and causes loan losses, it will not be included in the scope of compensation.

(7) using poverty alleviation microfinance to undertake problem credit.

accepting problem credit with poverty alleviation microfinance means that when poverty alleviation microfinance is issued, the enterprise is insolvent, the credit is overdue, or the original loan of the enterprise is required to be recovered due to violation of laws and regulations. This situation belongs to the abnormal distribution of household loans to help the poor micro-credit, and the risk compensation will not be compensated, which will be solved by the county level.

(8) the solution to the non-compensation part of risk compensation.

this method clearly stipulates that the county government shall coordinate relevant departments and lending banks to analyze the causes, delimit the responsibilities and organize and coordinate the poverty alleviation microfinance that is not compensated for the risk compensation due to abnormal and unreasonable payment, so as to determine the sharing ratio between the government and the bank. The compensation for this part of poverty alleviation microfinance is not bound by these measures, and risk compensation shall not be used. On the basis of fully respecting historical facts, safeguarding the reasonable demands of all parties and safeguarding the overall situation of poverty alleviation, the county level shall formulate compensation plans according to laws and regulations.

(9) Other related issues.

1. The term "eligible" mentioned in Article 4 of these Measures refers to the fact that there is no illegal distribution of micro-credit for poverty alleviation, with the focus on the fact that there is no illegal distribution.

2. The market-oriented disposal of non-performing loans mentioned in Article 25 of these Measures refers to the practice that lending banks will transfer their creditor's rights in accordance with relevant regulations to reduce the ratio of non-performing loans, including but not limited to single-family creditor's rights transfer, batch non-performing loans transfer, non-performing assets securitization, and non-performing loans transfer by fund. After disposing of non-performing loans in a market-oriented way, the lending bank can identify bad loans according to the Administrative Measures for Write-off of Bad Loans of Financial Enterprises (217 Edition) (Caijin [217] No.9), and complete risk compensation and write-off of bad loans.

3. The financial asset management company mentioned in Article 25 of these Measures shall apply for admission to the Finance Department of the autonomous region in an official document before the first cooperation with the county. The finance department of the autonomous region shall, after reviewing the qualifications of financial asset management companies, decide whether to be included in the access list. The finance department of the autonomous region will regularly announce the access list to the public, and dynamically adjust the list according to the management level of financial asset management companies.

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