Why is there so much oil in the Middle East?

1. First of all, you have forgotten one of the most important things, that is, the leaders in the Middle East have a good impression of Germany. Starting from Turkey, the master of Asia Minor, to the Arabian Peninsula, they have remained neutral. In fact, they have nothing to do with the Nazis. , what are you going to fight?

So, from a geographical point of view, the Nazis’ attempt to take over the Middle East was not about facing off against the British defenders in the Middle East, but about opening up the so-called “oil channel”: the Balkans-Mediterranean Sea-eastern North Africa-Asia Minor-the Middle East. "This is completely impossible. In the middle of the El Alamein War, Germany's tank forces began to run out of fuel on a large scale. Therefore, if we work backwards, if Germany wants to complete the armored forces that consume more fuel this time. Expedition, secondly, the Soviet Union and Germany were already in a stalemate at that time, and Germany had no way to divide its troops and go on an expedition. If Germany did this, the red flag would have been planted in Berlin in 1944. It was impossible in terms of hard conditions, let alone There is the question of sea rights in the Mediterranean.

2. The proven reserves in the Middle East became the center of global oil resources, probably after 1950. In the era of Mustache, the only proven large oil fields in the Middle East were in Iran, that is, Persia. oilfield. Let’s take a step back. Even if Germany received aid from aliens, he really opened the oil channel. How can he transport it out? In the end, you still have to take the Suez Canal, which is the British army in Egypt. This actually still does not get rid of North Africa. A nutritionless war of attrition on the battlefield. . . What's more, there is also the issue of sea power in the Mediterranean (the issue of sea power has been painful for thousands of years). Just look at how the German army's Mediterranean supply lines were harassed in the middle and late stages of the North African battlefield. . . .

Second, why did the Nazis not win the Middle East under their strategic planning?

1. The Soviet Union’s war progress was unfavorable. It originally planned to capture Georgia, the Caucasus region, and the Baku Oilfield as the first strategic node to enter the Soviet Union. In fact, the rhythm of the entire Caucasus expedition became very bumpy due to the terrible resistance of the Soviet Red Army, and it completely went downhill by 1942. The second stage of supplies brought by the oil resources of the Caucasus was unsuccessful. The original plan to join forces south of the Caucasus had become a joke at this time. The German offensive had been clamped down by the Red Army, and a major counterattack was also brewing. After all, the national strength of Hans Cat cannot swallow the size of a woolly bear

2. Tactically speaking, in the German plan 42 years ago, there was indeed a plan to conquer the Middle East, but This plan is different from the question's "simply turning the gun around." It was originally expected that Rommel in North Africa would fight with the Germans in the Caucasus after capturing Egypt. In fact, this is a paradox, because if you give troops to Rommel, the strength of the German army fighting in the Soviet Union will be weakened, and if Rommel does not receive reinforcements, the lovely Italian allies will annihilate the entire North African colonies (including Libya and Ethiopia). If it is lost, Hitler can't expect the Vichy French army in Algeria to regain the lost ground. And the longer the front, the more difficult it is to provide logistics.

Strategically speaking, continuing the old concept from World War I was obviously inconsistent with the new international situation in 1942.

The new situation in 1942 was a life-and-death fight between the global industrial countries after the United States entered the war, mixed with a lot of nationalist spirit. This was completely different from the colonial wars in the past. In the overall strategic situation, the struggle for dimensions gave way to the highest level of human fighting and the stage where high technology emerges endlessly. Politics began to give way to war, and the game of policy transformed into a battle of comprehensive national strength.

In the first half of 1942, there was still room for maneuver on this issue. It received full support from the German navy’s maritime power and the air force also provided support. In the good times after that, the problem did not lie in shipping. It was the poor infrastructure in Africa that made the land transportation and supply lines fragile and unbearable. One of the biggest mistakes of the German army was not using airborne troops to capture Malta in one go. This was a real strategic node, but the Allies saved it.

As for the book. . He did have plans to enter the Middle East from South Asia, but he was blocked by Niu Niu's army, and the supply lines on the South Asia road and the Indian Ocean maritime supply lines could not meet the requirements of the expedition. . . The only hypothesis that can be hypothesized is that if Benzi knew that there were large oil fields in Daqing, the battle for resources in Southeast Asia would not be so painful, but he would still have to die. . The problem with this book is that I never realize the limitations of my abilities.

Actually, just one sentence: The Middle East only became the world's major oil producing area after the 1950s.

If you play Hearts of Iron, you will know that there was not much oil in the Middle East during World War II.