How to organize logistical support during the Red Army’s Long March

Logistics support is the general term for the military’s organization and implementation of various professional service support such as material supply, medical rescue, equipment maintenance, and transportation. The first thing the Red Army has to solve in the Long March is the problem of survival. Therefore, the most prominent logistical work in the Red Army's Long March is the raising of food and other materials. However, this important issue has rarely been systematically studied in the academic community. In recent years, there have been many articles about the Long March, but most of them focus on research from macro perspectives such as military and political aspects. The relevant situations of raising food and other materials during the Long March are mostly written down in personal recollections or memoirs, and there are few dedicated chapters. This article attempts to make some useful discussions on the characteristics of the Red Army's logistical support during the Long March, the difficulties it faced, and the strategies to solve them, in order to gain a more superficial understanding of this very important but complicated task.

1. Characteristics of logistics support work during the Long March

When the Central Red Army was in the Soviet area, the number of the Red Army had reached 100,000. In addition to the enemy's economic blockade and natural disasters, food, etc. Material supplies are already tight, but after all, there are still base areas to rely on. The logistics support work after leaving the base area is very different in terms of organization establishment, work ideas, material sources, etc., which are mainly reflected in the following aspects:

From the perspective of organization establishment, logistics work It has always been one of the most important tasks during the Red Army's Long March. Before the Long March began, the logistics support work such as food supply and material reserves in the Central Soviet Area was mainly undertaken by the People's Economic Commission, the Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance. After the Long March began, all logistics departments and the then central government agencies were organized into one column - the Central Column, also known as the "Red Badge" Column, with more than 10,000 people in total. The General Supply Department and the Confiscation and Expropriation Committees at all levels were also established to be fully responsible for the Red Army's logistics support work. Lin Boqu serves as the director of the Confiscation and Expropriation Committee and the director of the General Supply Department. In addition, the Logistics Section of the Central Military Commission was incorporated into the First Column Preliminary Command of the Central Military Commission. Its main task is to serve the leading comrades of the Central Military Commission and perform logistics work for the Central Military Commission column. After the Zunyi Conference, the troops were downsized. The General Political Department decided to abolish the confiscation committees at all levels and instead set up confiscation and collection departments under the local work departments of the political ministries at all levels to be responsible for guiding and planning confiscation and collection work. Lin Boqu is still responsible for this aspect of work, especially the confiscation and collection work of the Military Commission column is still directly responsible for him. Although all the logistics departments were mixed into one column, which did not appear to be very obvious, the formation pattern of the logistics departments following the central government clearly showed that the central government attached great importance to the logistics support work in the Long March from the beginning. As the Red Army's supplies, especially food, became increasingly scarce in the later period, logistics work became even more critical to the Red Army's life and death, to the point where the entire army had to raise food and provide logistical support. It is also a last resort choice.

The changes in logistics work thinking during the Red Army’s Long March. Examining the logistics work of the Red Army during the Long March, its thinking has undergone a major transformation process, that is, from the initial all-round "big move"-style passive support method to the random supplementary active support method. According to Luo Tong's recollection, in the early days, the central column was a "big move" of offices and factories, with teams of mules and horses, stretcher teams, and porters, carrying those who carried them, those who carried them, those who carried them, and those who carried them. At that time, the central leaders wanted to take away printing presses, sewing machines, lathes, planers, and acting props, including "pots, jars, baskets, baskets, and baskets." There were eight lifts and ten picks in the long queue, and there were 4,000 picks alone. . Such a team can only be passively beaten in the face of the enemy's pursuit and interception. After paying a heavy price, as the central leaders changed after the Zunyi Conference, the logistics support ideas were quickly adjusted, that is, except for some important materials such as grain, all other important materials were thrown away. This greatly increases the mobility of the march, and the support method changes from passive to more flexible and diverse.

2. Difficulties faced by logistics during the Long March

Difficulties caused by the contradiction between marching mobility and material reserves and the deviation in the guiding ideology of the Red Army's material preparation before the Long March. The Red Army's strategic shift can only be completed during continuous marches, so what to take with you when you set off, what not to take, what to take with you more, and what to take less are all related to the overall situation and are extremely important. The "Left" erroneous leaders positioned this strategic shift as a "big move" before the Long March. Therefore, when the central government decided to carry out the strategic shift, the material focus was on the preparation of weapons, ammunition and other materials, and even some arsenals and printing plants. , money printing machines, etc. are all ready to be moved.

As for the most important material - food, although I have purchased some, I am generally prepared to eat it wherever I go. As a result, food reserves were insufficient. This "moving" strategic shift caused the troops to bring many things that were difficult to carry and cannot be used, which greatly affected the mobility of the march. Originally, there was a contradiction between marching mobility and material reserves. Under the guiding ideology of this "big move", this contradiction became more prominent and affected the carrying of more important materials, which undoubtedly increased the need for these materials during the Long March. Difficulty in raising funds. In the later period, after the Red Army lost many "pots and jars", although the contradiction between the two was somewhat alleviated, in order to maintain the mobility and flexibility of the army, the amount of food and other materials carried by the Red Army still needed to be controlled within a certain limit. Sometimes some food had to be abandoned in order to carry more important supplies.

Leaving the base area makes it more difficult to raise supplies. The Red Army still had a base in the Soviet area to rely on. After the Long March began, the Red Army, which lost its base, could only take a detour in the face of the encirclement and interception of the Kuomintang troops. The Long March passed through 11 provinces of Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Sichuan, Kangxi, Gansu, and Shaanxi, and crossed thousands of rivers and mountains such as the Wuling Mountains, the Xiangjiang River, the Wujiang River, the Jinsha River, the Dadu River, and snow-capped mountains and grasslands. Many of these places are remote areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. Many of these areas have a poor mass base and are not rich in products. In addition, the Kuomintang's constant reactionary propaganda has also increased the difficulty of raising materials for the Red Army.

3. Countermeasures to solve difficulties during the Long March

According to the changed situation, timely formulate correct and reasonable methods for raising materials, and strive to win the sympathy and support of the broad masses of the people. On October 21, 1934, the Central Red Army broke through the enemy's first blockade between Anyuan and Xinfeng in Jiangxi Province, crossed Zhangshui, and entered northern Guangdong. Because you can no longer use Soviet banknotes to buy things in the White Zone, the day after passing Zhangshui, Li Fuchun, acting director of the General Political Department, issued the "Interim Detailed Rules for the Confiscation of Contributions" based on the manuscript drafted by the Confiscation and Collection Committee, proposing: All units should During the operation in the white area, the soldiers, especially the party and league members, should be mobilized to investigate landlords, rich peasants and reactionaries near the garrison, and conduct confiscation work. The confiscated money, military supplies, materials, etc. should be concentrated in the regiment supply office and handed over to the Prohibition Committee; The distribution of rice, clothes, daily utensils, etc. shall be based on principles stipulated by the No. Committee. "The Supply Department shall be responsible for the distribution to the troops and the masses in consultation with the Political Department (special attention shall be paid to the distribution to the local people)." The detailed rules also stipulate: “In cities newly occupied by our army, all confiscation, requisition, donation, etc. work shall be carried out centrally and uniformly by the highest political organ of the troops entering the city and its confiscation committee. Each unit shall not conduct it alone to avoid unorganized activities. Chaos." On January 23, 1935, Lin Boqu, in the name of the director of the General Confiscation Committee, and Li Fuchun, director of the Red Star Political Department, jointly issued a notice on the "Measures for the Use of Confiscated Materials by All Troops", which stipulated that: Millet should be used for all purposes. There is no price, and each unit collects it as needed; each person is given six cents for vegetables per day; salt, oil, and foreign oil are halved according to the market price; a whole piece of cloth is priced at one-third of the market price.

Adopt correct ethnic policies and win the support of ethnic minority people and revolutionary masses. When the Red Army passed through the Miao and Zhuang inhabited areas, it attached great importance to ethnic policies in the work of confiscating and collecting grain. As acting director of the General Political Department of the Red Army, Li Fuchun personally issued the "Instructions on Paying Attention to Relations with the Miao People and Strengthening Discipline Inspection." Lin Boqu also often educates soldiers and cadres: "We are a revolutionary team and we defend the working people and ethnic minorities. We can only attack local tyrants and cannot harm the working people and ethnic minorities. Only in this way can we gain the support and support of the people." . ”

All front armies fully carried forward the spirit of unity, friendship and mutual cooperation to overcome difficulties together. Although Zhang Guotao, the leader of the Fourth Front Army, tried to split the Red Army and created great disharmony, the commanders and soldiers of the First and Fourth Front Army composed a triumphant song of unity, friendship and mutual cooperation. Marshal Xu Qianqian recalled: In order to welcome the Central Red Army, the Fourth Red Army at that time was vigorously raising various items prepared for the Central Red Army. "The climate of the northwest plateau is subject to change, with warm days and cold nights. We need to raise more wool and sheepskins to make sweaters, wool socks, and leather vests. According to the experience of our army's Western Expedition, cooking utensils are easy to lose, there are not enough cooks, and the troops often cannot cook meals. , directly affects marching and combat. It is estimated that the first army in the transition will encounter the same difficulties, so I propose to draw a group of cooks from each army, bring food, salt, and cooking utensils, and join forces with the 88th Division. After that, they immediately replenished the front army and solved the problem of eating first.

...In some important places, the general manager's department has set up grain stations to store grain. Some grain stations have accumulated more than two million kilograms. There was an extreme shortage of salt, so each army organized some people to go to the mountains to select stones and boil salt (there are white stones that can be used to boil salt). Officers and soldiers generally know how to make straw sandals, and also learn to cut leather clothes, tear wool, twist wool, and make sweaters, wool vests, and wool socks. From the front to the rear, from the headquarters to the company, from the local government to the people, everyone is busy welcoming the Central Red Army. The atmosphere is warm and tense, which is very touching. "In order to help the Fourth Front Army implement the decision of the Lianghekou Conference and solve the problem of reunification of the two armies, the Central Military Commission decided on June 29 to be composed of Chief of General Staff Liu Bocheng, Acting Director of the General Political Department Li Fuchun, and Chief of Logistics Lin Boqu The condolence group went to the headquarters of the Fourth Front Army to express condolences. Through various contacts with the Supply Department, Depot Department, Finance Committee, Grain and Fodder Department, Munitions Department, Ninth Army Supply Department and the Sichuan-Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee, they learned about the Fourth Front Army in detail. He also sent a telegram to the First Front Army and the 30th Army of the Fourth Front Army stationed in Zhuokeji, asking them to further analyze the organization, staffing, cash supplies and food deposits of the Front Army. Raising 300,000 kilograms of grain to supplement the shortage of food for the Fourth Front Army. It is this unity and cooperation that greatly enhances the determination and confidence of the Red Army soldiers to overcome all difficulties and obstacles.