A single spark can start a prairie fire. Where does this sentence come from

Mao Zedong wrote, "A single spark can start a prairie fire."

1930 10. On 5 October, Mao Zedong wrote a letter to Lin Biao, commander of the first column of GongSiJun. When this letter was included in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, it was named "A single spark can start a prairie fire". The letter analyzes and criticizes the right-wing pessimistic thoughts of Lin Biao, the * * * Production Party and the Red Army. Combined with the reality of the development of the Red Army and China Revolution, starting from the basic characteristics of China society, this paper expounds the basic idea that China Revolution must persist in establishing rural revolutionary base areas and promote the climax of the national revolution with the development of the Red Army and rural revolutionary base areas, and points out the future of China Revolution. The letter said: "The establishment and development of the Red Army, guerrillas and red areas is the highest form of peasant struggle under the leadership of the proletariat in semi-colonial China and the inevitable result of the struggle and development of semi-colonial peasants; And it is undoubtedly the most important factor to promote the climax of the national revolution. " This letter further developed the idea of "armed separation of workers and peasants" and marked the basic formation of Mao Zedong's revolutionary theory of "encircling cities with rural areas and finally winning national victory".

This is a letter from Mao Zedong to Lin Biao. This is a reply to Lin Biao, asking for his opinion on how to estimate the future of the Red Army. In this letter, Mao Zedong criticized Lin Biao and some comrades in the Party for their pessimistic thoughts about the current situation. 1948, Lin Biao proposed to the Central Committee that his name should not be mentioned when this letter was published publicly. Mao Zedong agrees with this opinion. When this letter was included in the first edition of this book, it was renamed "A single spark can start a prairie fire", and the content of criticizing Lin Biao by name was deleted.

Some comrades in our party still lack a correct understanding of the current situation and the subsequent problems of our actions. Although they believe that the climax of the revolution is bound to come, they don't believe that it may come soon. Therefore, they are not in favor of the plan to win over Jiangxi, but only in favor of carrying out mobile warfare in the three border areas of Fujian, Guangdong and Jiangxi. At the same time, they have no profound concept of establishing a red regime in guerrilla areas, so they have no profound concept of promoting the climax of the national revolution by consolidating and expanding this red regime. They seem to think that it is futile to do this hard work of establishing political power in a period far from the climax of the revolution, but they hope to expand their political influence in a relatively light mobile guerrilla way. When the work of winning over the masses in all parts of the country is completed or reaches a certain level, a national armed uprising will occur. At that time, the strength of the Red Army will increase, which will become a national revolution. Their national theory of winning over the masses before establishing political power is not suitable for the reality of China revolution. Their theoretical source is mainly that they don't recognize that China is a semi-colony that many imperialist countries compete for each other. If we realize that China is a semi-colony in which many imperialist countries compete with each other, we will understand why only China in the world has this strange phenomenon of long-term infighting among the ruling classes, why the infighting is getting fiercer every day, and why there can never be a unified political power. Second, we will understand the seriousness of the peasant problem, so we will understand why the rural uprising has developed to such a national scale. Third, we will understand the correctness of the slogan of the workers' and peasants' democratic regime. Fourthly, we will understand another strange thing corresponding to the long-term infighting within the ruling class in China, that is, the existence and development of the Red Army and guerrillas, and the existence and development of a small red area that grew up in the surrounding white regime with the Red Army and guerrillas (there is no such strange thing outside China). Fifth, we will understand that the establishment and development of the Red Army, guerrillas and red areas is the highest form of peasant struggle under the leadership of the proletariat in semi-colonial China and the inevitable result of the struggle and development of semi-colonial peasants; And it is undoubtedly the most important factor to promote the climax of the national revolution. Sixth, we will understand that a simple mobile guerrilla policy can't accomplish the task of promoting the climax of the national revolution, but Zhu De's Mao Zedong-style and Fang Zhimin-style policies, which plan to establish political power and deepen the agrarian revolution, and develop people's armed forces through methods such as township red guards, district red guards brigades, county red guards (2), local red army and regular red army, are undoubtedly correct, and the development of political power is expanding in waves. Only in this way can we establish the belief of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, as the Soviet Union did to the whole world. Only in this way can we give great difficulties to the reactionary ruling class, shake its foundation and promote its internal decomposition. Only in this way can we truly create the Red Army and become the main tool of the great revolution in the future. In a word, this is necessary to promote the revolutionary climax.

Comrades suffering from revolutionary acute diseases unrealistically overestimate the subjective strength of the revolution and underestimate the counter-revolutionary strength. This estimate is mostly based on subjectivism. In this way, there is no doubt that we will embark on the road of blindness. On the other hand, if we underestimate the subjective strength of the revolution and overestimate the counter-revolutionary strength, this is also an unrealistic estimation, and on the other hand, it will inevitably produce bad results. Therefore, when judging the political situation in China, we need to know the following points:

(1) Although the subjective strength of the China revolution is weak, all organizations of the reactionary ruling class (political power, armed forces, political parties, etc.). ) The backward and fragile social and economic organizations in China are also very weak. In this way, it can be explained that although the subjective strength of the revolution in western European countries may be stronger than that in China, the strength of its reactionary ruling class is many times stronger than that in China, so it still cannot break out immediately. At present, the subjective strength of China's revolution is weak, but the counter-revolutionary strength is relatively weak, so China's revolution will reach its climax faster than that of Western Europe.

(2) 1927 After the failure of the revolution, the subjective power of the revolution was indeed greatly weakened. What little strength remains, if viewed only on the basis of certain phenomena, will naturally make comrades (comrades who hold this view) have pessimistic thoughts. But if you look at it in essence, it is very different. There is an old saying in China: "A single spark can start a prairie fire." In other words, although there is only a little power now, it will develop rapidly. In the environment of China, it not only has the possibility of development, but also has the inevitability of development, which has been fully proved in the May 30th Movement (4) and the subsequent Great Revolution. We must look at the essence of things and take the phenomenon as an introductory guide. As soon as we enter the door, we must grasp their essence. This is a reliable and scientific analysis method.

(3) The same is true of counter-revolutionary forces. We should not only look at the phenomenon, but also look at the essence. In the early days of the Hunan-Jiangxi border separatist regime, some comrades did believe the incorrect estimation of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee at that time and regarded class enemies as worthless. Today, the so-called "very shaken" and "panicked" are adjectives used by the Hunan Provincial Party Committee to evaluate the Hunan ruler Lv Diping at that time (1May-June, 928). Under this estimation, political blindness will inevitably occur. However, in the four months from November of the same year to February last year (before the outbreak of the Chiang Kai-shek War [6]), when the enemy came to Jinggangshan for the third time, some comrades asked, "How long has the red flag been played?" In fact, at that time, the struggle between Britain, the United States and Japan in China was very explicit, and the situation of Jiang Guifeng's melee had already taken shape. In essence, it is the time when the counter-revolutionary trend of thought began to fall back and the revolutionary trend of thought began to revive. But at that time, not only the Red Army and local party member had pessimistic thoughts, but even the Central Committee was inevitably confused by that superficial situation and took a pessimistic view. The letter from the Central Committee in February was evidence of pessimistic analysis within the Party at that time.

(4) The current objective situation is still easy to confuse comrades who only observe the current superficial phenomena without observing the essence. In particular, when we work in the Red Army, we are defeated, surrounded on all sides, or pursued by powerful enemies, and often unconsciously generalize and expand this temporary special small environment, as if the situation of the whole country and the world is not optimistic, and the prospect of revolutionary victory is quite slim. Therefore, there is such an observation of grasping the surface and abandoning the essence because they have not scientifically analyzed the essence of the overall situation. If you ask whether the revolutionary climax in China is coming soon, you can only make a decision by examining in detail whether the contradiction that caused the revolutionary climax has really developed. As the contradictions between imperialists, between imperialists and colonies, and between imperialists and their own proletariat have developed internationally, it is even more urgent for imperialists to compete for China. As soon as imperialism competed for China, the contradiction between imperialism and China as a whole, and the contradiction between imperialism and imperialism developed in China, which led to the contradiction between the reactionary rulers of China and China expanding and fierce melee. Along with the contradiction between reactionary rulers of various factions-warlord scuffle and increased taxes, the contradiction between taxpayers and reactionary rulers will intensify day by day. Accompanied by the contradiction between imperialism and China's national industry, the fact that China's national industry can't get concessions from imperialism has developed the contradiction between the China bourgeoisie and the China working class. Capitalists in China tried to squeeze workers to find a way out, while workers in China resisted. With the commodity aggression of imperialism, the denudation of commercial capital in China and the aggravation of government taxes, the contradiction between the landlord class and farmers has deepened, that is, the exploitation of land rent and usury has become more serious, and farmers have become more hostile to landlords. Due to the oppression of foreign goods, the exhaustion of the purchasing power of workers and peasants and the aggravation of government taxes, domestic businessmen and independent producers are increasingly on the road of bankruptcy. Because the reactionary government has sent more troops indefinitely under the condition of insufficient wages, as a result, the war is getting more and more day by day, and soldiers and the masses are often in a difficult environment. As the country's taxes are getting heavier and heavier, landlords' land rent is getting more and more, and the disaster of war is getting bigger and bigger, famine and bandits have been caused all over the country, and the vast number of farmers and urban poor have embarked on the road of survival. Many students are worried about dropping out of school because they have no money to start school; Due to backward production, many graduates have no employment prospects. Knowing these contradictions, we can know what kind of situation and chaos China is in. You will know how the revolutionary upsurge against imperialism, warlords and landlords is inevitable and coming soon. China is full of dry wood, which is about to burn into a big fire. The phrase "a single spark can start a prairie fire" aptly describes the development of the current situation. Just look at the development of workers' strikes, peasants' riots, soldiers' mutinies and students' strikes in many places, and you will know that this "single spark" is undoubtedly not far from the period of "starting a prairie fire".

The general idea of the above words was already in the letter from the former Committee to the Central Committee on April 5 last year. The letter said: "This letter from the Central Committee (February 7 last year) is too pessimistic about the objective situation and subjective forces. The Kuomintang "suppressed" Jinggangshan (⑼) three times, which represented the climax of counter-revolution. However, so far, the counter-revolutionary trend of thought has gradually declined and the revolutionary trend of thought has gradually increased. Although the party's combat effectiveness and organizational strength are as weak as the central authorities say, under the situation that the counter-revolutionary tendency is gradually declining, the party's combat effectiveness and organizational strength will soon be restored, and the negative attitude of party cadres will soon be eliminated. The masses will certainly turn to us. Slaughterism (10) is to drive the fish out of the abyss, and reformism can no longer attract the masses. The people's illusions about the Kuomintang must be quickly shattered. In the future, neither party can compete with the producers of * * * for the masses. ⑾ The political line and organizational line pointed out by the Sixth Party Congress are correct: the present stage of revolution is democracy, not socialism, and the party's current task is to win over the masses, not to riot immediately. However, the revolution will develop rapidly, so we should take a positive attitude in the propaganda and preparation of armed riots. In the current chaotic situation, only positive slogans and positive attitudes can lead the masses. Under this positive attitude, the recovery of the party's combat effectiveness is also inevitable. ..... proletarian leadership is the only key to the victory of the revolution. Establishing the proletarian foundation of the party and establishing industrial branches in the central region are the important organizational tasks of the party at present; But at the same time, the development of rural struggle, the establishment of red political power in small areas, the establishment and expansion of the Red Army, especially the main conditions to help urban struggle and promote the revolutionary wave. Therefore, it is wrong to give up urban struggle; However, we are afraid of the development of farmers' strength, and think that farmers' strength will surpass workers' strength, which is not conducive to the revolution. If there is such an opinion in party member, we think it is also wrong. Because of the revolution in semi-colonial China, only the peasant struggle failed, without the leadership of the workers, and no peasant struggle developed beyond the strength of the workers to the detriment of the revolution itself. "This letter has the following reply to the question of the Red Army's operational strategy:" The Central Committee asked us to divide the team into small groups and disperse them to the countryside. Zhu and Mao left the team and hid the big goal, with the aim of preserving the Red Army and mobilizing the masses. This is an unrealistic idea. 1in the winter of 927, we planned to act independently by company or battalion, disperse in the countryside, mobilize the masses, and use guerrilla tactics to avoid the target, but it failed many times. Because: (1) Most of the main Red Army are not locals, which is different from the origin of the local Red Guards. (2) Small leaders are imperfect, unable to cope with the harsh environment and prone to failure. (3) Easily divided by the enemy. (4) The worse the environment, the more concentrated the team must be, and the more determined the leaders must be, so as to unite internally and deal with the enemy. Only in a good environment can we divide our forces and fight guerrilla warfare, and leaders are not inseparable as in a bad environment. "

The disadvantage of this passage is that all the reasons given for not splitting troops are negative, which is not enough. The positive reason for the concentration of troops is that only by concentration can we destroy bigger enemies and occupy towns. Only by destroying the larger enemies and occupying the towns can the people be widely mobilized and the political power of several counties be established. Only in this way can we stir up the far and near audio-visual (so-called expanding political influence) and promote the actual effect of the revolutionary climax. For example, the Hunan-Jiangxi border regime launched the year before last, and the Minxi regime launched last year (⑿) were all the results of this centralized policy. This is a general principle. As for dividing the army, right? There are also some. In the letter to the Central Committee, the Front Committee talked about the guerrilla tactics of the Red Army, including short-range division of troops: "The tactics we gained in the three-year struggle are really different from those of ancient and modern China and foreign countries. With our tactics, the mass struggle is expanding day by day, and we can't help any powerful enemy. Our tactics are guerrilla tactics. The main point is:' divide troops and mobilize the masses and concentrate on dealing with the enemy.' "The enemy advances and I retreat; The enemy is stationed, and I am disturbing; The enemy is tired and I fight; When the enemy retreats, I will chase. " The fixed regional system [13] adopts the wave-like promotion policy. Strong enemies follow the pursuit and adopt the strategy of turning around. "A short time, a good method, and a large crowd. This tactic is like weaving a net, which should be opened and closed at any time. Opening is to win over the masses, and closing is to deal with the enemy. This tactic has been used for three years. "

The so-called "opening" here refers to the short-distance division of troops. For example, when Yunghsin just laid the Hunan-Jiangxi border, the 29th and 31st regiments were separated in Yunghsin. Another example is that when Yunghsin was captured for the third time, 28 regiments went to Anfu border, 29 regiments went to Lianhua, and 3 1 regiments went to Ji 'an border. Another example is that in April and May last year, the counties in southern Jiangxi divided their troops, and in July, the counties in western Fujian divided their troops. As for dividing troops in different places, it is only possible under two conditions: a better environment and a sound leading group. Because the purpose of dividing troops is to win over the masses, deepen the agrarian revolution and establish political power, and expand the Red Army and local armed forces. If these goals cannot be achieved, or if the strength of the Red Army is weakened by the division of troops, as in the Hunan-Jiangxi border division in Chenzhou last August, it is better not to divide troops. If the above two conditions are met, there is no doubt that we should divide our troops, because under these two conditions, decentralization is more beneficial than centralization.

The spirit of the letter from the Central Committee in February was not good, and this letter had a bad influence on some comrades in the Fourth Army Party. At that time, there was a notice from the Central Committee, and the battle between Chiang Kai-shek and Gui might not break out. But since then, the central estimates and instructions are generally correct. The Central Committee has issued a notice to correct this estimation error. Although this letter of the Red Army was not corrected, the subsequent instructions did not have this pessimistic tone, and our views on the Red Army's actions were consistent with ours. However, the bad influence of the letter from the Central Committee on some comrades still exists. So I think it is necessary to explain this problem at present.

The plan to fight for Jiangxi for one year was also put forward by the former Committee to the Central Committee in April last year, and it was later decided by everyone. The reason pointed out at that time was: "Jiang Guijun is approaching each other in Jiujiang area, and the outbreak of war is just around the corner. The resumption of mass struggle, coupled with the expansion of contradictions within reactionary rule, may make the revolutionary climax come soon. In this situation, we feel that the military strength of the comprador landlords of Guangdong, Guangxi and Guangxi in several southern provinces is too great, and Hunan has lost almost everyone inside and outside the party because of the reckless mistakes of the party. Fujian, Jiangxi and Zhejiang provinces are another situation. First, the enemy forces in the three provinces are the weakest. There are only several provincial defense forces of Jiang Bocheng in Zhejiang [14]. Although there are fourteen regiments in the fifth department of Fujian, the Guo ⒂ brigade has been broken; Chen Lu [16] is a bandit army with low fighting capacity; The two brigades of the Marine Corps have never fought in the coastal areas before, and their combat effectiveness will not be great; Only can we play better, but according to the analysis of Fujian Provincial Party Committee, only Zhang's two regiments have stronger fighting capacity. And Fujian is now in a state of complete chaos and disunity. Jiangxi Zhu Peide ⒅, Xiong Shihui tricked two * * * with sixteen regiments, which were better than Fujian and Zhejiang, but much worse than Hunan. Second, there are fewer putschism mistakes in the three provinces. We don't know much about it except the situation in Zhejiang. Jiangxi and Fujian provinces have a better foundation between the Party and the masses than Hunan. On the basis of Jiangxi, De 'an, Xiushui and Tonggu in the north of Jiangxi still have a considerable foundation. Jianggang, Yongxin, Lianhua and Suichuan in Jiangxi, as well as the forces of the Party and the Red Guards. Gannan has greater hope, and the second and fourth regiments of the Red Army in Ji 'an, Yongfeng and Xingguo counties are developing day by day. The Red Army in Fang Zhimin has not been wiped out. This has created a situation of encircling Nanchang. We suggest that the Central Committee, during the long-term war of Kuomintang warlords, strive for Jiangxi with Chiang Kai-shek and Guangxi, and at the same time cover western Fujian and western Zhejiang. Expand the number of the Red Army in the three provinces, causing the masses to become independent, and complete this plan within one year. "

What I said above about fighting for Jiangxi is wrong in setting a one-year time limit. As for fighting for Jiangxi, in addition to Jiangxi's own conditions, it also includes the conditions for the upcoming national revolutionary climax. Because if you don't believe that the revolutionary climax is coming, you will never get the conclusion that you will fight for Jiangxi for a year. The disadvantage of this proposal is that it should not be set at one year. Therefore, the so-called "coming" that affects the upcoming revolutionary climax is bound to be accompanied by some impatience. As for the subjective and objective conditions in Jiangxi, it is very noteworthy. In addition to the subjective conditions mentioned in the letter to the Central Committee, we can now clearly point out three objective conditions: first, Jiangxi's economy is mainly feudal, the commercial bourgeoisie is less powerful, and the landlord's armed forces are weaker than any other province in the south. Second, there is no army in Jiangxi province, and troops from other provinces have always been stationed here. Foreign troops "suppress * * *" and "suppress bandits" are not familiar with the situation, nor are they as close as provincial troops, and they are often not very enthusiastic. Third, far from the influence of imperialism, it is no closer to Hong Kong than Guangdong, and almost everything is dominated by Britain. Understanding these three points can explain why rural uprisings in Jiangxi are more common than any other province, and there are more Red Army guerrillas than any other province.

How to explain the word "fast" when the so-called revolutionary climax is coming is a common question for many comrades. Marxists are not fortune tellers. We should and can only give a general direction to the future development and change, and we should not and cannot set the time mechanically. However, when I say that the climax of the China revolution is coming, it is by no means an empty thing that has no action significance at all, just beyond my power, as some people say "the possibility of coming". It was a ship standing on the coast overlooking the sea, and the tip of the mast could already be seen. This is a brilliant sunrise standing on the top of a high mountain, looking at the east. It is a mature baby restless in its mother's womb.

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Injection and release

[1] Fang Zhimin (1899- 1935), a native of Yiyang, Jiangxi, was the main founder of the revolutionary base area in northeast Jiangxi and the 10th Army of the Red Army. 1922 joined the China socialist youth league, 1924 joined the China * * * production party. Added as the Sixth Central Committee Member of China * * * Production Party. 1928 1 month, farmers in Yiyang and Hengfeng of Jiangxi Province held an armed uprising. 1928 to 1933, the peasants who led the uprising persisted in guerrilla warfare, carried out agrarian revolution, established red political power, gradually expanded rural revolutionary base areas to northeast Jiangxi, northern Fujian, southern Anhui and western Zhejiang, and developed local guerrillas into regular Red Army. 1934 1 1 month, led the 10th Army Corps of the Red Army to March into southern Anhui, and continued to carry out the northward task of the anti-Japanese advance team. 1935 1 month, was arrested in the battle with the Kuomintang army. In August of the same year, he died heroically in Nanchang.

[2] See this volume "Why can the red regime in China exist? Note [9].

[3] The "subjective revolutionary forces" mentioned here refer to organized revolutionary forces.

[4] See Note [9] of the Analysis of Social Classes in China.

Lu Diping (1887- 1935) was born in Ningxiang, Hunan. 1928 Chairman of the Kuomintang Hunan Provincial Government.

6. Refers to the war between Chiang Kai-shek and Guangxi warlords Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi in March and April of 1929.

7.1July, 928 to1month, the Kuomintang troops in Jiangxi and Hunan provinces failed to "suppress" the Jinggangshan revolutionary base twice, and from the end of the same year to the beginning of 1929, they mobilized six brigades from Hunan and Jiangxi provinces to launch the third "suppression" on the Jinggangshan revolutionary base. Mao Zedong and others carefully studied the plan to smash the enemy's "suppression" and decided that the main force of the Red Fourth Army would turn to the exterior line to fight the enemy, and a part of the Red Fourth Army would cooperate with Wu Gongjun to stay in Jinggangshan. The Red Army opened revolutionary base areas in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, and the Jinggangshan revolutionary base area once occupied by the enemy was also restored and developed.

[8] It refers to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's letter to the Front Enemy Committee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army on February 7, 1929. The letter from the Front Enemy Committee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army to the Central Committee on April 5, 1929, which is quoted in this paper, is roughly extracted as follows, mainly about the estimation of the situation at that time and the action strategy of the Red Army. The opinions put forward by the Central Committee in this letter are inappropriate, so the Front Committee put forward different opinions in its letter to the Central Committee.

[9] refers to the third "social suppression" of the Jinggangshan revolutionary base area by Kuomintang troops in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces.

[10] refers to the counter-revolutionary forces confronting the people's revolutionary forces by means of bloody slaughter.

[1 1] the sixth national congress of the China * * * production party was held in Moscow from June 1928 to July 1 1. At the meeting, Qu Qiubai made a report on the China Revolution and the * * * Production Party, Zhou Enlai made a report on organizational issues and military issues, and Liu Bocheng made a supplementary report on military issues. The meeting adopted resolutions on politics, Soviet regime organization, land, farmers and other issues and draft military work. The Congress affirmed that China was still a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, and China's revolution at that time was still a bourgeois-democratic revolution. It is pointed out that the political situation at that time was between two climaxes, the revolutionary development was unbalanced, and the general task of the party at that time was not to attack, but to win over the masses. While criticizing right opportunism, the meeting especially pointed out that the main dangerous tendencies within the party at that time were blindness, military adventurism and commandism. The main aspects of this congress are correct, but there are also shortcomings and mistakes. Lack of correct estimation and appropriate policies for the duality of the middle class and the internal contradictions of the reactionary forces; There is also a lack of necessary understanding of the orderly retreat of the party's strategy after the failure of the Great Revolution, the importance of rural base areas, and the protracted nature of the democratic revolution.

[12] refers to the democratic regime of workers and peasants in Changting, Longyan, Yongding and Shanghang counties in western Fujian. It was a newly opened revolutionary base when the main force of the Fourth Army of the Red Army left Jinggangshan and entered Fujian in 1929.

[13] "Fixed regional separatist regime" refers to a relatively solid revolutionary base established by the Red Army of Workers and Peasants.

[14] Jiang Bocheng was then the commander of the Kuomintang Zhejiang Provincial Defence Force.

[15] Guo Zhiguo, the brigade commander of the second Huncheng Brigade temporarily compiled by the Kuomintang Fujian Provincial Defence Force.

[16] Chen Lu refers to Fujian bandits Chen Guohui and Lu Xingbang, whose troops were incorporated by the Kuomintang government in 1926.

[17] Zhang zhen was then the commander of the first division of the Kuomintang army.

[18] Zhu Peide (1889- 1937) was born in Yanxing, Yunnan (now Lufeng County). At that time, he was the chairman of the Kuomintang Jiangxi provincial government.

Xiong Shihui (1893- 1974) was born in Anyi, Jiangxi. At that time, he was a member of the Kuomintang Jiangxi provincial government and the fifth division commander.