Wang Chunyong & Information

If everyone is rational, then the number of people who go to bars every day is almost just right, but people who are not saints are often limited in rationality. There are many people coming to the bar for the first time, so most people think the bar is too crowded. When making the second decision, refer to the previous one instead of going to the bar. Several people who went to the bar found that there were fewer people in the bar the next day, and they felt very cool. They will continue to come back for the third time, bringing back many people ... the cycle begins. On the one hand, bar games show that real game participants are extremely limited and rational, and their rationality is only a short delay. Historical data is only useful for computers, not necessarily for people.

On the other hand, bar games point out that winners are always only a few. Although it is possible to adjust it, such as sending a message to remind you from time to time, the cost is probably too high. On other occasions, a few people may even set up various obstacles to prevent the latecomers from rising. In other words, our world is still manipulated by a few people. However, in the end, the world is not a model, and the path of ethnic minorities is still traceable. Sophisticated generals will still find the only way out in the maze of gossip. You must be a more experienced general if you like. The king's sorrow. Three people are self-determined about guns, and the marksmanship of A, B and C is decreasing. The final helpless and magical ending will not depend on simultaneous shooting or successive shooting. The best shooter has the highest probability of falling. However, the worst gunman has the greatest hope of survival. Because no one will list the gunman with the least threat as the number one clear target. Here, the weak will win. It is by no means a myth to defeat the strong with the weak.

Is the fate of the king really so unbearable? Oh, say goodbye, forget that every theoretical model has a premise. If you break any of them, the king will still come back. This is the first-Mover advantage. Suppose this is a competition similar to CS, and the excellent gunner knocks down the No.2 gunner and immediately gets a reward: shield. Then shooter number three will be desperate. However, in any case, this game mode gives the vulnerable groups a hope. Opportunities always exist. The strategic alliance begins when two hunters cooperate to hunt deer and gain much more than rabbits alone. This may be a good thing, but it depends on the allocation of deer as a public resource. If properly distributed, the overall efficiency will be improved. If one side is dominant and the other side suffers, then Pareto improvement cannot be carried out and cooperation may eventually break down.

Another problem, a bigger problem. The demonstration of cooperation will allow more hunters to join, the number of deer hunting will increase greatly, and the interests of human beings will increase geometrically in the short term. But in the end, it was indeed an ecological imbalance, and the deer became extinct. After a short period of prosperity, hunters will return to their original rabbit hunting life again. Although in order to avoid this tragedy, mankind still has the last hope: Coase theorem, the magic weapon of institutional economics, uses the ownership of property rights to solve external economic problems. However, due to the cost and feasibility of negotiations, the tragedy of human society will continue to be staged. The last game before the chaos. Little pig and big pig live on one side of the pigsty (the trough is here), and turn on the food switch on the other side. Whoever steps on it loses the initiative. What was the result? It is the little pig who chooses to hitchhike, and the big pig who runs diligently. Because no matter whether the pig runs or stops, the best strategy of the big pig is to step on the organ. But in real life. There are still two strategies.

Piglets hitchhike. Big pigs sometimes consciously or unconsciously call themselves "the great man of chivalry, serving the country and the people", so they bear some unbearable burdens. The trick of game theory points out that America behaves like a big pig after the war. After the war, the United States tried its best to publicize its universal values, went deep into overseas affairs, and even spared no expense to help small countries defend themselves. In this way, small countries unconsciously "exploited" big countries.

After breaking a hypothesis of the model, the big pig still has a chance to get the upper hand. Because the big pig and the little pig have different hunger tolerance, so the big pig has the ability to last longer. If the pig doesn't want to starve to death, there is only one way to bet: the tortoise and the rabbit race. I hope the big pig can take a nap and eat a bite or two when he comes back, otherwise he will really lose his wife and lose his soldiers. Accordingly, it is no longer difficult to explain why many people gnash their teeth at Tencent, follow the trend unscrupulously, do QQ whirlwind and clap their hands. Because the unwilling pigs have completed the early stage of new technology research and development, the big pigs only need to follow quietly and kick out a path at an appropriate time.

The backwardness of the big pig here is not in line with the shooter's game. The backwardness of the gunman is based on the fierce struggle of others, and the backwardness of the big pig is entirely based on its own strength. And the big pig doesn't have to take any radical measures at all, just follow. Because the condition for pigs to win is not proximity, but distance. A depressing game ending. A policeman and a thief each have only one chance to patrol or steal a place or b place. The value of land A is greater than that of land B, so the police should always protect land A in order to protect it. Game theory holds that of course not, and the reasonable strategy of the police should be to tend to patrol randomly with a certain probability. This probability is: the value of p =/the total value of ab. Only in this case can the thief's greatest chance of success be reduced to a minimum. But unfortunately, what the thief is looking for at this time is to maximize the minimum chance of success. In other words, the police's best strategy will improve the thief's worst strategy! This is the "minimum-maximum law" put forward by von Neumann.

We must thank this imperfect world again, because in reality, similar phenomena can still try to find the deadly routine of the opponent (of course, we must consider whether the other party is a more experienced hunter and deliberately releases the bait). And maintaining the disorder of one's actions may become a weapon of deception strategy, which is just like what Zhang Sanfeng said: If you have a move, you will win. After the European government spent huge sums of money to buy Concorde, it finally got stuck. Even if the prospect is bleak, I will throw it in the past with a face, and I will give up when I have no choice. At this time, the cost of investment is all in vain. If, when you find it impossible to continue, you dare to let go, the loss will be much smaller. But will they? Can they? How heroic it is for a strong man to break his wrist, but how difficult it is!

The sunk cost is likely to continue people's fearless persistence. People who have sunk should have given up, but unfortunately most of them have the psychology of gamblers, believing that Archimedes' lever will eventually start. It's a pity that they suffocated before they reached the fulcrum enough to pry the lever.

Concordia fallacy is actually a reason to give up halfway. Will anyone worry that its origin will affect some goals that should be adhered to? It is indeed possible, but we must believe that people are rational enough to compare the relationship between sunk cost, opportunity cost and future income. If you look at it clearly, you will definitely get out of the Concordia fallacy. A repeated game. The mechanism of centipede game is to return to the beginning with the final result. This is a wise strategy, karma, grasping karma, has its own good results. Another advantage of it is to make the future planning clear, so that you will no longer hesitate. Unfortunately, many times, we can't see through the eyes of puzzles. Our black eyes are only used to night.

There is also a fatal paradox in the centipede game, which is still the conflict between individual interests and collective interests, because the final betrayal is always superior to cooperation. Sadly, this betrayal will be due to human reasons, and the leap is just to visit and return to the original place: people will refuse to cooperate from the beginning. Let's thank this imperfect world. In fact, people rarely do this. Of course, there is little cooperation in the end, that is to say, the backward method only takes effect suddenly in the intermediate stage, but no one can predict where the intermediate step is. There, we only hope in trust, morality, conscience and so on. How do two children share the cake? Classic story, classic answer: choose one point. In reality, the rational distribution of rights will effectively promote fairness and efficiency. The separation of management rights and ownership rights really makes the economy more dynamic. However, the advanced model of cake sharing emphasizes bargaining strategy. The sharing of cakes is not one-off, but multiple rounds, and there is a cost: the cakes are melting.

The increase of time scale will complicate the distribution. If the two sides can't reach a deal in time, not only the collective income will decrease, but also the personal income will decrease. In this case, it will be extremely beneficial for one party to weigh the cost, threat and commitment with time. The customer may be forced by the situation and must end the negotiation as soon as possible. At this time, the seller is not in a hurry and deliberately delays, and the customer will compromise on the price.

Of course, clients also have policies. Its strategy is to shop around and ask for promises or threats. This premise is the existence of a buyer's market. Customers should also protect their bargaining power, that is, customers have the right to complain about businesses. Many people equate this game with eating chicken. But cockfighting is two aggressive individuals, while eagle pigeon is a game between two different groups, one is peaceful and the other is aggressive. In a corn field with only pigeons, the eagle who suddenly joins will benefit a lot and attract his companions to join. But the result is not that the eagles drive the pigeons out of the cornfield, but that there is a certain proportion, because the marginal income of adding an eagle to the eagle group tends to zero (infighting among the eagles), and equilibrium will come.

Thus, the stable strategy of ESS evolution appears, that is, once the equilibrium is formed, the deviated movement will be hit by natural selection. In other words, after the eagle is full, the eagle trying to join will be squeezed out by the eagle.

The greatest benefit of evolutionary stability and balance is to remain stable. But the problem is to form a strong path dependence, that is, the winner is not necessarily the best. Because the best will be beaten into early birds, this is a personal failure, a group victory, and a collective stagnation. Epiphany game. There were three people in the room and they didn't speak. Beauty came in and said, at least one of you has a dirty face. There were three people around, and there was no response. The beauty said again: Do you know? The three of them watched it again and suddenly realized that they were all red in the face. Why? Because of the beauty's nonsense, all three people know about the existence of dirty faces, and they must also know that the other side knows about the existence of dirty faces (because the other two faces are not red, which means they have seen dirty faces), and they know that the other side knows that they have thought of the previous step ... The cycle began, knowledge began to assimilate, and the truth came out: all three people were dirty and blushed.

This is the role of knowledgeable * * *, which is a bit scary and powerful. It's almost a legless trick, killing people without bloodshed. Before the table game, private calculation has killed the opponent. However, it is very likely that the other party also anticipated this, thought of it long ago and killed it at the same time. Finally, a double-death situation was formed.

Of course, although there are similar phenomena in reality, the greater role of knowledge is to reduce transaction costs. Because some rules are well known, both sides just have to act according to them. Naturally, information plays a very important role in the game. Restore the game theory to reality, people are no longer completely rational, information is asymmetric, and the game needs to strive to seize the information highland.

Information asymmetry is a big obstacle. The asymmetry of information will cause "adverse selection" and "moral hazard", the former is beforehand and the latter is afterwards. Information asymmetry will benefit one party in the short term, but it will eventually destroy the whole market. So there are two solutions. Induce opponents to reveal their real information in private. Is to give customers a magnifying glass to ensure that customers will not go to other counters. This strategy is obviously more effective, but it is also more risky: what if customers see their defects with a magnifying glass?